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ABSTRACT 
 
Shanzhai Online Videos in China: Governance and Resistance through Media. 
(August 2011) 
Xi Cui, B.A., Beijing Broadcasting Institute; 
M.A., Communication University of China 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Antonio C. La Pastina 
                            Dr. Cara Wallis 
 
This dissertation explores the production, circulation, and regulation of Shanzhai 
online videos in order to understand how people’s everyday lives are governed and how 
the governing power is resisted through the media system in contemporary China. 
This research is situated in the specific socio-cultural and historical context 
where Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) have proliferated among 
various social strata, where the media are both the propagandistic mouthpiece and a 
profit-oriented industry, and where people are encouraged to pursue their life goals 
under a neoliberal rationality that is pervasive in media. 
I use a Foucauldian framework to examine the power modalities and power 
relationships manifested in the Shanzhai practices. I argue that both disciplinary power 
and the power of governmentality are found in this cultural practice. It is through the 
production, circulation and regulation of Shanzhai videos that power is exercised on 
different parties involved in this process as governance and resistance. 
 iv
This power relationship, I argue, is explicated through a ritualistic view of the 
reality presented in the trans-media, trans-genre narratives that people internalize in 
order to develop specific ways of using media to pursue their life goals. Meanwhile, 
people also employ various strategies to negotiate for resources to achieve these goals. 
In these negotiations, power relationships manifested themselves as their actions upon 
each other. Ordinary people are disciplined through patterned uses of media to live their 
lives and governed by a neoliberal mentality to pursue their life projects on the Internet. 
However, there is more than one set of discourses with a claim to the “truth” about 
Shanzhai in Chinese media. Thus, people are also empowered to take advantage of this 
discrepancy to gain symbolic as well as material favors. 
This study examined a nuanced and dialectic power relationship in contemporary 
Chinese society. First, it is found that people are both empowered and subjected to the 
ways they use media to pursue personal goals. Second, the resistance in the Shanzhai 
practices not only brought them symbolic power as much previous literature suggests, 
but also material resources such as media access and sponsorship. Last, the holistic view 
of the media system helps us situate Shanzhai online videos in the convergent media 
environment and draw a better picture of the web of power relationships.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Shanzhai (山寨), translated as copycatting by Google, ranked the first among the 
top 10 searched words in this search engine in 2008. China Radio International 
explained Shanzhai as “literally refer[ing] to the mountain strongholds of bandits. First 
borrowed to describe rip-off products, it has evolved to also referring to homemade 
products, such as video parodies of movies” (Y. Han, 2009). It has penetrated to various 
aspects of Chinese everyday life ranging from cell phones to clothes, from fast food 
brands to celebrity imitators, from grassroots holiday celebrations to amateur video 
parodies on the Internet. 
Some say it is a sign of the liveliness and creativeness of grassroots culture, but 
some bemoan its lack of originality and possible copyright infringement. On December 
2, 2008, one of the most important news outlets, Xinwen Lianbo of China Central 
Television (CCTV), made a two-minute-long report on Shanzhai, covering everything 
from cell phones to Shanzhai culture.1 The coverage in the official media invited further 
discussion in the popular press and cyberspace regarding Shanzhai practices. Three 
weeks later, the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpiece People’s Daily commented on 
Shanzhai for the first time. It published an article in the column called “Culture 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of the journal of Human Communication 
1
 Since mid-2008, there have been multiple reports in China’s news media on the Shanzhai cell phones. 
These reports are followed by blog posts, discussions in BBS and foreign media reports (Wallis & Qiu, in 
press). The Xinwen Lianbo report is the first one that commented on Shanzhai culture, in addition to 
Shanzhai cell phones. 
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Observation,” arguing two potential paths for Shanzhai culture. One would be producing 
“cultural junk” if Shanzhai solely concentrates on creating fun from imitation or on 
plagiarism, and the other path is toward “the cultural journey of folk wisdom” if 
Shanzhai goes beyond imitation and takes on innovation (F. Li & Zhang, 2008). The 
People’s Daily published multiple commentaries on Shanzhai in the two months 
following. In March 2009 during the congressional session, Ni Ping, a famous television 
hostess, proposed to “Renounce the Shanzhai Culture and Support the Original Works” 
(Ni, 2009), which generated great controversy regarding the development of grassroots 
culture. At the same time, multiple famous Shanzhai online videos and cultural events 
were circulating and being tracked in various news outlets. Since then, Shanzhai became 
a prominent social topic and a cultural phenomenon. Netizens, media, scholars, as well 
as policy makers, all joined the clamorous social drama, both discursively and in actions. 
Thus, Shanzhai is not only a locus of expressions of different social groups, but also a 
struggle for construction, transformation, and reinforcement of the social structure 
through cultural production. In this sense, Shanzhai cultural productions become an ideal 
empirical site to examine the ways in which different social groups interact with each 
other, in and through China’s media system. 
By examining Shanzhai, this study will try to answer the questions regarding the 
governance and resistance of expressions through media in contemporary Chinese 
society. Specifically, I will argue that the processes of Shanzhai production, circulation, 
and regulation reflect the different modalities of social control that co-exist in 
contemporary China. In the case of Shanzhai, the power dynamics among different 
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social groups manifest themselves in the control over and struggle for expressions 
through specific uses of media. I will examine the cultural significance of some media 
representations, and their convergence, which Shanzhai videos imitated, the strategies 
employed by different parties involved in Shanzhai, and the discursive contestation of 
Shanzhai cultural production. In this way, we can better understand how the modes of 
social control are transformed and carried out through the consumption and user-led 
production of media in China. 
In this chapter, I will first sensitize the readers to the concept of Shanzhai with a 
brief historical review. Then I will introduce the framework which I will use to examine 
and discuss the relationship between Shanzhai and Chinese society. Last, I will preview 
each of the following chapters. 
A Brief Introduction of Shanzhai 
Before being used by lay people, Shanzhai was a professional jargon in a limited 
circle in the Canton area and had a much longer history than most people know. The 
word Shanzhai was first used in Hong Kong in the 1970s (Lüqiu, 2009). It literally 
means mountain village. From the early half of the 20th century through the late 70s, the 
Lion Rock area, a hill in Hong Kong, had been a very poor community. Many small, ill-
equipped workshops with low-paid laborers were located in that area. However, many of 
these workshops succeeded in their businesses through the owners’ and workers’ hard 
work. The Lion Rock spirit is seen as one of the most important reasons for Hong Kong 
to have thrived in the world economy since the 1970s. Shanzhai factories used to refer to 
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those small workshops in Lion Rock (Y. Xu, 2009). The connotation was that they were 
poorly equipped, producing low-end, low-tech products with low-paid labor.  
Imitation was not part of the connotation of Shanzhai until more recently when 
the term began to be used in the Canton area in southeast China. Following the opening 
and reform policy,2 the first special economic zone of China was established in 
Shenzhen in 1978 when it was still a small fishing village adjacent to Hong Kong. Many 
factories, especially Other Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) factories, were attracted to 
Shenzhen because of its preferential policies and cheap labor. Among the products of 
those factories, there have been knock-off cell phones as early as the late 1990s. 
However, most of the early knock-off cell phones were made with recycled parts of the 
copied model. The use of the word “Shanzhai” was largely limited to insiders in the 
industry (Z. Xu, 2009). It was not until 2003, when a Taiwan-based Integrated Circuit 
(IC) design company, Media Tek (MTK), developed a set of cheap cell phone chips that 
Shanzhai cell phones started flooding into markets and became popular (Wallis & Qiu, 
in press). It is around this time when the word Shanzhai started to be publicly used in the 
cell phone markets, among consumers, and was reported by the media. Figure 1.1 shows 
two examples of Shanzhai knock-off phones. The one on the left is an imitation of 
Blackberry, branded as BlockBerry. Its logo is also designed to be confused with 
BlackBerry’s. The Shanzhai iPhone on the right is branded HiPhone with a logo of an 
orange, in contrast to an apple. 
                                                 
2
 The Opening and Reform (Gaige Kaifang) Policy was implemented in December 1978 on the Third 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the Eleventh National Congress of CCP, led by the reformist leaders 
such as Deng Xiaoping. It is seen as a major turning point of China’s political and economic agenda after 
the Cultural Revolution. Since then, China started to shift its concentration from class struggle to 
economic construction, and to take a pragmatic approach on political and socio-economic problems. 
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What makes the concept of Shanzhai popular is not only the cheap knock-off cell 
phones, but also the brand and design imitations, as well as pastiches of brands and 
designs, in a variety of other consumer goods in China ranging from fast food to 
electronics, from architecture to vehicle designs. Some Shanzhai products, such as cell 
phones, also include different features that were not available in the original designs, 
such as a Ferrari car design, an external lens for a cell phone’s embedded camera, an 
embedded lighter, etc. By early 2008, though imitation seemed to be a more important 
indicator of Shanzhai products since the designs they imitated were dominantly 
            
 
Figure 1.1. Examples of Shanzhai Cell Phones. The photo on the left is an 
advertisement of a Shanzhai cell phone branded as “BlockBerry” to imitate 
“BlackBerry” (Haff-Comm, 2009). The photo on the right is an imitation of 
the iPhone, and named HiPhone (Keifer, 2010). 
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transnational brands’ high-end products, the original connotation of Shanzhai as poorly 
made, inferior technologies persisted in the popular perceptions about Shanzhai.  
More recently, the Shanzhai practices have penetrated into cultural spheres. For 
example, since 2008, amateurs’ imitations of various popular television shows appeared 
on the Internet and circulated widely in China. They were not necessarily named as the 
Shanzhai version of the imitated shows by the producers themselves; however, when 
netizens shared this content, they tended to label each production as the Shanzhai 
version of the original show. Three prominent cases of this type are the Shanzhai 
Chunwan (Spring Festival Gala hosted by CCTV on every Lunar New Year’s eve, 
hereafter, the Gala), Shanzhai Baijia Jiangtan (Lecterns for a hundred schools of 
thoughts, a show of CCTV, hereafter, the Lecture Show), and Shanzhai Honglou Meng 
(Dream of Red Mansions, a classic novel which was adapted into TV drama in 1987 by 
CCTV, hereafter, the Red Mansions). They circulated widely on the Internet in China. 
The producers of these three series of videos did not necessarily share the same 
motivations, and they were caught in different webs of relationships among government 
administrators, commercial sponsors, traditional mass media, and audiences. However, 
the videos are all labeled Shanzhai mainly because of their apparent imitation and 
reference to the popular original television shows, and also because their production was 
all done outside of the established institutions and, at least at the beginning, and usually 
poorly made compared with professional standards. This study is based my in-depth 
examination of these three cases. 
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From mid-2008 when these Shanzhai cases became well known, a connotation of 
resistance to the established powerful institutions became more evident in the word 
Shanzhai. This contemporary use of Shanzhai, connoting resistance or rebellion, is 
coupled with its use in a Chinese classic novel, Shuihu Zhuan (The Water Margin), 
written in the 14th Century. The novel tells a story about peasants establishing their own 
armed force and authority in a remote mountain area, and fighting against the Song 
Dynasty. But at the end, the rebels were enlisted by the royal court into its army. 
Shanzhai, in this novel, refers to the mountain village where the peasant rebels withstood 
the royal court. Thus, by labeling cultural practices as Shanzhai, the connotation of 
resistance is conferred onto it. Sometimes, online discussions also parallel concerns 
about Shanzhai being assimilated into the mainstream with the failure of the peasants’ 
revolt in Shuihu Zhuan. 
These connotations are important because, as readers will see in my later 
analysis, they are the discursive resource for different social groups to construct 
Shanzhai under their control or struggle for cultural expressions. The uses of these 
discursive resources of Shanzhai both reflect different groups’ positions in the social 
structure as well as their cultural/ideological orientations in the global system. These 
uses also contribute to the political struggle and to the reshaping of power dynamics 
within Chinese society. 
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Three Shanzhai Cases 
Case one: Shanzhai Honglou Meng 
Honglou Meng, also translated as The Dream of the Red Mansions, The Dream of 
the Red Chamber, and The Story of the Stone, is one of the four classic masterpiece 
novels in China. The first 80 chapters, the major part of this work, were written in the 
18th Century by the novelist Cao Xueqin during the Qing Dynasty. The novel provides a 
detailed, episodic record of the two extended families of the wealthy and aristocratic Jia 
clan, the Rongguo House and the Ningguo House, who reside in two large, adjacent 
family compounds in the capital. This work covers various aspects of the life in that era 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Photos of the 1987 CCTV Version of the Red Mansions (left) and the 
Shanzhai Red Mansions (right). The photo on the left is from I Love the Red 
Mansions (Wuaihonglou, 2008) and the one on the right is from Jiefang Daily 
(2008) 
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so extensively and in such detail that a scholarly field, Redology,3 was developed and 
devoted exclusively to the study of it. This work was adapted into a television series in 
1987 by CCTV (Figure 1.2, left)4. At that time, when television sets started to become 
popular in Chinese families but entertainment was still scarce, this TV drama became 
part of the collective memory among a generation of Chinese. 
Twenty years after the first television adaptation of the Red Mansions by CCTV, 
in 2008, Beijing Television Station announced their plan of remaking the Red Mansions. 
Along with the preparation for shooting, a nation-wide reality show to choose major 
characters for the remake was carried out in different regions in China. This reality show 
started with American-Idol-style public auditions nationwide. The final round of this 
show was broadcast live by Beijing Television and drew extensive attention from 
viewers and other media. 
Amidst this renewed zest for the Red Mansions, Chen Weishi, a young college 
student in Chongqing city, shot an amateur video of a scene in the Red Mansions during 
the family reunion on Spring Festival holiday (Figure 1.2, right). All the actors were his 
relatives. The video was shot in the living room and bedroom of his family’s condo and 
with very simple props such as using bed sheets as actors’ clothes. A series of video was 
first put online in February 2009, right after the Spring Festival when it was shot. There 
are four clips so far and each lasts from 4 to 9 minutes. It became very popular after it 
                                                 
3
 Redology (红学) is a scholarly field that is devoted to the study of the Dream of the Red Mansions, one 
of the four classic novels of China. The topics range from literary critiques to the studies of food or 
clothing in Qing Dynasty through this novel. 
4
 The CCTV version of the Dream of Red Mansions released in 1987 was very popular among Chinese 
television viewers. Along with the television adaptation of the other Chinese classic novels, the Romance 
of the Three Kingdom (Sanguo Yanyi), the Journey to the West (Xi You Ji), and Water Margin (Shuihu 
Zhuan). It was seen as the evidences of the revival of popular culture in China (Keane, 2002, 2005). 
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was posted online, where discussion of it also took place. It is called the Shanzhai 
Honglou Meng (Red Mansions) and widely circulated. One of the characteristics of this 
case is that, unlike other popular Shanzhai videos, the family crew planned to continue 
shooting episodes during future family reunions, and their operation has not involved 
any commercial or government intervention. However, after gaining popularity, the 
family did get much publicity. They were visited by a famous Chinese television drama 
director who was working for Beijing Television Station on the remake of the Red 
Mansions. I will explicate the relationships among the actor-selecting reality show for 
the remaking of Red Mansions, the online DIY video Chen’s family made as a 
participation in the media world, and the family’s celebrity. I will argue that the 
Shanzhai Red Mansions video exemplifies the mentality of self-motivated democratic 
participation in cultural expressions through media, a way to govern the society at a 
distance. Meanwhile, I will contrast it with other cases in order to understand the 
spectrum of different Shanzhai practices. 
Case two: Shanzhai Baijia Jiangtan 
Baijia Jiangtan, literally translated as Lecterns for a hundred schools of thought, 
is a daily half-hour show on CCTV’s Science and Education Channel (CCTV-10). This 
show is broadcast at noon on weekdays and has been popular since its start in July 2001. 
It invites scholars to give a series of lectures on topics like arts and history. The lectures 
are given in very accessible ways with visual aids added by editors later. The word 
Baijia, or a hundred schools of thought, was used in ancient literature to refer to the co-
existence and contestation of many different schools of thought during the Chunqiu 
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(770-476 BCE) and Zhanguo (475-221 BCE) eras. Thinkers of various schools during 
those periods, including Taoists, Confucians, Legalists, Mohists, etc., enjoyed relatively 
free conversations, what is called Baijia Zhengming, or “a hundred schools of thought 
contend.” More recently, the principle of Baijia Zhengming, Baihua Qifang, or “let a 
hundred schools of thought strive” and “let a hundred flowers blossom,” respectively, 
was adopted as the guideline of socialist literatures and arts by Mao in the 1950s (Hong, 
1994). The “double-hundred approach” (Shuangbai Fangzhen) in literature and arts was 
echoed by the Rectification Movement (Zhengfeng Yundong) in 1957 that encouraged 
the democratic parties to critique and offer advice about the Communist Party’s policies. 
However, in the latter part of 1957, seeing many radical comments and harsh criticism 
on the Party’s policies from democratic parties and intellectuals, the Party’s Central 
Committee saw these as threats and started an anti-Rightwing Movement that led to the 
political persecution of many outspoken compatriots. In 1978, under the leadership of 
Hu Yaobang, then the general secretary of the Communist Party of China, the Party 
admitted the exaggeration of the anti-Rightist movement and corrected the wrongs done 
to many cadres during the anti-Rightist movement. The “double-hundred approach” has 
been reiterated since then by succeeding generations of leadership in China. Until now, it 
is still a rhetorical device to demonstrate the openness and livelihood of literature and 
arts in China.  
Han Jiangxue, a 33-year-old unemployed young man in Beijing, loves studying 
Chinese history. He spent three years writing a book of 600,000 Chinese characters on 
the Song Dynasty (960-1279). Han tried to recommend himself to the Baijia Jiangtan 
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(the Lecture Show, hereafter) twice, and gave the editors his manuscripts. However, he 
was declined for the lack of a legitimate title or published works. After being rejected, in 
June 2008, Han shot a 6-hour-long lecture video on the Song Dynasty with the help of 
some friends. After adding visual aids and sound effects, he put the 11-episode lecture 
online. It attracted more than ten thousand views every day after it was promoted on the 
home page of Sina Video (the video sharing service of a major Internet portal in China). 
This video was named From the Jingkang Humiliation to the Fengbo Pavilion by Han 
himself. However, Han and his works were widely reported, commented upon, and 
shared with the label of “Shanzhai Baijia Jiangtan”. Figure 1.3 includes the screen shots 
of CCTV’s Lecture Show and Han’s video.  
Case three: Shanzhai Chunwan 
Chunwan (the Gala hereafter) is the abbreviation of the Spring Festival Eve Gala 
in Chinese. It has been hosted by CCTV since 1983 and has almost become a media 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Photos of the CCTV Lecture Show (left) and the Shanzhai Lecture 
Show (right). The photo of CCTV’s Lecture Show is from Jia Wang (2008). The 
photo of the Shanzhai Lecture Show is from Chen (2009). 
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ritual for Chinese people (W. Zhou, 2005). However, CCTV’s Gala has received more 
and more criticism every year for its lack of change, less appealing performances, and 
obvious ideological hype. 
Shi Mengqi (Lao Meng, or Old Meng, as most people call him), from Chongqing 
in southwest China, works in Beijing as a wedding cameraman. In 2008, he wanted to 
organize a Spring Festival Gala with the help of netizens for the migrant workers who 
couldn’t go home during the holidays. He set up a website, stuck a banner saying 
“Shanzhai Gala” on his van, and wanted to select programs from among grassroots 
performers in an office far from downtown Beijing. His idea was quickly reported by 
media and drew Internet users’ attention. A provincial television station in southwest 
China and a video sharing website agreed to broadcast his show on the 2009 Lunar New 
Year’s eve. However, because the extensive media coverage raised the government’s 
fear of massive grassroots enthusiasm to participate, the government prohibited the 
television station and the website from broadcasting the show. The recording of the 2009 
Shanzhai Gala was only broadcast by a satellite channel based in Macau, which had very 
limited viewership on the mainland. 
 In 2010, Lao Meng organized the second Shanzhai Gala with his staff and 
sponsors. It was better produced, and apparently more commercialized. More 
importantly, it was broadcast by various websites in China with the government’s 
approval. However, Lao Meng was ordered to drop the word Shanzhai and use “folk” 
instead in the show (J. Yang, 2010). Figure 1.4 are the snapshots of CCTV’s Gala (left) 
and Lao Meng’s Shanzhai Gala (right). 
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This case puts two spins on the understanding of Shanzhai. First, Lao Meng, as a 
migrant worker in Beijing, wanted to make a grassroots spring festival for millions of 
migrant workers like him. This group of people has a marginalized social status 
compared with urban Internet users in China. Secondly, the Shanzhai Gala was both 
censored by the government’s cultural administration in fear of mass enthusiasm for 
grassroots participation, and was simultaneously pursued by commercial enterprises as a 
viral advertisement opportunity. The two productions showed a trajectory from a 
grassroots, spontaneous and resistant attempt of cultural production to a more docile, 
commercialized, and assimilated one, though there were still struggles in the 
commercialization process. 
These three cases all drew extensive media coverage during the course of their 
production and viral circulation. Exposure in the traditional mass media as well as 
conspicuous positions in major Internet portals greatly influenced their development, 
  
 
Figure 1.4. Photos of the CCTV Gala (left) and the Shanzhai Gala (right). 
The photo of the CCTV Gala is from XinminNews (2010) and that of the Shanzhai 
Gala is from QQ (2010). 
 15
such as drawing commercial sponsorship, public figures’ comments, public debates, and 
even government interventions. Media not only reported these cases, but were also 
deeply involved in and greatly influenced the trajectories of their development. Later, 
there were also other imitators who “Shanzhai-ed” these Shanzhai productions, which 
further illustrated the nature of this unique type of cultural production. 
Theoretical Frame 
In studying Shanzhai culture, I actually intend to explicate contemporary Chinese 
society from a unique perspective. Shanzhai is the entry point for me, because, first, the 
production, circulation, and regulation of Shanzhai involve different parties, ranging 
from grassroots producers, official media, commercial media, commercial sponsors, and 
government regulators, etc. The strategies and actions of these players toward each other 
form a web of a power relationship that is unique to China. Second, the roles of media 
and ICTs are complex and sometimes schizophrenic both as ideological apparatus and 
industrial sectors, as mouthpieces indoctrinating the people, and economic drives 
catering to the people. Third, the opening up and reform since 1978 has led to many 
structural changes in Chinese society, from rural-to-urban migration to the simultaneous 
growth of wealth and a wealth gap. Shanzhai is a microcosm of the power dynamics 
manifested in the practices regarding different types of media in these current social, 
economic, cultural, and historical conditions. Thus, to study the power relationships 
among different social groups in Shanzhai practices, I propose to use a Foucauldian 
framework to understand Shanzhai as the site of governance and resistance through 
media. 
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Disciplinary power, panopticon and governmentality 
Michel Foucault’s works concentrate on the issue of power in modern societies. 
He understands power as “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in 
which they operate and which constitute their own organization” (Foucault, 1990, p. 92). 
Thus, power has to be found in the process of struggle, in the form of chains or 
disjunctions, as the strategies that are possible for people to carry out in their actions. 
Because power is inherently relational, and because it not only exists in but also 
simultaneously configures relations, it is the “how” rather than “what” and “why” that is 
the fundamental question on power (Foucault, 1982). Foucault suggests that the term 
“conduct” helps illustrate the specificity of power relations because, the verb “conduct”, 
translated from the French word conduire, has the meanings of both “to lead” and “to 
behave” (Foucault, 1982, p. 789). The duality of “to lead” and “to behave” shows that 
power relationships form in “an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those 
which may arise in the present or the future” (p.789). 
It is my intention to study the relationships among the different parties involved 
in Shanzhai production, circulation, and regulation, or the exercise of power in 
Foucault’s words, in order to understand the governance and resistance of the people 
through media in China. The production, circulation, and regulation in Shanzhai are 
ceaseless processes of actions which are responses to as well as conditions of other 
actions. 
Foucault also argues that power is not necessarily repressive, but rather 
productive. Power produces knowledge, disciplines, and human subjects. In Discipline 
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and Punishment (Foucault, 1979), he refers to Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon as a 
metaphor of the modality of productive power to produce the “docile body” (Foucault, 
1984, p. 179). Bentham’s Panopticon is a semi-circular prison with a guard tower at the 
center. Prisoners’ cells are built to form a semi-circular arch facing the tower. The cells 
are lit up to increase inmates’ visibility to the guard, while the visibility of the guard is 
eliminated by blinds. In this way, the guard can always see the inmates without being 
seen, and the inmates have to assume that they are under surveillance at any moment. 
This internalized constant gaze is a process of soul training to align people’s behaviors 
to the norms. This, Foucault argues, “substitute[s]  for force or other violent constraints 
the gentle efficiency of total surveillance, of ordering space according to the recent 
humanization of the codes” (Foucault, 1984, p. 217) . More importantly, the process of 
soul training is invisible and is exerted through the subjects’ internalization of the norms. 
Thus, while the subjects practice according to the internalized norm, they are also 
reproducing it. Foucault uses panopticism to refer to a modality of power, the 
disciplinary power. The Panopticon becomes the archetype of closed social 
organizations, materialized in total institutions such as schools, hospitals, and prisons. 
More broadly, this paradigm is “endemic to modern society” and “a major social process 
constituting modernity” (Giddens, 1985 in Lyon, 2007, p.14). 
In his later work, Foucault started to concentrate on governmentality as a 
modality of power. As I mentioned previously, Foucault argues that power is the 
“multiplicity of force relations” that can only be studied in the exercise of it. The 
relationships of subjects under disciplinary power are formed in a closed environment 
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such as penitentiary prisons; thus, the norms are prescribed, pronounced, and 
internalized. Disciplinary power in an enclosure is a specific “mold” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 
4) of actions upon actions. Governmentality, as Foucault argues, is a different modality 
of power in modern societies. “‘[G]overnment’ did not refer only to political structures 
or to the management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of 
individuals or of groups might be directed” (Foucault, 1982, p. 790). In other words, 
“[t]o govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others,” (p. 790) 
or to govern with a specific mentality.  
In this way, Foucault’s theory on power grants more agency to human subjects in 
societies and meanwhile subjects humans to governance at a distance.  In this power 
modality, there are a variety of possibilities of actions that are opened up for subjects 
under a certain logic of calculation. The precondition for individuals to use the rational 
calculations to configure their actions, or the way power exerts on individuals, is 
freedom. Meanwhile, freedom also implies resistance in the form of “the recalcitrance of 
the will and the intransigence of freedom” (Foucault, 1982, p. 790). Power and 
freedom’s refusal to submit to it exist in “a relationship which is at the same time 
reciprocal incitation and struggle” or “agonism” (p. 790). 
Foucault’s governmentality focuses on the governance of the state in modern 
societies. Similar to the modality of disciplinary power where subjects internalize the 
norm, in the modality of governmentality, people internalize certain rationality and ethic 
codes to direct their actions (N. Rose, 1992), or what Deleuze calls the “modulation” in 
contrast to the disciplinary power as a “mold” (Deleuze, 1992, p. 4).  Foucault argues 
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that the rationality underlying this modality of power, or the “art of government” 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 89), is used by states to improve the prosperity, security, and well-
being for both the states and the individuals. In advanced liberal societies, the wellbeing 
of social, political, and economic existences should be ensured by “the ‘enterprising’ 
activities and choices of autonomous entities- businesses, organizations, persons- each 
striving to maximize its own advantage by inventing and promoting new projects by 
means of individual and local calculations of strategies and tactics, costs and benefits” 
(N. Rose, 1992, p. 145). In this context, personal freedom and liberal democracy become 
what Foucault calls the “technologies of the self” that “permit individuals to effect by 
their own means or with the help of others a certain numbers of operations on their own 
bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in 
order to attain a certain state happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” 
(Foucault, 1988, p. 18). 
The relationship between citizens and societies in the proliferation of neoliberal 
mentality has been discussed in various contexts. Deleuze (1992) argues the “societies of 
control” which rely on governmentality are replacing the “disciplinary societies” which 
feature internalized gazes and enclosed institutions. The new power modality of the 
“free-floating control” in developed countries has relegated the production of products 
with raw materials to the Third World, while, itself, concentrates on providing service 
and buying stocks. The societies of control work on the “capitalism of higher-order 
production” (p. 6). However, this dichotomous view of the disciplinary societies and the 
societies of control, of the developed world and the developing world, is too rigid. 
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Scholars have argued that situations are much more complex in terms of governance in 
modern societies, especially in the non-Western context (Ong, 2006; Ong & Zhang, 
2008; Sigley, 2006; Wallis, 2008). In China, although there is an evident expansion of 
the governance at a distance, the disciplinary modality and even authoritarian 
domination have not diminished. The power to the self-regulation is introduced to East 
and Southeast Asian countries as an exception to their postcolonial, authoritarian, or 
post-socialist governance. Meanwhile, there are also exceptions to neoliberalism to 
structurally disfranchise certain groups of people from the chances of social mobility and 
self-improvement (Ong, 2006). However, Wallis (2008) in her study of rural-to-urban 
migrant workers in China showed that different modalities of power are exercised on this 
marginalized group of people simultaneously. The Chinese Party-state, in promoting the 
socialist market economy, rather than transforming itself linearly to the neoliberal 
governance with a retreat of itself, actually regroups itself to promote a situated 
governmentality in the non-Western authoritarian context. 
Using the Foucauldian framework to examine Shanzhai helps me understand the 
governance and resistance through media in the contemporary Chinese society. First, 
with the government’s resolution to develop the economy and an increasing global 
influence on urban culture, the neoliberal mentality has great impact on the way ordinary 
Chinese people live their everyday lives. Second, the involvement of grassroots people, 
government agencies, commercial, official, and even overseas media, and business 
sponsors in the Shanzhai practices can reveal a more complex web of power 
relationships beyond that among citizens, corporations, and the state.  
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 However, as Lyon (2007) argues, Foucault didn’t mention the role of mass 
media in his analysis of the exercise of power in modern societies. As I will demonstrate 
in the following chapters, Shanzhai exists in the convergence of various media. The 
media not only report the development, but also contribute to the formation of this 
cultural phenomenon. Oftentimes, the actions of Shanzhai producers, sponsors, as well 
as government regulators upon each other are taken toward media or in the spotlights of 
media. To a large extent, the governance and resistance in the Shanzhai cases are 
manifested through media. Thus, in the following, I will also introduce the concepts of 
synopticon and assemblages into my theoretical framework.  
Synopticon and media 
One of the critiques of Foucault’s lack of recognition of mass media is Thomas 
Mathiesen’s The viewer society: Michel Foucault’s ‘Panopticon’ revisited (Mathiesen, 
1997). Mathiesen raised the concept of synopticon where the many watch the few and 
compared it to the panopticon where the few watched the many. He sees synopticon as a 
symbolic display and confirmation of power which invites admiration. Mathiesen first 
paralleled the development of mass press in 1700-1800, or the synoptic conditions, to 
Foucault’s analysis of the rise of the panopticon. Thus, rather than a fundamental 
transformation from the public display of physical punishment to the panoptic discipline 
as Foucault argued, Mathiesen argued that the spectacle where the many watched the 
few actually persisted. He also argued that the spectacle, from its ancient origin, has 
emphasized the “maximum diffusion from a few leading figures of visual impressions, 
sound impressions and other impressions” (Mathiesen, 1997, p. 222) of important people 
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or symbols. Only in the modern society, especially in the 1900s, the spectacles are more 
and more mediated under new organizational and technological conditions. This 
perspective is very much in line with media scholar Nick Couldry’s critique of the 
“media world” and media power which argues that the mediated images for “the many” 
have tremendous cultural power (Couldry, 2003b). More importantly and relevant to my 
argument is that, historically, panopticism and synopticism have been involved in 
“intimate interaction, even fusion, with each other” (Mathiesen, 1997, pp. 223, original 
emphasis). 
Mathiesen’s arguments give great attention to the media’s role in modern society 
and put the power relationship in the mediated synopticons to the foreground. Like the 
highly visible location of cathedrals and the events of military leaders victoriously 
entering the city, synoptic moments shape people’s experience of panopticon through the 
mechanism of scopophilia, a concept borrowed from psychoanalysis referring to “a love 
of looking that is characteristic of a particular stage of childhood development vital to 
our ability to see ourselves as others see us” (Lyon, 2006, p. 28). Norman Denzin (1995) 
used the metaphor of cinema to illustrate the internalization of the “voyeur’s gaze” and 
exercise of surveillance over themselves in the modern society. Through the mass media 
system, surveillance is normalized and de-stigmatized, and even rewarded, like the stars 
in all kinds of reality shows. Audience/performers see being seen, mainly in media 
nowadays, as gratifying and an important part of their identity formations, while media 
also take efforts to “cast people who have a natural openness” (Andrejevic, 2004, p. 
106). 
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Here I need to clarify the differences between my uses of synopticons and 
panopticons in this study and Foucault’s original uses. First, the difference between 
Foucault’s public spectacle in ancient times and Mathiesen’s synopticon on which I 
draw in my arguments is that Foucault’s spectacle is to single out and humiliate the 
deviants violating the norm, while Mathiesen’s synopticon, especially in its modern 
mediated form, picks up both deviants, such as the crime reality shows, and the highly 
“normal,” or the models, for public display. Second, Foucault uses panopticon as a 
metaphor of modern institutions that force people to internalize surveillance and behave 
in disciplined ways to avoid being seen. However, I use panopticon as a metaphor of the 
current media system which, many times, rewards the people being seen with celebrity 
and status. Thus, rather than designed to single out deviants and possibly apply 
punishment (negative reinforcement) in Foucault’s original use, the panopticons of 
media today, such as reality shows, online viral circulation, or even news reports, often 
single out model citizens, grant celebrity and status, and thus, are rather a positive 
reinforcement of social norms and certain rationality and is usually desired and 
competed for. However, in Foucault’s uses of panopticon, Mathiesen’s uses of 
synopticon, and my uses of both of them in this study, we agree on the function of social 
sorting of the surveillance system. Lyon (2003) argues that the surveillance systems have 
criteria to follow. They sort the monitored objects and single out either deviants to 
punish or models to reward. Foucault calls this sorting standard “a law of truth on him 
[object] which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him” (Foucault, 
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1982, p. 781). This sorting mechanism, as I will demonstrate in later chapters, exercises 
power on Shanzhai producers and their production. 
These characteristics of synopticon and its interaction with panopticon have 
explanatory power on the Shanzhai cultural phenomenon. The Shanzhai producers, in 
their everyday media consumption, are not only monitoring the spectacles of CCTV’s 
Spring Festival Gala celebration, the ways unknown intellectuals gained celebrity status 
and expressions in the Lecture Show, and the “democratic” opportunities for grassroots 
people to express themselves on the Internet, but they also internalize the connections 
between a Spring Festival gala and holiday celebration, between an unknown speaker of 
a TV lecture show and celebrity, and between a random video on the Internet made by 
some ordinary person and its viral popularity. The synoptic spectacles instill into 
people’s minds the logics that become the rationality underlying people’s everyday lives. 
Meanwhile, these Shanzhai producers, as well as many ordinary media audiences, also 
want to be seen in media like the previous successful examples they witnessed. Thus, the 
media synopticons are not only cultivating a certain rationality, but also motivate people 
to act in certain ways. Audiences, such as reality show applicants and also Shanzhai 
producers, constantly assume that the media, like a panopticon, are watching them, and 
they constantly try to perform in the way that draws media’s gazes. In this way, the 
combination of media synopticon and panopticon actually governs the way some people 
express themselves, or more broadly the way these people live their everyday lives, from 
a distance through the governmentality embedded in it. 
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However, there are also a few points in Mathiesen’s arguments that are not 
satisfactory. First, just like the example of cathedrals and military leaders’ victoriously 
entering cities, the power of church or the military leader, put in the synopticon to fit 
their status, is taken for granted. It is as if their power to be admired has been there 
before the creation of the synopticon. The role of media synopticons that grant power to 
the media personas is not critically examined. Especially in the Web 2.0 age, when many 
people could potentially enter the media world and become a media person in viral 
sensations, this power should not be taken for granted, but should be attributed partly to 
the social construction which itself greatly relies on media. This complicated social 
construction/competition of Shanzhai producers’ images as media personas will be 
critically examined in my study. 
Secondly, in his examination of the combination of panopticon and synopticon, 
Mathiesen assumed a monolithic power structure that operates the two elements in the 
surveillance system. Haggerty and Ericson (2000) argued that Foucault focused too 
much on the state as the agent of surveillance while, instead, both state and non-state 
institutions are involved in massive efforts to monitor different populations. In the same 
vein, the invisible gaze exercising the panoptic surveillance in order to pick out the 
model “inmate” for synoptic display should not be assumed as consistent or without 
internal conflict. The simplified view doesn’t work well for the Chinese media system, 
as I will summarize later. 
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Assemblage and rhizomatic surveillance 
The problem of the single and monopolistic surveillance agency is partly solved 
by Haggerty and Ericson’s application (2000) of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of 
assemblages (1987) in surveillance and social control. Deleuze and Guattari introduced 
the notion of assemblage as an ontological view. Assemblages consist of a “multiplicity 
of heterogeneous objects, whose unity comes solely from the fact that these items 
function together, that they ‘work’ together as a functional entity” (Patton, 1994, p. 158). 
Deleuze and Guattari propose seeing the assemblage as the ontological foundation of the 
postmodern society. However, when Haggerty and Ericson borrowed this notion to 
theorize the surveillance in the informational post-modern society, they concentrated on 
the totalizing potential of the networked surveillance more than the internal tensions and 
chances of changes. Under this view, the surveillance technologies are becoming 
rhizomatically connected in assemblages, rather than hierarchical in the centralized 
surveillance systems. The elements in the surveillance system that were seen as discrete 
are now seen as inter-connected in networks. This tendency suggests increasingly 
inclusionary strategies in social surveillance. Nothing can easily escape from being 
monitored. When the object is picked up by one of the nodes in the assemblage, its data 
are also available for sharing because of the interconnectedness in the assemblages. 
“From now on, such matters [the invisible armada and elusive activist] will be readily 
captured by a surveillant assemblage devoted to the disappearance of disappearance” 
(Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, p. 620). 
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Bogard (2006) attempted to correct the pessimistic view of the totalizing 
surveillance assemblage. On the one hand, he admits that the increasingly inclusionary 
assemblages transform the hierarchies in traditional observations and put both formerly 
powerful and formerly marginalized subjects under surveillance. The democratized 
surveillance “means more ways to observe the observers, bypass their firewalls [that 
protect secrets], access their databases and decode their communications” (p. 102) . On 
the other hand, he utilized Deleuze and Guatarri’s concept of “lines of flight” and 
Foucault’s dialectic view on power and resistance to argue that the assemblage is 
constantly transformed by the lines of flight which it tries to capture. 
To theorize these dual dimensions of the assemblages, Deleuze and Guattari 
defined a horizontal axis and vertical axis. The horizontal axis contains two segments, 
content and expression. “On the one hand it is a machinic assemblage of bodies, of 
actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on the other 
hand it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of incorporeal 
transformations attributed to bodies” (1987, p. 504). Under this view, panopticon and 
synopticon are machinic assemblages that work by “enclosing and partitioning space, 
segregating bodies, or again, by connecting them together into larger functional 
ensembles, coordinating their collective flows, and so on” (Bogard, 2006, p. 104).  
Meanwhile, they are also enunciative because they attribute properties to bodies, and 
they announce “truth” or “norm,” which exerts the sorting function. Thus, to examine 
surveillance assemblages, both what they do and what they say, are important.  
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The vertical axis of an assemblage consists of “territorial sides, or 
reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and cutting edges of deterritorialization, which 
carry it away” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 504). In terms of surveillance assemblages, 
their territorializing work is “to trap or capture lines of flight, arrest flows and convert 
them into reproducible events;” in other words, they determine the connections or 
disconnections between flows (Bogard, 2006, p. 107).  At the same time, on the vertical 
axis, assemblages also have edges of de-territorialization. The lines of flights running in 
the assemblages both resist the surveillance assemblage and are parts of it. The “indocile 
bodies that won’t behave, or ungovernable words whose meanings are hidden or will not 
stay fixed” are “lines of flight immanent to rhizomatic surveillance that take advantage 
of the decentralized, non-hierarchical nature of information network.” (p. 108) The 
flights refer to the transformation of assemblages as the effect of their own organization. 
In other words, the assemblage flees itself. 
The radically expanded horizon of surveillance, as assemblages, is both more 
totalitarian and more democratic. On the one hand, now, this view cautions us against 
viewing Foucault’s panopticon as a one-way power relationship. “[T]he panopticon’s 
power derives precisely, as Foucault says, from its unverifiability…it eludes being seen 
and recorded by its own tools. It resists being converted into a verifiable event, even 
while its façade remains visible,” (Bogard, 2006, p. 109). But now it is hard for any 
subject to escape from an omnipresent and inter-connected surveillance system, 
including the guards on the tower of the panopticon. On the other hand, because of the 
rhizomatic leveling of the formerly hierarchical surveillance structure, such as a single 
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panopticon, lines of flight can take advantage of the decentralized and non-hierarchical 
nature of the media/surveillance system. The decentralized surveillance system is more 
likely to capture those formerly marginalized voice which actually compete for 
visibility. While capturing these voices and trying to territorialize them, the surveillance 
assemblages themselves are transformed. 
In this highly mediated world, assemblages could be all kinds of media and their 
convergence (e.g. Jenkins, 1992; Jenkins, 2006). The separated synopticons in different 
media might converge as well. 
With the plethora of television channels, decentralization has also taken place, so 
that there are many synopticons. The decentralized, narrowly oriented 
panopticons may quickly be combined into large broad-ranging systems by 
simple technological devices, covering large categories of people in full detail. 
So may, on given important occasions, the various decentralized synopticons. 
(Mathiesen, 1997, p. 221) 
 
The concept of assemblage sheds light on Shanzhai practices because, first, the 
interconnectedness of the media, serving as panoptic assemblages, gives formerly 
marginalized people more opportunity to be captured. Of course there are struggles and 
strategies, or actions upon actions, regarding accesses to media. Second, the synoptic 
side of the assemblages make stories about the Shanzhai producers and production 
circulate in different media. This could help Shanzhai producers gain symbolic status 
and more freedom of expression, albeit reinforcing the mentality of self-made 
achievement. Meanwhile, the trans-media exposure and popularity could also invite 
government agencies’ vigilance, even censorship. When the two scenarios happen 
simultaneously, it is because of the inconsistent sorting standards in the Chinese media. 
The inconsistency in the Chinese media assemblage attributes different “truths” to 
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Shanzhai and invites discursive contestation which has an impact on the power dynamics 
in China. 
Hegemony and counter-hegemony 
In addition to drawing upon a Foucauldian theory of power to explicate 
governance and resistance through the media system, I also utilize Gramsci’s hegemony 
and counter-hegemony. These concepts particularly shed light on the complexity of the 
formation of “common sense,” or “a relatively rigid phase of popular knowledge at a 
given place and time” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 362), the process of power negotiation, the 
identities of different parties employed in Shanzhai practices, and the discursive 
construction of Shanzhai. 
Gramsci’s (1971) hegemony refers to a process of moral and intellectual 
leadership which is: 
characterised by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other 
reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent. Indeed, the 
attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the 
consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion -- 
newspapers and associations -- which, therefore, in certain situations, are 
artificially multiplied.(p. 80) 
 
Scholars usually interpret Gramsci’s reflection on hegemony as a response to the 
economism and reductionism tendencies in orthodox Marxism (Bates, 1975; S. Hall, 
1986). Reductionism tends to “read off” developments in superstructure from their 
economic determinations. Gramsci attempts to overcome this one-way determination by 
focusing on the “various moments or levels” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 181) in the development 
of a historical conjuncture. Thus, Gramsci’s analyses of social forces have the following 
characteristics. 
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First, Gramsci concentrated on the relations of social force “which constitute the 
actual terrain of political and social struggles and development” (S. Hall, 1986, p. 14). 
He believed that the “common sense” rose from the push-and-pull among different 
forces, rather than from a coherent ideology that “depends on its specific philosophical 
elaboration” and that “cannot guarantee its organic historical effectivity” (p.20). 
Hegemony is neither achieved in coercion nor in uncontested consensus and alliances, 
but in the negotiation between attempts to assume an intellectual and moral leadership 
and the counter-hegemonic struggle which openly challenges institutionalized 
apparatuses as instruments of education to construct and maintain material and non-
material structures (Chin & Mittelman, 1997). 
Second, Gramsci’s analysis never assumed a so-called “class unity,” a priori. He 
accepted the shared social, economic, and historical conditions of various classes, while 
he also recognized their inevitable conflicting interests and fragmented cultural 
identities. Thus, Gramsci distinguished three different stages in which class 
consciousness and unity develop. In the “economic corporate” stage, “professional and 
occupational groups recognize their basic common interests but are conscious of no 
wider class solidarities” (S. Hall, 1986, p. 14). In the “class corporate” stage, class 
solidarity develops, but only in terms of the economic interest. In the stage, or moment, 
of “hegemony”, the interests of various subordinate groups that are beyond the economic 
field are encompassed. The various subordinate groups are allied and, then, hegemony 
begins to 
‘propagate itself throughout society,’ bringing about intellectual and moral as 
well as economic and political unity, and ‘posing also the questions around 
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which the struggle rages…thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social 
group over a series of subordinate group.’ It is this process of the coordination of 
the interests of a dominant group with the general interests of other groups and 
the life of the state as a whole, that constitutes the ‘hegemony of a particular 
historical bloc (PN [Prison Notebooks], p.182) (cited in S. Hall, 1986, p. 15) 
 
Gramsci’s formulation of “hegemony,” premised on the above assumptions, has 
special purchase to this study. As Hall (1986) and Bates (1975) summarized, hegemony 
is historically specific in the life of a society. It is not an evolutionary law that repeats 
itself across different social or historical conditions. Meanwhile, hegemony is 
constructed on multiple fronts of struggle simultaneously. In this way, economic 
determinism is avoided and a social and moral leadership can be exercised on a range of 
different sites to propagate “an intellectual, moral, political and economic collective will 
throughout society” (S. Hall, 1986, p. 15). In addition, the leadership in a period of 
hegemony is not assumed by one coherent “ruling class,” but a historic bloc that might 
be only one fraction of the dominant economic class, and might be affiliated by various 
strata of the subaltern and dominated classes. In a word, each hegemonic formation has 
its own, specific social composition and configuration and only exists in the negotiation 
with counter-hegemonic forces. 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony will help me theorize the process and complexity 
of the power relationships among different social groups in China. Examined through 
this lens, the strategies that various parties employed in Shanzhai production, circulation 
and regulation not only signal the relations among social forces, but also manifest the 
complex identities of and alliances among various social groups that shifted in different 
stages of Shanzhai practices. The discourses of Shanzhai in the popular and official 
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press, under this framework, illustrate “the multi-accentual, inter-discursive character of 
the field of ideology”(S. Hall, 1986, p. 23). They are actually the attempts of different 
social groups to promote consensus and establish leadership in a hegemonic manner, 
though still in contestation. Thus, the combination of this Gramscian hegemony and the 
Foucauldian theory of power can better explain the exercise of both disciplinary power 
and the power of governmentality in contemporary Chinese society. 
Chapter Organization 
As I argued previously, Shanzhai, as a grassroots cultural phenomenon, really 
epitomizes the governance and resistance in Chinese society, under contemporary social, 
cultural, economic, as well as technological conditions. In the following chapters, I will 
focus on various elements in the governance and resistance, ranging from the context of 
contemporary Chinese society, to the cultural significance of Shanzhai from the 
perspective of media ritual, the strategies employed by different parties involved in 
Shanzhai production, circulation and regulation, and the discursive construction of 
Shanzhai. 
Chapter II serves to contextualize Shanzhai phenomenon and my arguments 
regarding it. I will cover the reforms in China’s media sector, the development of 
China’s ICTs, especially the Internet, and the popular uses of ICTs, including both the 
consumerist and the activist aspects. It is important to present the background because 
Shanzhai, itself a complicated phenomenon, cannot be essentialized as either popular 
entertainment or resistance. It is rooted in both social zeitgeists, and the discourse and 
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practices of Shanzhai are unique to the conditions of media structure, social structure, 
historical and technological conditions. 
Chapter III will examine the Shanzhai productions from a ritual perspective. 
Seeing Shanzhai as an integral part of the entire media environment, and more broadly, 
the social experience, I am cautious against reducing Shanzhai to a phenomenon of new 
media. In fact, it is, in all kinds of ways, connected to the factors outside the Internet, 
from the original television shows Shanzhai producers imitated to the news coverage in 
traditional mass media such as metropolitan newspapers. The media system as the 
combination of panopticons and synopticons, indeed the surveillance assemblages, form 
a totality which produces the shared beliefs and life experience, or the supposed-to-be 
ways of life. The ritual perspective allows me to capture the relationship between 
Shanzhai producers’ media uses, both consumption and creation, and this shared 
experience of life. In this way, it answers why people are doing or watching Shanzhai on 
a macro level, rather than the personal psychological level. In this chapter, I will argue 
that the Shanzhai producers saw the television show they imitated as a prescribed way to 
achieve certain goals in their lives, such as the way to celebrate Spring Festival, the way 
of popularizing intellectual opinions, or the way for ordinary people to participate in 
media production. More broadly, these ritualistic uses of media are informed and, when 
the Shanzhai producers themselves got famous, also inform the general public about a 
self-reliant self-improvement, and self-achieving mentality, which becomes the 
governmentality in the Chinese society. 
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In Chapter IV, I will concentrate on the strategies that different parties employed 
in the process of Shanzhai production, circulation, and regulation. If the previous chapter 
concentrates on a broader, overarching cultural meaning of Shanzhai producing a 
governing technology, this chapter will examine the actual actions taken by all the 
parties in order to understand the complexity in the governing process. I will try to 
understand the political, economic, as well as cultural struggles, manifested in the 
strategies people employed in reaction to each other. This chapter will use Bourdieu’s 
analytics of the exchanges among various types of capital in order to understand the 
strategies, some of which De Certeau (2002) would call “tactics.” Nevertheless, the 
exchanges are also attempts to gain or evade gazes in panopticons, or to enter or avoid 
synoptic displays. This chapter will help illustrate what happened to people in this whole 
process. The constraints, the advantages and the leverages all will illustrate the power 
relationship among different parties in contemporary Chinese society. In this way, I 
intend to understand how power is exercised, through media, on different social 
constituents. 
Chapter V will move away from the interview data and concentrate on the 
popular discourses that reflect as well as contribute to the landscape of Shanzhai 
phenomenon. I will examine how Shanzhai is reported and commented upon in 
metropolitan newspapers and the official mouthpiece newspapers. These discourses not 
only reflect different stances on the Shanzhai culture, we can also see the struggle of 
discourse-shaping power as an integral part of the cultural politics in Chinese society. 
This chapter, under the Foucauldian framework, explicates the discursive sorting 
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standards in the surveillance system, or really the exercise of power through claiming 
“truth” about Shanzhai. It works together with Chapter Four to describe the power 
relationships both through actions and through discourse. More importantly, it will 
illustrate that there are different “truths” about Shanzhai in the surveillance assemblages. 
This corrects the rather pessimistic and functionalist view of surveillance assemblages 
theorized by Haggerty and Ericson (2000). 
The conclusion chapter will provide a summary and discussion of the arguments. 
I will first summarize the major arguments in this study and then concentrate on the 
implications of the findings. The implications will cover issues like the situated 
applicability of Foucauldian framework of governance and resistance in the 
contemporary Chinese society and the totalitarian as well as democratic potential of 
Chinese media structure and participatory media uses. Last, some limitations of this 
study and potential topics of further explorations will be provided. 
A reflection on methodology will be provided in the appendix. In this section, I 
will describe the rationale and procedures of my sampling and data collection. Also, I 
will specifically address the disjuncture I experienced between Western-based research 
methods and protocol and the Chinese social and cultural conditions. In addition, I will 
provide descriptive accounts of my interviewees and the questions they were asked. 
Methodology Brief 
This study is based on the 15 in-depth interviews I conducted during the summer 
of 2010 in Beijing. The interviewees include Shanzhai producers and performers, 
commercial sponsors of Shanzhai production, the media that cooperated with these 
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Shanzhai producers, journalists who followed the development of the Shanzhai 
production, the government officials whose agencies are directly involved in the 
regulation of Shanzhai, and the staff members of the television shows that Shanzhai 
producers imitated. 
A detailed reflection on the fieldwork and interviews is provided in Appendix A. 
The list of interviewees and brief introductions of each of them are provided in 
Appendix B. Appendix C includes the interview questions I prepared for different 
categories of interviewees. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
 
In the first chapter, I introduced the basic concepts of Shanzhai and the 
development of its connotations. I also laid out the theoretical framework to understand 
Shanzhai as a microcosm of governance and resistance through media in contemporary 
China. In this chapter, I will present the background information about the contemporary 
Chinese society to further contextualize my arguments. 
There will be three parts in this chapter. First, I will briefly summarize the media 
environment in the post-reform era in China. The Shanzhai phenomenon exists in the 
media system that is both designed to propagate the Party’s ideology and is expected to 
be a vigorous economic drive. These are the dual, and at some moments schizophrenic, 
roles that condition the appearance, strategies, and discourses of Shanzhai. Second, I will 
provide a background of the Internet in China. Again, I will start with the development 
of ICTs, and the official pragmatist philosophy of fostering telecommunication 
technologies in China. However, users are always “making do” (De Certeau, 2002) with 
technologies for their own ends and creating social influences unexpected to the 
technology providers. So thirdly, I will also review existing theorizations on the uses of 
the Internet in China, especially highlighting various forms of online resistance. 
Media Environment in the Post-Reform Era in China 
I start the background chapter with reviewing the media structure in China 
because, first, the discursive constructions of Shanzhai in the commercial and official 
media are both powerful interpretations of Shanzhai for the mass audience and 
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reflections of the media’s own positions in the power dynamics in the society. Media 
have the power to make claims about and frame issues like Shanzhai, and they are, in 
turn, transformed to some extent by involvement in Shanzhai production and circulation. 
The involvement of various media is a very important part of the development of and 
dynamic in Shanzhai production, distribution and regulation. Second, the nature of 
different media directly influences the strategies available to Shanzhai producers. As I 
will demonstrate in Chapter Four that Shanzhai producers actually took advantage of 
various media outlets, such as commercial metropolitan newspapers and the Macau-
based television station seen and regulated as an overseas medium, for their own ends. 
Third, Shanzhai producers, sponsors, and regulators themselves are also media 
audiences. They are subject to the totality of the mediated world which partly shapes the 
meanings and the ways of using certain media. 
Before its opening up and reform in 1978, China’s media system had been 
following a Leninist guideline that exclusively emphasized the propagandist role. The 
Party principle (dangxing yuanze) was established that “news media must accept the 
Party’s guiding ideology as its own, that they must propagate the Party’s programs, 
policies, and directives, and that they must accept the Party’s leadership and stick to the 
Party’s organizational principles and press policies” (Y. Zhao, 1998, p. 19). Thus the 
media serve as the mouthpiece of the Party. According to this view, because the Party is 
the revolutionary vanguard of the mass, the media are the mouthpiece of the people, too. 
The reform of China’s media sector, long seen as the powerful education tool and 
ideological frontline, started as early as the overall economic reform in the late 1970s. 
 40
With the appearance of advertisements on Shanghai local television shows and the 
introduction of business management to a few newspapers, media outlets started to 
commercialize themselves and diversify their incomes outside of government subsidies 
(Y. Zhao, 1998). The government tended to cut subsidies to the media sector, gradually 
forcing the media to become self-sufficient financially. However, they still had to firmly 
adhere to the Party line. 
Throughout the 1980s, China’s media reform had been fermenting under the 
supervision of relatively liberal leaders such as Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang. Multiple 
opinions were tolerated and even encouraged in the media. The Thirteenth National 
Party Congress in 1987 even put political reform, which included journalism reform, 
onto the national agenda (Y. Zhao, 1998). There were extensive debates on the freedom 
of the press and the freedom of speech. Liberal Party leaders such as Zhao Ziyang 
proposed “letting the people have more information and more participation” though in a 
paternalist tone as Zhao argued (1998, p. 36). The “people principle,” which had been 
criticized as “bourgeois liberalization” in the early 1980s, gained momentum since the 
Party’s Thirteenth National Congress in 1987. Until the 1989 student movement, the 
Party’s control over media under the Party Principle had been challenged in theory in 
outspoken debate. However, the overall political environment was still conservative and 
media, despite the vigorous debates, were still dominantly seen and run as the Party 
mouthpiece (Y. Zhao, 1998). 
The crackdown on the democracy movement in 1989 was a major setback in 
China’s political reform, including reform in the media sector. After 1989, the Party 
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authority was reinstated and liberal leaders were mostly purged outside the central 
political body. Journalism also suffered from the conservative backlash. Many 
journalists were imprisoned, investigated, suspended from work or reassigned to other 
positions. Some had to hide their bylines even they were allowed to write (Chan, 1993). 
The new leadership in the Party effectively reimposed the Party’s principles and closed 
major theoretical debates over media reform (Y. Zhao, 1998). 
In face of the tightened ideological control after 1989 and the slowed economic 
reform, Deng Xiaoping paid a visit to southern China. In order to brush aside “the 
conservatives’ urge for taking anti-peaceful evolution as the central task” (Chan, 1993, 
p. 25), during this trip, he reiterated the central importance of economic construction as 
the “one centrality” of the Party. “Deng called for faster economic growth and boldness 
in experimenting with reforms. At the same time, he directed that practice should take 
precedence over theoretical debates and that controversies over the nature of Chinese 
reforms and other historical-political issues should be shelved” (p. 25). Throughout the 
1990s, China’s media sector had undergone slow but continuous changes, even though 
the basic tones of media still strictly followed the Party line. 
Since the inception of media commercialization in China, media are increasingly 
dependent on advertisement and sponsorship revenues. The advertisement-supported 
model resulted in a great proliferation of media outlets in the early 1990s. The number of 
registered newspapers in China increased from 1,543 at the end of 1991 to 2,039 by the 
end of 1993. Most newspapers started to increase pages. The numbers of radio and 
television stations increased from 724 and 543 in 1991 to 1,202 and 837 over the same 
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time period. Television shows had so many commercials and such long commercial 
breaks that they became the audience’s common complaints during that time (Y. Zhao, 
1998, p. 57). Though none of them were privately owned, many people actually rushed 
into the gold mine with the nods of their local government or institutional agencies such 
as industrial associations. This greatly altered the nature of news media operations in 
China which is more and more seen as a money-making business. 
Other than the changes in management and financing structure, the forms of 
newspapers have also been transformed to cater to a wealthier market, mostly urban 
readers. In the early 1990s, evening newspapers started to change their orientation to 
more “soft” content to distinguish themselves from the hardcore mouthpiece dailies. In 
addition to turning to popular taste, these papers also encouraged readers’ participation 
as amateur journalists by providing tips and writing stories. Activities of “reporter for a 
day” were organized to assign stories to readers to write up (Y. Zhao, 1998, p. 131). 
These news media gradually transformed themselves into mass-appealing journalism. 
Other commercial attempts were tabloid papers which included crime and scandal stories 
and weekend editions which were published for readers rather than for leaders. 
Successful newspapers were those that could combine the propagandist role with 
the commercial model well. Starting with newspapers such as Beijing Youth News, 
metropolitan newspapers started to prevail among elite urban readers. Because the elite 
urban young readers are among the people who directly benefited from the overall 
economic development and are relatively wealthier, newspapers catering to them were 
more appealing to advertisers and hence profitable (Yuezhi Zhao, 2000a). However, at 
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the same time, a decline of peasants’ newspapers was observed by media scholars as one 
of the negative impacts of media commercialization since the 1990s (Y. Zhao, 1998). 
Approaching the 21st century and the entry into the WTO, Chinese authorities 
apparently recognized the weakness of domestic media in face of the immanent 
international competition. Conglomeration has been arranged by different levels of 
governments. At first, state policy was issued to endorse merging among the same form 
of media, not crossover, and only Party newspapers that meet certain operational criteria 
and under the approval of the central government can take over other papers. Zhao 
(2000a) argued that this was under the mesmerization of the large size of Western media 
conglomerates and their influence. Party authorities wanted to strengthen the party 
organs so that they could compete with transnational media moguls after the country’s 
entry into the WTO and they could also cross-subsidize unprofitable, but politically 
important, media outlets, but managers who actually ran the media only eyed economies 
of scale (C.-c. Lee, He, & Huang, 2006; Yuezhi Zhao, 2000a). This inherent struggle 
between the growth of media conglomerates and the existing administrative structure of 
party organs rendered many of the attempts unsuccessful (Yuezhi Zhao, 2008). 
Accompanying this commercialization process, ranging from cutting subsidies to 
conglomerations, were various other transformations such as journalistic value and 
measures of media control. Various scholars have studied the changes and struggle of 
journalistic values in the contemporary media system since the opening up and reform 
policy (Chan, Pan, & Lee, 2004; Pan & Chan, 2003; Y. Zhao, 1998; Yuezhi Zhao, 
2000b). It has been found that journalists are increasingly conscious of Western 
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journalistic ideals such as objectivity and timeliness. However, they still have to 
negotiate these values in their daily practice vis-à-vis the Party principles. Generally, 
compared with Party mouthpiece media, commercial media such as metropolitan 
newspapers are more likely to assume Western journalistic values and Western values in 
general. 
In response to the changing media structure, Chinese government’s regulations 
also keep changing. In the early age of commercialization, though the government cut 
subsidies and pushed media into the advertisement market, the government still holds 
personnel control over media. The government single-handedly appoints the managerial 
body of media so as to maintain its control even though the media are partly 
commercialized (Y. Zhao, 1998). It has been a quite effective control counterbalancing 
the influences of commercial interest in the media sector. Meanwhile, the Party also 
assumes “commanding heights” (Yuezhi Zhao, 2008) over various government 
departments such as the General Administration of Publication and Press (GAPP), the 
State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT), the Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII) and the Ministry of Culture (MOC). This ideological control 
is synthesized by the Party’s Department of Propaganda over radio, film, television, 
press, Internet, theaters, etc., through various government agencies. These government 
agencies rely on both legal frameworks and ad-hoc and impromptu rules. Legal 
frameworks materialized in stipulations, management measures, censure notices, etc. are 
proactive and also serve as guidelines for media’s self-discipline. Impromptu rules are 
made on special cases to control public opinions. There is an increasing tendency of 
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decentralizing the control responsibilities (Tsui, 2003; Weber & Lu, 2007). These 
measures are not only exerted on traditional media, but are increasingly adjusted to 
strengthen control over the Internet. 
Internet in China: A Microcosm of the Power Dynamics 
The Construction of the Internet infrastructure in China 
Telecommunication was not an emphasis in the early years of Communist China. 
This is a direct result of the government’s concentration on industrialization and its lack 
of recognition on the importance of information technologies. Paul Lee (1997) 
documented the changes of the Chinese government's budget on telecommunications 
from 1949 to the 1990s. Telecommunication was one of the most under-funded 
economic sectors in the early Five-Year Plans. It didn’t change until the opening up and 
reform when the government switched to a "catch-up theme" which sees 
telecommunication technologies as important economic facilitators. Large budgets and 
flexible regulations on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) were granted to this sector. 
However, a direct consequence of this is the extreme disparity of telecommunication 
development between rural and urban areas (H. Yu, 2006; Yuezhi Zhao, 2008). 
With the same economic orientation under the banner of informatization 
(xinxihua), the Internet in China started in research and higher educational institutions, 
unlike the US where it began as a military project. Qi Yanli (2000) divided the 
development of China’s Internet into three phases based on the infrastructure 
development and commercialization process. First, between 1987 and 1994, China had 
been connected to foreign networks in Europe and North America, mainly through email 
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systems. The application was largely confined to a few research institutions as 
experimental projects. 
Second, in the mid-1990s, domestic network infrastructures were expanded to 
connect more research institutions. The Internet went through its first expansion 
burgeoning in China, however, primarily among intellectual elite. During that time, the 
China Science and Technology Network (CSTNET) connected hundreds of research 
institutes, while the China Education and Research Network (CERNET) constructed by 
the Ministry of Education, connected many universities. Qi (2000) singled out this short 
period in the development of China’s Internet as distinctive because, first, the networks 
were popular only among a limited elite population, and second, it was still non-profit-
based. It is during this period when China formally joined the global Internet through 64 
kpb international lines. 
Third, since 1995, ChinaNet, built by the Ministry of Post and Telegraph, was 
put into use for the public. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Electronic Industry built the 
China Golden Bridge Network (ChinaGBN) together with the Golden Cards Project and 
the Golden Custom Project, as a push on China’s informatization. ChinaGBN was put 
into commercial use in September 1996. In June 1998, ChinaNet provided access to 
three other networks, the ChinaGBN, CERNET, and the CSTNET, making the domestic 
Internet infrastructures interconnected. 
Qi’s periodization (2000) focused on the development of infrastructure and 
connections. However, the hardware development was in part driven by general policy 
orientation and changes of administrative structures. The regulation on the Internet 
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which evolves with the development in hardware infrastructure is also an important 
aspect of China’s Internet. 
Control over China’s Internet 
Because of the monopoly of Internet backbones by a few government 
departments or institutes, early control over the Internet was mainly exerted over 
physical connections (Harwit & Clark, 2001). Also, because there was no single ministry 
that had been designated as the official administration to manage the emerging Internet, 
regulations of the Internet industry, as well as departmental interest, were spread in 
different ministries and institutes. The inconsistency of administration was especially 
manifested in the tensions between the Ministry of Post and Telegraph (MPT) and the 
Ministry of Electronic Industry (MEI). Historically, MPT had a monopoly over 
telecommunication infrastructures. With the establishment of the ChinaGBN under MEI, 
business operation became a battle field between the two departments. In 1998, the 
government finally decided to replace the two ministries with the new Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII) which took over governmental functions such as satellite 
communication and air traffic control (Tai, 2006). The administrative restructuring 
helped China to have a body of policy making, licensing, and more importantly 
negotiating the WTO entry. Also, because of the monopoly of physical infrastructure, 
the control over the Internet was exerted mostly on physical connections through ISPs 
which leased lines from MII’s backbone network. 
With the proliferation of Internet application in China, regulators started to shift 
concentration to content controls. The content control in the telecommunication network 
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dates back to as early as the mid-1990s. Right after China’s Internet went commercial, 
the then-minister of the MPT claimed that “as a sovereign state, China will exercise 
control on the information” (Tai, 2006, p. 132) flowing to China on the Internet. 
Following the “Regulations of Safety Protection for Computer Information System” 
issued in 1994, which mainly targeted computerized information, in 1996, the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council jointly issued a statement 
warning against pornography, political dissent, and other forms of “harmful materials” in 
cyberspace. It is also in this statement that utilizing the information technologies to 
“increase global information exchanges, promote economic construction and develop 
science” (p. 133) is established as the official orientation.  
In more recent years, while the Internet industry is further commercialized, 
especially in terms of foreign ownership, the regulators are still struggling for content 
control. On the one hand, government agencies arduously block “harmful” foreign IPs 
and record visiting activities through ISPs. On the other hand, MII has allowed ICPs’ 
financial cooperation with foreign media sources. However, news portals of commercial 
websites are still not allowed to collect news by themselves. They have to rely on 
traditional domestic news outlets ranging from official news agencies, newspapers, radio 
and television stations, as well as commercial metropolitan newspapers. It is found that 
some websites had partnered with some commercial newspapers and conducted 
interviews themselves. Those reports are published in the name of the partnered 
traditional media outlets (Tai, 2006). As Harwit and Clark (2006) observed, the 
government controls of the Internet “remain schizophrenic as the goal of exploiting the 
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international network’s education and commercial advantage conflicts with the desire for 
information monitoring” (p. 27). 
Nevertheless, the government still mobilized various types of content control 
both to contain the Internet and to increase the regime’s legitimacy. First, the 
government increasingly resorts to legislative measures to control the content on the 
Internet. In early Oct, 2000, the State Council Decree 292 required ICPs to keep the 
content and records of users up to 60 days and provide them to the authorities upon 
request (Harwit & Clark, 2006). ICPs’ responsibility of policing their own sites for 
subversive materials was officially established. By 2005, there had been as many as 43 
relevant laws and regulations related to various aspects of Internet management (Yuezhi 
Zhao, 2008). Second, the Chinese government intentionally mixes up the Internet 
governance with political censorship. As Wu (2009) argued, the discourse to legitimize 
such control in the name of Internet governance includes both utilizing e-government to 
better serve the people and curbing harmful information like pornography. Thus, anti-
pornography campaigns are mobilized online to crack down on harmful content, not only 
pornographic, but also those subversive or critical in nature. Other legal frameworks are 
also used in Internet governance. For example, political dissidents have been arrested 
under the label of “disclosing state secrets” (Yuezhi Zhao, 2008, p. 42). Copyright laws 
are used as a means to maintain centralized cultural resources and control information 
flow in the case of “egao” (Meng, 2009), “a multimedia expression that spoofs or pokes 
fun at an original work” (Wallis, 2011, p. 423). Meanwhile, the legislative control over 
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the Internet content is also “privatized” by government agencies to pursue their own 
regulatory power such as SARFT’s intervention in the case of “egao” (Meng, 2009). 
Other than centralized crackdown, censorship, or interventions, the control over 
the Internet content has also been gradually decentralized. First, the government 
carefully orchestrates nationalist sentiment online and integrates it into contemporary 
Chinese cultural identity (Lagerkvist, 2006; MacKinnon, 2008; Qiu, 2004; Yuezhi Zhao, 
2008). Second, the Propaganda Department regularly sends out lists to commercial 
websites to instruct on the censored phrases and relies on the websites’ self-discipline to 
censor their content. For example, Yue Xu (2011) systematically analyzed the censored 
phrases in Baidu’s BBS service, Tieba. He grouped the censored words into four 
categories, and 19 sub-categories ranging from political incidents to natural disasters. A 
manager of Tieba admitted that they deleted as many as one million posts a day, though 
most of which, he said, were unsolicited advertisements. The self-regulation promoted 
by the Internet entrepreneurs and endorsed by the government is a step toward a more 
responsive and productive bottom-up business model for the media (cultural) 
management (Weber & Lu, 2007). It also projects the image of a transparent and 
conscientious government that embraces the WTO rules. 
Since 2000, in addition to increasingly resorting to legislative administration, the 
government has also strengthened the technological dimension of network censorship 
(MacKinnon, 2008, 2010; Qiu, 2004). Other than blocking “harmful” websites, the 
government has established a sophisticated system of information monitoring and 
surveillance under the project of Golden Shield (the Great Firewall). A few Western 
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based companies have also been accused of collaborating with the Chinese government’s 
censoring efforts by providing, even customizing equipment, for the state firewall 
(Hughes & Wacker, 2003). 
Chinese uses of the Internet 
Despite the tightening control over Internet content, the proliferation of the 
Internet has been keeping up the momentum. According to the latest report from 
CNNIC, by the end of 2010 (CNNIC, 2010a), China had 457 million Internet users, or 
34.3% of the total population. On average, people spent 18.3 hours weekly on the 
Internet. Though the education level of the online population is moving downward, the 
majority are still those with high school or above. The population is relatively young 
with people between 10 and 40 accounting for more than 80% of users. The majority of 
the online population are students (30.6%) followed by enterprise employees (16.2%), 
and individual business owners/freelancers (14.9%). Among various other occupations, 
migrant workers are still on the other end of the digital access gap, accounting for 3.5% 
of Chinese netizens. Most netizens earn less than 3000 RMB (about $460) a month, with 
almost one fifth earning less than 500 RMB (about $76), many of whom are students. 
The applications on China’s Internet are obviously entertainment-oriented. 
Online music ranks as the second popular application, penetrating 79.2% online 
population following the top-ranked search engine (81.9%). Online news (77.2%) and 
Instant Messengers (77.1%) are followed by Online Games (66.5%). Blogging ranks the 
sixth (64.4%) followed by Online Videos (62.1%). In contrast to the western use of the 
Internet, email ranks the 8th with only 54.6% online population using it. E-commerce 
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such as online shopping, online banking, the online stock exchange, travel reservations, 
and group shopping are still relatively limited. Although this report showed that the 
digital divide between urban and rural areas, the distance between age groups and 
income groups, is generally shrinking compared with previous years, there is still a quite 
evident disparity in existence. 
According to another CNNIC report (CNNIC, 2010c), almost 70% of online 
respondents reported decreased time watching television. It is estimated that 40 million 
people solely rely on Internet videos. TV drama and movies are popular genres among 
online video consumers. These people are informed of specific video clips mostly by 
search engines, personal communication, and social network websites. 
Other than the official report on Internet uses, which concentrated on 
informational and consumerist themes, Chinese netizens also arduously practice 
activism, communicate on contentious issues online, and form a multiplicity of public 
spheres full of contestations (C.-c. Lee, 2003; G. Yang, 2009a, 2009b; Yuezhi Zhao, 
2008). Damm (2007) summarized two popular discourses, both of which, he said, were 
wrong in their assessment of the impact of the Internet on Chinese society. The first is 
the liberation discourse that frames the Internet as the technology of freedom. This 
discourse emphasizes the impact of the Western social structure, especially the civil 
society, on the Chinese society enabled by the Internet. Thus it argued for a utopian view 
of the Internet. The second discourse is the control discourse which concentrates on the 
government’s role so much so that “every single action taken by the Chinese authorities 
is immediately interpreted as a ‘crackdown’ and as censorship” (p. 278). 
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To examine the relationship between civil society, an inherently Western 
concept, and China’s cyberspace, Tai Zixue (2006) concentrated on the way the Internet 
changes China. He argued that the concepts of civil society and public sphere were alien 
to Chinese culture. Historically, there was a lack of associational social organization as 
an intermediate space between kinship and the state, which were the traditional 
governance structures in China. The Internet, commercial in its nature, brought the 
opportunity to develop associational relationships. Though Tai mentioned the influence 
of the omnipresent state power on business, he still believes that market is not a foe, but 
a friend to China’s civil society. “The new socio-economic situation creates a 
functionally equivalent to the western civil society in China” (p. 80). However, this 
theorization seems to fall into the liberation discourse. By seeing the Internet as an 
equivalent to the Western civil society, Tai risks reducing the agents to two, the state and 
the users, and framing the Internet as the technology of freedom. The important 
influence of big Chinese, as well as transnational, corporations and their relationships 
with the state, is largely ignored. 
More recently, Yang’s study of online contentions (G. Yang, 2009a, 2009b) 
provided a framework of multidimensional interactions which involves the state, market, 
civil society, transnationalization, cultures of contention, and online activism. He 
identified four types, for analytical purposes, of online activism in China. Cultural 
activism concentrates on cultural values, morality, lifestyle, and identity. Social activism 
concentrates on corruption, environmental issues, and underprivileged groups. The 
category of political activism, though all activism is political to some extent, stresses its 
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oppositional nature on sensitive issues such as human rights, political reform, etc. The 
category of online activism stands out because of its scale and frequency, as Yang points 
out. It is also often exploited by the government for its legitimacy and by the Internet 
businesses for profit. Yang (2009a) also summarized three conditions for activism to 
flourish on China’s Internet. The first is “the existence of a fledgling civil society of 
grassroots civic groups, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and—most important 
of all—online communities” (p. 34). The proliferation of the Internet greatly facilitated 
the formation of various online communities. Though not necessarily politically 
oriented, they provide important social space to discuss various issues. The second 
condition, as Yang sees, is the commercial nature of many websites. Websites 
sometimes deliberately fuel or maintain controversies to attract traffic for business 
purposes. Thirdly, in response to the more sophisticated control, Chinese netizens’ 
creativity is an important factor in forming the online civil society. 
Yang sees contemporary online contentions as a generalized response to the 
consequences of Chinese modernity. “It is a countermovement rooted in material 
grievances and an identity movement born out of the identity crisis associated with 
dramatic change” (G. Yang, 2009b, p. 209). He also admitted that online contention 
since 1990 had more modest goals than its offline counterpart in the 1980s. Recent 
contentions in the cyberspace are less disruptive, less epic in style, while more playful 
and prosaic. The more recent contentions are mostly fostered by urban youths, revealing 
a divide in the digital civil society (Also see H. Yu, 2006; Yuezhi Zhao, 2008). This 
digital divide has undoubtedly undermined efforts and hopes of digital democratization 
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(H. Yu, 2006). Nevertheless, in general, scholars are still optimistic about the expansion 
of unofficial democracy brought by the Internet. 
These literatures are mostly concerned with online contentions and activism with 
an explicit political agenda. Although Guobin Yang (2009b) identified cultural 
contentions such as Mu Zimei’s blog about her sex life, he didn’t explore this category 
as heavily as social, economic, and political contentions. However, this kind of cultural 
consumption, which inevitably contains cultural politics even in the most consumerist 
forms, is the dominant application on China’s Internet, as reviewed previously. Shanzhai 
falls into this type of activism which is not explicitly political, but nonetheless manifests 
cultural politics and power relationships. 
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CHAPTER III 
SHANZHAI: A TRANS-MEDIA, TRANS-GENRE RITUAL 
 
Introduction 
In the first chapter, I sensitized readers to the concept of Shanzhai and described 
what Shanzhai productions are like with the three cases in my study. Against the 
backdrop of China’s social structure and media landscape, Shanzhai online video 
production has emerged and grown into a society-wide cultural phenomenon. I call it a 
society-wide cultural phenomenon not in the sense that everybody is making Shanzhai 
videos, but that the news about it is carried in influential media of all types; the videos of 
Shanzhai productions are shared and commented upon widely online, in addition to 
many grassroots Shanzhai productions. Though only a very small number of people are 
making Shanzhai cultural products among the 446 million Internet population in China 
(CNNIC, 2010b), many more people, online or offline, know something about it even if 
they don’t follow it attentively like I do as a researcher. More importantly, what made 
Shanzhai a societal phenomenon is that Shanzhai producers have become celebrities and 
are invited to comment on broader social topics. News media also extensively cite 
netizens’ comments in their coverage of Shanzhai. Online discussions even vigorously 
argue about the implications of official newspaper and news shows’ editorials on 
Shanzhai. 
In this chapter, I intend to answer the question about why people make Shanzhai 
productions and why so many people and media are talking about it. Or to put it simply, 
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why is Shanzhai such a big deal? I argue that Shanzhai has become a trans-media, trans-
genre ritual (Jenkins, 2006) that constitutes part of the life experience of many Chinese 
people. Meanwhile, this life experience directs the ways people live their daily lives as 
an exercise of power, a technology of the self (Foucault, 1988). 
Seeing Shanzhai as a cultural phenomenon, I will not try to answer the questions 
from a socio-psychological perspective. Carey argued that tracing a conception of 
persons to “psychological and sociological conditions or, indeed, to exclusively political 
or economic conditions” doesn’t help pull off an effective theory of popular culture 
(2009, p. 49). In my interview, Shanzhai producers, sponsors of Shanzhai productions, 
journalists, and some netizens revealed various personal motivations for involvement in 
Shanzhai, ranging from “for fun,” “for expression,” to “for money” and “for fame.” I am 
interested in why different people “happened” to pursue whatever their personal 
motivations with Shanzhai. Thus, following Carey’s view of communication as culture, I 
will assume a socio-cultural perspective under which Shanzhai is a “manifestation of a 
basic cultural disposition to cast up experience in symbolic form” (p. 49).  
More specifically, I will argue that the Shanzhai phenomenon is an example of 
media rituals in the age of media convergence (Jenkins, 2006). Jenkins, with his research 
on various fan communities, illustrated the simultaneously symbiotic and contentious 
relationship between corporate producers and fans, and the cross-media circulation of 
the original and derivative media narratives. He argued that we are living in the 
convergence culture that is a cultural process full of negotiations rather than a 
technological end-point.  
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Following Nick Couldry’s (2003b) arguments on media rituals, I use a ritual 
perspective to look at this convergence as manifested in the Shanzhai phenomenon. 
From the imitated television shows to the Shanzhai productions, and then to the media 
coverage and online interactions, I argue that Shanzhai is a trans-media, trans-genre 
media ritual which pronounces a social order. This phenomenon cannot be isolated from 
a saturated media environment in contemporary Chinese society. It is both a reflection 
and a reproduction of the symbolic power of various media as a whole to define social 
reality and to assume the central position of our society.  
In the following, I will first review the ritual perspective on our mediated culture. 
Theorizations on news, reality shows, and online participations as media rituals will be 
summarized respectively. They will serve as the theoretical framework for my analysis 
on Shanzhai in this chapter. Because most of the reviewed works below are Western 
scholarship, I will be very careful about their applicability in a contemporary Chinese 
context. However, since the ritual perspective attends to the relationship between the 
general life experience and media, it should be the cultural meanings and patterned 
media uses that are China-specific, rather than the ritual perspective.  
After the review section, I will use Shanzhai as an example to illustrate how 
stories about the imitations of some popular televisions shows became a trans-media, 
trans-genre social “reality show” and how Shanzhai producers’ imitation is actually a 
ritualistic use of the Internet in an attempt of ordinary people to enter the “media world” 
(Couldry, 2003b). Following that, I will show how the stories of Shanzhai producers 
who became “media persons” (Couldry, 2003b) also constitute the broad trans-media 
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ritual and reinforce the symbolic social order and the power of media. Taking a critical 
stance, the power relationship or hierarchy between the media world and the ordinary 
world will be critiqued. The cultural implications of the trans-media rituals will be 
discussed in relation to democracy and governance in our highly mediated contemporary 
society. 
Media Rituals: Connecting the Media World to the Ordinary World 
Ritual studies began with anthropologists’ works. Durkheim, who studied 
religions of Australian tribes, sketched out his understanding of how religions worked in 
human societies. In his The Elementary Forms of Religions (Durkheim, 1995), he 
documented how people attributed sacredness to a certain object and identified with it as 
the tribal totem. Durkheim distinguished the sacred and the profane and explained the 
social function of ritual as binding people together with a commonly accepted sacred 
totem. Van Gennep (1960) and Turner (1995) studied the transformation, in addition to 
the maintenance, of societies in rites. Sociologists such as Goffman also studied people’s 
ritualistic behaviors in modern societies, for example face work (1955), that maintain 
certain socially upheld beliefs. These patterned and formalized actions in various 
societies are essentially communicative and culturally significant. 
To understand these communicative behaviors, cultural studies prefers the word 
“culture.” Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall both argue that the word “communication” 
used by mass communication research isolates this discipline from that of literature and 
art or “the expressive and ritual forms of everyday life—religion, conversation, sports” 
from “an entire body of critical, interpretive, and comparative methodology” (Carey, 
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2009, p. 32). The cultural studies perspective prefers the word “culture” in its 
anthropological sense that encompasses “the entire way of life.” 
Building on Dewey’s comparing societies existing “by transmission” and “in 
transmission,” Carey (2009) called the traditional American mass communication 
studies “the transmission view” and the perspective of seeing communication as culture 
as “the ritual view.” The transmission view concerns itself with “a process of 
transmitting messages at a distance for the purpose of control” while the ritual view 
conceives communication as “a process through which a shared culture is created, 
modified, and transformed” (p. 33). If “communication by transmission” is oriented to 
the extension of messages in space, then “communication in transmission” as a cultural 
process concentrates on the maintenance of society in time.  Rothenbuhler 
(Rothenbuhler, 1998) provided a clear definition of ritual that especially sheds light on 
communication studies. For him, a ritual is a “voluntary performance of appropriately 
patterned behavior to symbolically affect or participate in the serious life” (p. ix). 
Assuming this ritual perspective, this chapter, examining Shanzhai as a cultural 
phenomenon, attempts to explicate the meanings of the serious life that people 
participate in through Shanzhai production, circulation, and regulation. 
Narrowed down from ritual communication in general, media studies under the 
ritual view also analogize media presentations and uses to social rituals. Thus, under this 
view, media do not extend messages in space but serve to maintain the society in time, 
through “the representation of shared beliefs” (Carey, 2009, p. 15). In this process, 
media do not simply exert their power through individual viewers’ psychology as in the 
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transmission view of communication, but assumes the authority of announcing social 
values and orienting the whole society to them, which Rothenbuhler calls the “serious 
life.” 
One of the seminal works of media ritual is Dayan and Katz’s Media Events 
(1992). It studied live television broadcasts of important events and theorized its socio-
cultural implications through the ritual lens. The authors distinguished three “scripts” of 
media events: conquest, contest, and coronation. However, regardless of these various 
scripts, all media events share similar syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic features that 
qualify them as media rituals. They all interrupt normal broadcast routines, are 
preplanned, and are presented live. They are all presented with reverence and ceremony, 
and are declared historic. As mediated rituals, they all excite the audience, propose 
norms of viewing, integrate society, and renew loyalty (Rothenbuhler, 1998). Millions 
people watching an important live broadcast is similar to Durkheim’s observation of 
tribal people gathering around their sacred totem. In media events serving as modern 
rituals, a society is bound by television. 
However, scholars are not fully satisfied with Dayan and Katz’s neo-
Durkheimian explanation of modern media. First, it heavily emphasizes the function of 
modern media as the social glue. Baumann (1992), with his study of an Anglican 
observance in a multi-ethnic suburb of London, argued that rituals could also be 
performed by competing constituencies rather than solely by in-group members, and 
could speak to aspirations of cultural changes as much as perpetuate social value and 
self-knowledge. Second, the arguments concerning the media events as rituals only 
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concentrated on the exceptional cases “whose rhetorical form is always, perhaps, resisted 
by some of the population” (p. 7). Following Silverstone’s argument, Couldry (2003b) 
argued for using the ritual perspective to understand the organization of social life as a 
whole. Third, studying separate media events doesn’t help explicate the power of media 
on people’s total social experience. Seeing media as the social center that constructs 
meanings, values, and ritualistic behavioral patterns helps scholars critically examine the 
power relationship between the media world and the ordinary world. Couldry (2003b) 
calls it post-Durkheimian in contrast to seeing media ritual as simply presenting 
naturally existing binding elements of social life. 
In this chapter, I will take the “post-Durkheimian” perspective on media ritual to 
examine the Shanzhai phenomenon. Under this perspective, media, and their 
convergence, serve as a powerful social center that organizes the way ordinary people 
live their everyday lives. It is granted that the meanings people make out of their 
everyday lives are not necessarily monolithic for various social groups residing in 
different positions in the Chinese society. However, the different meanings are all 
significant, and people’s attitudes to them are earnest and serious. Shanzhai, under this 
perspective, is people’s participation in the everyday life which features patterned media 
uses. Although the participation in Shanzhai is often playful and entertaining, the 
participants’ attitude toward it is nevertheless serious. For the Shanzhai participants, it is 
the way to live their ordinary lives, therefore ritualistic. In this way, the media not only 
model different people’s participation in their daily lives, but also reproduce this 
molding power, as well as the modulating power (Deleuze, 1992) of media. I will 
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critically examine three cases of Shanzhai to explicate the power relationship between 
the ordinary world and the media world. 
News as a ritual  
As I discussed above, Shanzhai is a cultural phenomenon that emerged from and 
sustains itself through an atmosphere of extensive media attention, especially news. I 
will argue later that the news coverage of the original television shows and their casts 
oriented Shanzhai producers to certain serious beliefs of everyday life, and therefore 
greatly contributing to their decisions of making Shanzhai videos to participate in that 
“everyday life.” In addition, the news coverage of Shanzhai producers also makes them 
the model of a patterned, ritualistic media uses for further imitators. Thus, news is a 
powerful component of the media environment that occupies the symbolic center of our 
society. To make this argument, it is important to review the social influences of news 
and audiences’ beliefs toward this media genre.  
First, news is trusted because it is believed to be true. News, as defined by 
Corner (1995), is “regularly updated information about, and depiction of, significant 
recent events within a particular geographical area or sphere of activity” (Hill, 2007, p. 
55). Objectivity is the cornerstone of news. Westerståhl explicated two layers of 
meaning of objectivity: impartiality and factuality (Westerståhl, 1983). Objectivity has 
been internalized by journalists as a professional myth/ritual (Berkowitz, 1997; 
Schudson, 1995). It is rooted and guaranteed by the long-standing journalistic traditions 
and technological advancement. The sense of truism in news is also presented to mass 
audience with specific news writing structures, direct quotes, audio and visual footage, 
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and so on. In general, news is a factual genre, as Annette Hill (2007) categorized, along 
with current affairs and investigations, documentary, popular factual programs, etc.  
News is also usually presented live. On the one hand, being presented live means 
being factual. This sense of factuality contributes to people’s trust in the ability of news 
to represent social reality and deflects the suspicion of manipulation. The trust, in turn, 
gives privilege to news media over our everyday life experience. On the other hand, 
being presented live gives people the sense of togetherness. Dayan and Katz (1992) 
singled out “presented live” as a necessary characteristic of media events. In order for 
media events to exert the bonding power on an audience, people have to watch them 
simultaneously. Just like Scannell (1989) argued, through the ritual perspective, 
“liveness” is part of a wider coordination of society in time. 
However, people’s trust in news is increasingly undermined by the exposure of 
various manipulations. Media scholars have theorized the unnatural factors in news 
production such as agenda-setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), gate-keeping (White & 
Dexter, 1964), and framing (Gitlin, 1980). Audiences have also have cast doubts on the 
natural authority of news media to announce reality (Couldry, 2000; Hill, 2007). In 
addition, the social environment also threatens the ritual function of news on people. 
Katz and Liebes (2007) argued that cynicism, disenchantment, and segmentation 
undermined attention to ceremonial media events. Meanwhile, the ubiquity of television 
technology, and the readiness for disruption in television schedules could render the 
ritual aspect of media events ineffective. 
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However, the above concerns are mostly based on seeing news as a production 
(e.g., agenda-setting), specific news stories (Hill, 2007) or specific sub-genres (e.g. 
disastrous marathon) (Blondheim & Liebes, 2002). News, as a whole, as a genre should 
be “best understood as a process of categorization that is not found within media texts, 
but operates across the cultural realm of media industries, audiences, policy, critics and 
historical contexts” (Mittell, 2004, p. xii cited in Hill, 2007, p.59). News as a factual 
genre is not rooted in the factuality of a camera shot or a piece of quote, but in people’s 
ritualistic orientation toward news as the sacred world that organizes our ordinary life. 
Rothenbuhler  argues that all communication has a ritual element, some aspect that 
“enables participation in the serious life” (1998, 2009). Routine news, as a genre of ritual 
communication, reproduces the sense of a stable reality. Disruptive news, as another 
genre of ritual communication, repairs the disrupted order and restores the social 
meanings. Thus, news, as a whole, “does not offer certainty, but the means by which 
viewers can work through the confusion of modern life” (Hill, 2005, p. 67) on the level 
of the overall life experience. 
Here I am not suggesting that the Western conceptualization of news is perfectly 
comparable to the Chinese media. I will be very cautious to draw conclusions in my 
argument. However, there are indeed continuities between the Western and Chinese 
news media in the contemporary Chinese media environment. As I reviewed in the 
background chapter and I will do in chapter five when discussing media discourse on 
Shanzhai, readers will see the penetration of Western journalistic ideals into China’s 
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news media, especially urban oriented, commercial media such as metropolitan 
newspapers and the Internet. 
Reality shows as a ritual 
It is hard to clearly define a reality show since it has become a “catch-all phrase” 
(Kilborn, 1994). While most reality shows are characterized with minimal script writing 
and extensive use of non-actors, scholars are more concerned with the cultural and the 
“branding discourses” that have coalesced to differentiate a particular moment in 
television culture (Murray & Ouellette, 2004). Murray and Ouellette described reality 
TV as “an unabashedly commercial genre united less by aesthetic rules or certainties 
than by the fusion of popular entertainment with self-conscious claim to the discourse of 
the real” (p. 2). Biressi and Nunn (2005) see this genre as a dialogue “with reality as it is 
commonly understood and in doing so they help produce current knowledge about what 
that reality might consist of” (p. 4). 
Since their proliferation in the 1990s, reality shows as a general category quickly 
developed into various sub-genres and spread into global television markets (Hill, 2005; 
Huff, 2006). Some trace the beginning of the reality show to as early as An American 
Family, a PBS production in the early 1970s. Reality TV as a more established genre 
first appeared as crime and emergency services reality shows, or infotainment. After 
that, the second wave of reality program featured popular observational documentaries, 
or “docu-soaps” and lifestyle programs. Docu-soaps are also called “fly-on-the-wall” 
documentaries, “soap-docs,” or “reality-soaps” which complement infotainment with 
character-driven narratives (Hill, 2005). At the decline of the docu-soap’s viewership, 
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lifestyle programs alongside docu-soaps quickly gained popularity. The essence of this 
sub-genre is the involvement of ordinary people and their ordinary leisure interests such 
as gardening and home improvement. A twist in these programs is the experts who give 
advice on the lifestyle task, such as cooking, fashion, home renovation, etc. “They 
transform the ordinary into the extraordinary” (Hill, 2005, p. 29). The third wave of 
reality programming are reality game shows which Hill (2005) called “social 
experiments that placed ordinary people in a controlled environment over an extended 
period of time” (p. 24). Of course, Big Brother and Survivor are classics among them. 
This sub-genre is also famous for its international success. Hartley said “the novelty of 
reality-format shows from the business point of view is that a single (global) concept or 
format can be reproduced in different (local) markets,” which “allows viewers greater 
levels of personal interactivity with the show, including attending live events” (Hartley, 
2008, p. 70). 
Though, same as news, reality shows feature real happenings, but audiences do 
not culturally process them as news. On the one hand, the audience perceives news as 
public service and informative (Hill, 2007), which of course confirms its 
disinterestedness and factuality, while reality shows are perceived as entertainment. 
Compared with news, the audience across different gender, age, country, and education 
groups sees more public value in news than in various sub-genres of reality shows (Hill, 
2007). However, on the other hand, reality shows provide the sense of real ordinary 
people getting into the media world, at least with more possibility of entering it. Thus, 
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what is happening, in an unscripted manner, is television looks more likely to happen to 
ordinary people in their everyday lives.  
This sense of participation and democracy is pivotal for reality shows to 
consolidate media’s authority as the society’s center. Hartley (2008) sketched out 
different types of “philosophy, epistemology, educational reach,” “interpretive and 
creative form,” “literacy,” and “modes of address” for each one of the pre-modern 
(medieval), modern, and contemporary (postmodern) ages. He argues that meanings in 
contemporary postmodern society happen in private life, known by Do It Yourself (DIY) 
citizens with self-experiences, under the power of Foucauldian governance of life, in the 
creative form of reality, and whose mode of address is conversation. Thus, the reality 
show is a media format that resonates with the cultural and historical conditions of 
meaning-production in contemporary society. It provides ordinary people with “reality,” 
as presented by “ordinary people” in the media, to make sense of their own life 
experience, to produce meanings, and also to govern themselves. Reality shows in 
contemporary media also provide the epistemology of the plebiscite in contrast to the 
epistemology of empiricism in the modern age, or theology in Medieval age. From the 
Foucauldian perspective, Ouellette and Hay (2008) argued that the sense of self-choice 
and democracy, which is increasingly ruled by the market, makes reality shows a 
popular television genre. They critiqued the reality show as a symbolic epitome of 
neoliberal mentality that exercises power over people, and helps govern the society from 
a distance. 
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Many scholars point out that the fact that reality shows are unscripted does not 
mean what happens in the shows are not performance. Audiences tend to discuss reality 
shows in terms of the improvised performances of the participants who are “ordinary 
people” (Hill, 2005). But even if there is not a written script to direct participants in front 
of the cameras, cultures, social norms, identities, and certain rationalities also prescribe 
the behaviors for performers. For example Dayan and Katz documented that Chicago 
people in the parade welcoming General McArthur showed their excitement in front of 
the camera which in turn excited hundreds of thousands of television viewers, while only 
people in the streets knew that the excitement faded out right after McArthur’s car and 
the camera moved on. Similarly John Corner studied the British reality show Big 
Brother, and concluded that: 
One might use the term “selving” to describe the central process whereby ‘true 
selves’ are seen to emerge (and develop) from underneath and, indeed, through 
the ‘performed selves’ projected for us, as a consequence of the applied pressures 
of objective circumstance and group dynamics. A certain amount of the 
humdrum and the routine may be a necessary element in giving this selving 
process, this unwitting disclosure of personal core, a measure of plausibility, 
aligning it with the mundane rhythms and naturalistic portrayals of docu-soap, 
soap opera itself, and at times the registers of game-show participation. (Corner 
2002, p.263-4) 
For viewers, what is natural is factual (Hill, 2007). Thus, these natural “selvings” 
“move back to reality away from the spectacle of reality entertainment” (p. 17). They not 
only suggest the naturalness of these performing behaviors, more importantly, they 
validate reality shows of their authority to present natural (factual) reality, or what things 
are supposed to be. In this sense, performances in the reality shows are not only 
articulations of a socially upheld value in the Durkheimian sense, but they are also 
 70
patterned behaviors with meanings or a mentality of the daily life. They lead to the 
audience voluntarily aligning their life to media presentations. 
The connecting point between this review of reality shows and the Shanzhai 
cases I study is that the imitated original television shows and the chronic news coverage 
of these television shows and their cast members in different media converge into a 
mediated real life or, in other words, a real-life reality show. The mediated, also 
converging as I will elaborate later, environment built a social drama about these shows 
and their cast members which is actually what the Shanzhai producers intended to 
imitate and re-live themselves. It is this cross-genre, cross-media social drama that exerts 
a socio-cultural influence on the audience including Shanzhai producers, just like a 
reality show does (Jenkins, 2006). I will provide further evidence later to argue for this 
point. But before making the case, it is necessary to review Internet participation also as 
a ritualistic media use and the convergence of all the mediated reality in different 
channels. 
Internet participation as a ritual 
Internet participation as a media ritual has not been fully developed by scholars; 
however, some have mentioned the connections between the World Wide Web and 
ritualistic use of media (Couldry, 2003b; Hartley, 2008). As a part of the media 
landscape in contemporary society, the Internet has its private side (Chandler & Roberts-
Young, 1998) and its “public status” (Couldry, 2003b, p. 130). Despite the ambiguity of 
this new medium, it is so important that we cannot ignore its potential of influencing the 
totality of people’s life experience. As Couldry argued, it is “‘the Internet’, the reified, 
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naturalized space of social coordination… that is more likely to generate ritual forms, 
although it will be some time, I suspect, before these forms became stable” (pp. 129-
130). Couldry actually called for empirical work to explore “the consequences for 
media’s authority and attitudes to the media process” when “media shift to being a 
broader stream of information and leisure flows accessible at the consumer’s option” 
(Couldry, 2000, p. 188). This part will discuss the ritual features of the audience’s 
participation, especially on the Internet.  
There are three points in which participatory media uses in the Internet are 
similar to those well-examined media formats from a ritual perspective: participation, 
liveness, and the sense of pilgrimage. In the first place, participatory media extend the 
sense of opportunity for ordinary people to enter the media world through factual genres 
to “equal” opportunity to enter the media world. First, the simplest form of participating 
in the traditionally well-guarded media space, such as reality shows, is through online 
voting. Many reality shows allow people to vote for the participants (Hill, 2005; Huff, 
2006). By clicking in web browsers or sending out short messages via cell phones, 
audiences are given the sense of empowerment to decide “what really happens” in the 
media world, which naturalizes the media authority. 
Second, the Internet helps ordinary people to get into television on reality shows 
and possibly get famous. This television genre has already liberalized the television 
screens in the sense that ordinary non-actors are featured in prime time programs. The 
Internet further provides the opportunity for people to apply for it or to submit audition 
audio/videos. This reinforces the feeling of “lottery celebrity” (Andrejevic, 2004), the 
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promise that anybody can become an instant celebrity through reality shows. But at the 
same time, it further disguises and naturalizes the boundary between the media world 
and the ordinary world that is still strictly gated and legitimizes reality shows’ power to 
define reality. 
Third, and more broadly, the Internet itself promises equal opportunity for its 
users to become lottery celebrities online, while the issue of the digital divide is quite 
often ignored. If the Internet access to reality shows serves to disguise the boundary 
between the media world and the ordinary world, then conventional Internet uses such as 
blogging, video uploading, and tweeting, and so on themselves can be considered as 
“naturally” happening in the media world. Thus, ordinary people’s access to the media 
world is not only a possibility, but a guarantee. The boundary between the media world 
and ordinary world seems to blur and even diminish in this case. 
Critiques of the above forms of participation are concerned with the 
representativeness of the reality presented by media. The voted participants and finalists 
in reality shows, often through online participation, and the viral online 
content/celebrities are not as much democratic representation as a ritualistic performance 
in the media. The ritual performance confirms the “otherwise merely assumed 
connection between medium and representative social group” (Couldry, 2003b, p. 109) 
and is in fact a “plebiscitary industry” (Hartley, 2008). Hartley uses this concept to 
illustrate the yoking together of politics and entertainment in the contemporary society 
where democratic processes are substituted for “a new paradigm based not on 
representation but on direct participation, a shift from consumer rather than from 
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political culture” (p. 126). Hartley focused mainly on reality television while various 
forms of participation on the Internet further reinforced this paradigm. Couldry (2008) 
expressed similar concern but toward a broader scope of media. He calls this media-
presented representativeness “crisis of voice.” He argued that the participation-based 
media democracy weakens the government’s ability to deliver different voices and 
subjects the reality construction to commercial media under the logic of neo-liberalism. 
The second analogous point, from the perspective of ritual communication, 
between participatory media and factual media genres is the liveness. Audiences’ voting 
and the live broadcast of it is similar to the live broadcast of a media event, which not 
only presents a reality, but also more importantly gives this reality a social dimension. 
Neumann expressed that “today the issue of shared, non-interfering, two-way 
communications again arises as a practical possibility” (1991, p. 168). More broadly, the 
interactivity provided by the Internet gives rise to viral popularity with seemingly 
democratic “clicks” and subsequence publicity all over the world. The whole social 
process of going viral is experienced as live and natural, what Couldry (2004) called 
“celebrification.” Celebrification implies the power of media to define reality as well as 
the social construction of interactivity in the process of transforming ordinary people 
into celebrities. With the facilitation of the Internet, people can not only vote for their 
stars, but also witness the rise of stars day by day together. 
The third analogy between Internet participation and the reality genre under a 
ritual perspective is pilgrimage. If the analogy of participation concentrates on the sense 
of equal access to the media world, and the analogy of liveness concentrates on the sense 
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of being together, then pilgrimage concentrates on people’s serious attitudes toward the 
media world. As Couldry (2000) argued, the boundary between the media world and the 
ordinary world is usually carefully guarded in order to keep the media power scarce and 
preserve it exclusively for the media. Using the Internet doesn’t necessarily mean 
attempts to shatter media power. On the contrary, people share stories and pictures of 
pilgrimages to the media sites online, and these “infinite and at least partly unregulated 
space[s]” (p. 91) in turn become a pilgrimage destination. This ritualistic use of the 
Internet to pay homage to the media world actually reinforces the media’s higher 
position in the hierarchy over the ordinary world. 
Media ritual in the convergence culture 
In the above, I reviewed the take of media ritual scholarship on Internet uses and 
its connection with reality television. Now, I will expand to incorporate media 
convergence in a broader sense under the perspective of media rituals. The trans-media 
circulation of media narratives, or the “serious” social reality under a ritual perspective, 
is not limited to the Internet and television. Fans create their own media space to 
communicate and socialize with each other based on the reality given by other media 
texts, although for their own ends (Jenkins, 1992). Jenkins (2006) specifically identified 
the trans-media narrative and struggle over it as “convergence culture”. For example, 
television networks have mixed feelings toward spoiler websites. Sometimes they use 
them to promote their version of reality, as in Survivor, and other times they guard their 
monopoly of defining and presenting it. Editors, reporters, and columnists and publishers 
admitted that they constantly quote from popular blogs (Drezner & Farrell, 2004). 
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Reality shows get extensive coverage, from “news magazine ruminations on the public 
fascination with instant celebrity” to endless tabloid stories (Andrejevic, 2004, p. 4). In 
this way, ordinary people in the television reality shows are naturally transformed into 
media celebrities with coverage from other media outside the television show itself. 
Some shows only present the same content in television, radio, and the Internet. Fan-
based media convergence goes beyond the strict texts and expands to the whole 
narrative, including derivative texts for meaning poaching (Jenkins, 1992). More 
broadly, the cross media promotion of ordinary people beyond their initial stage, 
especially with the involvement of news media—a powerful factual genre—serves as a 
collaboration of media’s power to present a seemingly natural, but actually constructed, 
reality.  From a ritual perspective, the concentration of so many communication streams 
in one “super-medium” may only enhance that supermedium’s framing potential 
(Couldry, 2000, p. 189 original emphasis). 
However, scholars have also provided cautions against the seemingly equal 
access to and the representativeness of the media world. Similar to Couldry’s concern 
over the “crisis of voice” (2008), Ouellette and Hay (2008) extended their critique on 
neo-liberalism to the convergence of media as a “technology of contemporary 
citizenship” to promote the governmentality of constant self-improvement. They said: 
The web has become a resource through which enterprising individuals can help 
themselves, and many TV programs since the late 1990s have mobilized it as a 
way to personalize and customize televisual instruction. In some respects, TV’s 
convergence with other forms of media has revitalized the ideal of home-based 
education as citizenship training. (p. 31) 
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The web’s enterprising people indicate a ritual perspective on the convergence of 
media. It is a cultivating process that prescribes people’s behavior by orienting them to 
the serious meanings of life defined by the converging media environment. Not limited 
to the convergence between television and the web, when all the media formats, 
including news, coordinate as one media world, it is not only more powerful in 
“enterprising individuals,” but at the same time, more naturalized since the boundary 
between media and the ordinary world is not straightforward any more. 
Further, the media convergence which combines consumption and participation, 
consumer and producers, together could further be capitalized by commercial media. 
Ouellette and Hay (Ouellette & Hay, 2008) pointed out that “Web participation turns the 
game of voyeurism into an economy of surveilling consumers and of active, productive 
consumers by audience actively provide/produce information about themselves” (p. 
210). More broadly, as Andrejevic (Andrejevic, 2004) observed, “The convergence of 
different forms of media (print, radio, TV) anticipated by the Internet parallels the 
convergence of functions (advertising, entertainment, production), as well as the 
dedifferentiation of spheres of labor, leisure, and consumption envisioned by the 
proponents of mass customization” (p. 53). However capitalized, the market-driven neo-
liberalist media-convergence does serve to naturalize media power and enhance the 
ritual power of the media world to provide the “supposed-to-be” way, a specific 
rationality on which we carry out our ordinary life. 
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The power of the converging and mediated reality 
Having talked about the ordinary people’s “equal” access to the media world in 
different ways, we need to critically examine the boundary between the media world and 
the ordinary world underneath the “natural” reality constructed by converging media 
channels and narratives. Couldry (2003b) summarized that neo-Durkheimian readings of 
media and, more broadly, of communication as rituals tend to see them as an expression 
of society’s center (Real, 1989)  and concentrate on the social-bonding function (Dayan 
& Katz, 1992; Turner & Turner, 1995). Couldry’s (Couldry, 2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2004) 
own critical examinations emphasize the power relationship between the media world 
and the ordinary world, and also that between the media personalities and ordinary 
people. As Couldry pointed out, “rituals do not so much express order, as naturalise it” 
(Couldry, 2003b, p. 27 original emphasis). It serves to disguise the social construction of 
power relationships in ordinary life with its natural performances. 
Couldry summarized five ways for media to maintain as well as to naturalize its 
power over ordinary life: framing, ordering, naming, spacing, and imagining. First, 
framing refers to media’s ability to frame a shared social experience that is qualitatively 
different from the quotidian everyday, private life. With the concepts of “liveness” and 
“prime time,” Couldry argues that the shared experience in live mediation and prime 
time broadcasts is “marked off” from what is “private and particular” (Couldry, 2000, p. 
178). Second, the distinction between a shared social experience and the private 
particular life then indicates a hierarchical “order” with the media world apparently 
prioritized. This “ordering” process is reflected and reinforced in people’s daily talk 
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about the loftiness of the media world. Third, the dimension of “naming” confirms 
media’s authority to “announce” social facts, or as Couldry put it “in a broad sense to 
include the sense of “actuality.” Factual television, ranging from news to reality game 
shows, culturally as a broad but consistent genre (Hill, 2007) depends on this naming 
mechanism. Fourth, spacing serves to reinforce the hierarchy constituted by framing, 
ordering and naming. Spacing refers to the segregation of media’s institutional sphere 
from the rest of social practices, such as the secrecy of shooting locations and symbolic 
capital of those who have access to media production skills. Couldry (2000) argues that 
“the boundaries around the media sphere reduce the chances of the media’s authority 
being ever de-naturalized” (p. 178) which is “what legitimates the enormous 
concentration of symbolic power in media institutions” (p. 83). However, in reality 
shows and Internet participations, as well as other converging media participations, the 
spacing of media territory is “breached” with ordinary people enter it. It reinforced the 
naming dimension which confirms reality shows’ factuality, and at the same time 
symbolically naturalized the space distinction between the media world and ordinary 
world. However, as considerable evidence suggests, the boundary is still intact between 
the two worlds; only it is naturalized to help construct the “reality.” Many reality show 
participants are selected based on their performance skills and playfulness; participants 
are required to sign contracts preventing leaking any details before the “reality” is aired 
(Huff, 2006). The fifth dimension is imagining, which refers to viewers’ “imaginative 
and emotional investments in the symbolic hierarchy of media frame” (p.178). In reality 
shows, this imagined hierarchy still exists while, more importantly, the “ordinary 
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people” featured in this superior media world further confirmed its factuality and 
representativeness. Both hierarchy and factuality are constructed and reinforced with the 
coordination of these dimensions. The “real” media world of converging channels and 
narratives is both different from (in terms of authority of announcing factuality) and the 
same (in terms of the appearance and sense of opportunities to participate) as the 
viewers’ ordinary world. From this point, the converging but highly mediated life 
experience becomes the ordinary people’s life experience in a ritualistic manner. I will 
demonstrate how these same mechanisms are manifested in Shanzhai production as a 
socio-cultural phenomenon. 
Now, I have reviewed different factual genres and media formats as well as their 
convergence under the perspective of media rituals. This will be the analytics for my 
further interpretation of the Shanzhai phenomenon in this chapter. In the next two 
sections, I will first argue that three prominent Shanzhai shows are actually ritualistic 
uses of the Internet under the influence of media convergence. Then, when these 
prominent Shanzhai cases become part of the media world, they exert ritualistic forces 
on the subsequent audience and Shanzhai producers. All in all, the Shanzhai 
phenomenon is an example of the governance of society from a distance through the 
convergence of media. 
Shanzhai: A Journey to the Sacred 
Above, I reviewed some theorizations suggesting that multiple media formats 
and narratives can converge to orient people to the belief of a constructed social reality 
and subsequently prescribe people’s behaviors in patterns, in this case Shanzhai media 
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production, in accordance to a certain mentality. But most of the reviewed arguments are 
made regarding the combination of fictional drama and fan-based media, reality shows 
and the Internet, or reality shows and news reports. Here I will develop a similar 
argument encompassing multiple media and genres all at once. As noted above, I will 
illustrate this idea with three Shanzhai cases: Shanzhai Baijia Jiangtan (Lectern for A 
Hundred Schools of Thought, hereafter Lecture Show), Shanzhai Chunwan (Spring 
Festival Gala), Shanzhai Honglou Meng (The Dream of Red Mansions, hereafter Red 
Mansions). 
The Shanzhai Lecture Show 
As I introduced in the first chapter, the CCTV Lecture Show features intellectuals 
giving lectures on a broad range of topics, but recently concentrated more on Chinese 
literature, history, culture, etc. This show started on July 9, 2001 when the Science & 
Education Channel of CCTV was launched. The show is aired at noon every day, and 
each episode lasts half an hour. The objective at the beginning of this show’s run was 
worded “Construct common sense of the times, enjoy life with wisdom” (Wan, 2007). It 
targeted a well-educated audience. At first, this show usually invited scholars well-
known to the public to give lectures on a wide range of topics. It featured Nobel 
laureates of physics Chen-Ning Franklin Yang, Tsung-dao Lee, Chao-chung Ting, and 
Stephen Hawking, classic literature scholar Ye Jiaying, and famous Redologist, Zhou 
Ruchang. Most of these early lectures were stand-alone speeches rather than multi-
episode series that have continuous narratives. The viewership of this show struggled in 
the early years mainly because of its high-brow stance. 
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In 2004, the Lecture Show started a new series on the Qing Dynasty called 
Unsolved Cases of the Twelve Emperors of Qing Dynasty. The speaker, Yan Chongnian, 
is a scholar at the Beijing Social Science Academy and an expert on Manchu history, 
Qing history, and Beijing history. Since then, the Lecture Show adjusted its target 
audience to those with as low as a middle school education and narrowed its 
concentration from a wide spectrum of topics to Chinese traditional culture and history. 
Meanwhile, most speakers are experts on specific topics with good presentation skills, 
but less-well-known to the general public. In 2005, a new series on The Dream of Red 
Mansions was started by Liu Xinwu, the former chief editor of The People’s Literature, 
and a well-known writer. The lectures he gave in the show featured his expert 
interpretation of The Dream of Red Mansions (S. Zhou, 2008). This series, similarly to 
Yan Chongnian’s on the Qing Dynasty, generated audience enthusiasm for these topics. 
After that, Yi Zhongtian’s series on the classic novel of Sanguo, Yu Dan’s series on 
Confucius’s Lun Yu, Ji Lianhai’s series on two famous officials of the Qing Dynasty, all 
drew large viewership and turned these speakers into celebrities. 
Since then, this show has not only been popular, but has became a stage to launch 
scholars as stars. Most of the speakers are intellectuals ranging from university 
professors to museum curators, and one of them is actually a high school history teacher. 
This show not only gives a stage to these speakers, but also names their series after their 
names, such as Yi Zhongtian tastes Sanguo, Ma Weidu’s talks on furniture collection, Yu 
Dan’s impressions of Lun Yu, Liu Xinwu reveals secrets of The Dream of Red Mansions, 
etc. Through this show, these ordinary scholars not only got their academic arguments 
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out to the public, but also turned themselves into media persons who, under the ritual 
perspective, are privileged to take part in the reality construction.  
However, the media zeal for the Lecture Show is far from this simple. The 
celebrity of these speakers is more of the result of a media collaboration than merely 
exposure to a lecture show series on CCTV. On August 7, one of the most important 
official mouthpieces, People’s Daily, published an editorial How to look at the 
fashionable history study ("Ruhe," 2006), commenting on the popular enthusiasm for 
Chinese history invoked by the Lecture Show. These celebrity scholars were interviewed 
and reported on in many news, as well as entertainment, media. Prestigious publications 
like the Guangming Daily, the Sanlian Life Weekly, and the China News Weekly carried 
lengthy coverage on this cultural phenomenon. 
These scholars also published books related to the topics of their lectures, and the 
books were usually among the best-sellers (Peng, 2009). In October 2004, Yan 
Chongnian’s Zhengshuo Qingchao Shier Di [Serious Talks on Twelve Emperors of the 
Qing Dynasty] (Yan, 2004) sold 300,000 copies. In 2006, 550,000 copies of Yi 
Zhongtian Pin Sanguo [Yi Zhongtian Tastes Sanguo] (Yi, 2006) were ordered within 
nine days, and an additional 100,000 copies were immediately printed. Yu Dan Lun Yu 
Xinde [Yu Dan’s Impressions of Lun Yu] (D. Yu, 2006) sold one million copies in a 
month. Other derivative books from other speakers of the Lecture Show were also 
successful. 
Not only books by the speakers, but also those commenting on and critiquing the 
speakers’ arguments are successful. There are Qieman, Yi Zhongtian [Wait, Yi 
 83
Zhongtian] (Honghai, 2006), and Qingsuan Pin Sanguo [Reckoning the Taste of 
Sanguo] (Tianxingjian, 2007) that argued against some of Yi’s opinions expressed in the 
Lecture Show, and Yu Dan Weishenme Zheyang Hong [Why is Yu Dan So Popular] 
(Min, 2007) , and Jie Du Yu Dan [Detoxicate Yu Dan] (J. Xu & Yang, 2007) that raised 
opposition to Yu’s interpretation of Confucian works.  
Sometimes, the debates developed into dramatic news stories that drew 
journalists’ attention. Yan Chongnian’s interpretation of the history of the Qing Dynasty 
had been criticized by netizens for his bias toward the Manchus who ruled China then. A 
pro-Han reader slapped Yan in the face at a book-signing event in Wuxi, Jiangsu 
province, on October 5, 2008 (C. Xu, 2008). This incident drew extensive news 
coverage, and also led to the Shanzhai version of the Lecture Show going viral, which I 
will elaborate on later. 
Of course, the Internet is also indispensable in building the celebrity of these 
speakers. Statistics show that in July 2006, during the peak period of the Lecture Show’s 
viewership, its webpage drew about 200,000 visits a day, more than any other shows on 
CCTV (L. Yang, 2007). Some speakers’ blogs are also very popular. The blog of Kong 
Qingdong, who gave a series of speeches on Chinese martial novels, has almost 49 
million accumulated visits, Yi Zhongtian has 29 million visits, and Yuan Tengfei has 
more than 4 million visits. From the ritual perspective, these visits, on the one hand, can 
be seen as the viewers’ pilgrimage (Couldry, 2003b) to the media world, a reflection of  
media power. On the other hand, they also confirm, reinforce, and constitute the media 
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power, especially when they are integrated into the broad media world to consolidate a 
too-natural-to-be-questionable reality. 
Seen from the ritual perspective, the lecture show itself, the books, the online 
debates, and the news coverage all together converge into a reality show spectacle in real 
life that tells a story about ordinary people becoming celebrities over and over again. 
First, this trans-media reality show is ubiquitous in people’s everyday lives. People’s 
ordinary lives are immersed in the performed reality. All the evidence from different 
media outlets validate each other and make the whole story natural and tenable enough. 
Second, the trans-media reality show develops as people are kept updated with every bit 
of the development from various media. In other words, the trans-media reality show is 
presented live. Third, people’s participation, from going to book-signing events to 
joining the debates online are similar to a pilgrimage where people convince themselves 
of the reality presented by media and meanwhile confirms the higher position of the 
media world over the everyday ordinary life.  
However, the trans-media ritual, while presenting ever-convincing naturalness 
and smoothness of the narrative, conceals media power in many ways. There is much 
evidence in my interviews that the trans-media “reality show” about those ordinary-
scholars-turned popular figures was rather a manipulated performance. First, the 
ordinary scholars are far from ordinary. One of the decision makers of the lecture show 
(Informant No. 10) admitted that they received hundreds of applications from all kinds 
of channels to ask for chances to audition. However, the show’s criteria are that the 
speaker must be affiliated with an official institution and must have an officially 
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recognized title, either academic or administrative. When I asked about some people in 
the private consultant business, he said, “Not a single one. Those famous mouths outside 
[state institutions], not a single one.” Before speakers are given the opportunity to 
audition, the show usually conducts extensive background checks with people ranging 
from the candidates’ employers to their academic peers to ensure they are free of any 
scandal. Though this isn’t unique to this show and is quite common in Chinese media, 
this approach nevertheless excludes many people from accessing the media channels 
while the access that the rest of the “ordinary people” have does look natural and equal 
to the audience. Second, the arguments the speakers make, though in a very accessible 
style, are subject to the scrutiny of an expert panel in the related area. There cannot be 
any argument that is “at odds with official interpretations or potentially harmful to social 
stability” (Informant No. 10). Third, speakers must audition in order to show their 
presentation skills. This informant who worked for the CCTV Lecture Show admitted 
that many very knowledgeable and well-respected scholars were excluded because they 
lack appealing presentation styles. Even those who passed the audition are usually 
provided with extensive suggestions and instructions, as well as chances to practice 
presenting in front of a camera. After all, these unnatural selections or survivors finally 
appear on television as an “ordinary person” ready to be transformed into a celebrity. 
Not only the selection of speakers, but also their public images are carefully 
controlled. Even though there is no traditional working contract, the informant from this 
show said they usually required the speakers to let the show know about important 
public events speakers would be involved in ahead of time. These public events range 
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from publishing books, accepting interviews in other media, to receiving awards. The 
informant, who had left this show by the time of my interview, attributed an incident to 
the lack of control of the speakers outside the show. In spring 2010, a speaker publicly 
disputed with her publisher over royalty issues which damaged the speaker’s, as well as 
the show’s public image. In fact, when Informant No. 10 worked at the show, he 
personally coordinated several volumes of books derived from the scripts of the Lecture 
Show, published in the name of the speakers. He did this in order to avoid any 
discrepancy between the public images of speakers presented in their personal 
publications and the images desired by the show. 
How is the trans-media “reality show” related to Shanzhai? Based on my 
interviews, I will argue that the Shanzhai Lecture Show is rather an attempt to copy the 
trans-media social drama, or a real-life reality show, about the CCTV Lecture Show than 
simply an imitation of the original show for fun. I will show that there are serious beliefs 
embedded in the Shanzhai producer’s patterned behavior of media uses under the 
influence of the trans-mediated reality. Thus, the Shanzhai production is a way to access 
the sacred reality. 
Han Jiangxue, the producer/speaker of the Shanzhai Lecture Show, resorted to 
making Shanzhai videos because he wanted to express his understanding of the history 
of the Song Dynasty as inspired by the fact that ordinary intellectuals achieved their 
expression via media. However, the specific path from self-recommendation to CCTV to 
putting his videos online is contingent on the specific media and social structures of 
China and his position in these structures. First, for a period, Han believed that the story 
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of ordinary scholars’ turning into celebrities was real. With this belief, he self-
recommended himself through a contact person to CCTV’s Lecture Show. After being 
clearly told that he was not qualified because of the lack of a legitimate title, Han didn’t 
give up, and called the show’s office to recommend himself again. After being rejected 
again, he made the lecture video himself and mailed the DVD to the Lecture Show to 
recommend himself for the third time. As I mentioned above, the media world is strictly 
guarded with some China-specific criteria of qualified speakers, even though it appeared 
to the viewers as naturally disinterested and open to ordinary intellectuals.  
Disillusioned by the hard boundary between the media world and the ordinary 
world, Han turned to the Internet which, for him, guaranteed an equal chance of 
expression. At this point, even if he had given up the ritualistic attempt to enter the 
television media world, he was still caught in the ritualistic use of the Internet to 
participate in the constructed equal opportunity of expressions online. What is more, the 
story of ordinary scholars getting expression, even celebrity, as the overarching serious 
life story constructed by the trans-media environment still prescribes the way he 
attempted to enter into the media world. He uploaded his video on Yue Fei, the patriotic 
general in the Song Dynasty, on September 18, 2008, the 71st anniversary of the start of 
the anti-Japanese war. 
Han: Then I put it online. Internet is pretty good too [comparing with television], 
it’s a spreading channel. I chose September 18. It was the Olympic Games before 
the date, and attention could be less if you put it on during the Games. 
Me: You mean attention of media or netizen? 
Han: Netizens, I didn’t expect media would pay attention to me.  
(Interview with Han Jiangxue, June 2, 2010) 
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By putting his video online, Han hoped that the timing and the patriotic 
sentiment in his video could draw netizens’ attention in cyberspace, which promises 
ordinary people the opportunity of being heard. However, he admitted that viewership of 
his videos in the early days after uploading was very poor. 
His efforts to get into the sacred media world under the guide of a constructed 
reality by the whole media environment stopped here. I will discuss later what happened 
to him and his video when I examine how some Shanzhai productions successfully 
entered the media world and became sacred with the joint help of various media. Here I 
will provide another example of Shanzhai producers using media in a ritualistic way, to 
pursue the serious life experience of the Spring Festival. 
The Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala 
The Spring Festival celebrates the new year of the lunar calendar. It is usually 
around early February. It is the most important holiday every year in Chinese 
communities worldwide. During Spring Festivals, people usually go back to their 
hometowns for a family reunion. The family reunion, the dinner on the Spring Festival 
Eve, as well as lion dancing or fireworks depending on areas, are almost compulsory and 
ritualistic. 
Since 1983, a new ritual has been introduced with the popularization of television 
in Chinese families. On New Year’s Eve of 1983, CCTV aired its first Spring Festival 
Gala. It has been presented ever since, and the viewership of this show always 
dominates on that evening. Zhao (1998) argued that it had become a national ritual to 
indoctrinate a national ideology and to unite the nation around it. Zhao’s analysis, from 
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the ritual communication perspective, is Durkheimian which focuses on the integrative 
power of the symbolically presented values in the media. However, in recent years, there 
has been more and more criticism over the lack of creativity, the over-
commercialization, and the bold ideological labels in the CCTV galas. In the criticism, it 
is hard to say that people are still taking the symbolic construction of national ideologies 
in these media events as natural. However, the way that people celebrate the Spring 
Festival with a gala featuring songs, dance, comedies, etc. are not questioned as much. 
As Lao Meng said: 
I watched the Spring Festival Gala, and I thought why not make one myself. I 
can set up my camera, and with a net cord, I can live broadcast it. I thought it 
could be fun. I would make it in the form of the Spring Festival Gala, but it’s 
open, anybody can come, and anybody can watch it. Its nature is not much 
different from that of the Spring Festival Gala. Do you call it “folk,” or mass? 
Neither is right, then only Shanzhai is the most appropriate. (Interview with Lao 
Meng, May 28, 2010) 
 
Apparently, Lao Meng didn’t take the Spring Festival gala as a holiday ritual in 
the Durkheimian sense that it promotes certain values, but he did see it as integrative 
with the help of the Internet. The television Spring Festival Gala as a patterned behavior 
is a ritual in the sense that it has become the way to celebrate the Spring Festival. Thus, 
Lao Meng’s attempt of making a televised gala himself to celebrate the Spring Festival 
emerges from an unquestioned cultural experience of the television versions of the 
Spring Festival Gala, although constructed by media throughout the years. 
The difference between the Spring Festival Gala and the Lecture Show is that the 
Spring Festival Gala is not and has never attempted to be a reality show in the sense that 
it opens access to ordinary people, even symbolically. The Spring Festival Gala is 
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always strictly guarded and well prepared as an important national event. Every year 
around October, the news about selecting the general director of the gala within CCTV 
comes out. Usually, only prestigious and nationally well-known artists qualify for an 
audition. There are increasingly more young professional performers featured in the 
galas in recent years; however, well-established artists are still the mainstay. Stories 
about round after round of auditions are tracked by media ranging from CCTV itself to 
metropolitan newspapers and entertainment websites. The famous charge against Zhao 
An, the director of four years’ of the Spring Festival Galas, of his corruption vis-à-vis 
program selection for the galas a few years ago, further breached the boundary between 
the media world and the ordinary world (2003).  
Lao Meng, from the beginning of his idea of a Shanzhai gala, didn’t even try to 
enter the CCTV gala like Han Jiangxue did with the CCTV Lecture Show. But Lao 
Meng carried this ritualistic way of celebration to cyberspace, the same as Han, where, 
as Lao Meng said, “anybody can come and anybody can watch it.” A performer in the 
second Shanzhai gala, Informant No. 7, said “I couldn’t go home last Spring Festival and 
I don’t like the CCTV’s gala which is too far from the people in the street. I think joining 
the Shanzhai gala is a good way to celebrate it with the netizens and good for myself [in 
terms of career].”  
Some performers that I interviewed also expressed their preference for the 
Internet as a medium for ordinary people to have fun, to express themselves, or even to 
get famous. Informant No. 8, a high school music teacher preparing for his graduate 
school exams in Beijing, attended the second Shanzhai gala. He said, “If you work in an 
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art circle, you always want some stage to show yourself. Is this kind of grassroots 
activity more suitable for me? I think so”.  
Thus, the Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala is prescribed by a trans-media ritual 
because, first, the CCTV Spring Festival Gala ritualizes the way people celebrate the 
holiday eve and, second, the Internet provides a space for ordinary people to 
symbolically access the media world. Although the two galas are very different in terms 
of production quality,  media channels, and participants, both of them reflect, and also 
reinforce, the way contemporary Chinese people celebrate the Spring Festival. This way 
is laden with rich cultural meanings of this holiday and constitutes the cultural 
experience of the people. In this sense, Shanzhai gala is not simply imitating a show, but 
participating in a cultural performance of the Spring Festival, or a ritual. 
Shanzhai Red Mansions 
The Dream of Red Mansions, also translated as The Story of the Stone or The 
Dream of Red Chambers, is one of the four great classic novels in China. It was written 
by Cao Xueqin in the mid-18th century in the Qing Dynasty. The plot is developed on 
the ebb and flow of two branches of the Jia clan which reside in two large, adjacent 
family compounds in the capital of the Qing Dynasty, now Beijing. This work has been 
adapted into multiple media formats and genres since the early 20th century ranging from 
multiple versions of movies to television series and Shaosing opera, a local art form 
popular in the Zhejiang and Shanghai areas. Most of the early adaptations were created 
either before the founding of the People’s Republic of China in Shanghai or by movie 
studios and televisions stations based in Hong Kong or Taiwan. The version most well-
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known to the mainland audience is the television series of the Red Mansions produced 
by a studio affiliated with CCTV in 1987. It was one of the most popular television 
dramas in the 1980s and created a collective memory for that generation of Chinese 
(Zeng & Hao, 1997). 
In 2005, Beijing Television Station decided to remake the TV series of the Red 
Mansions and, not surprisingly in this media environment, they decided to select some 
important actors/actresses for this new show with a reality show contest. The reality 
show was called Honglou Meng Zhong Ren (People in the Dream of Red Mansions). The 
crew members surveyed 250,000 students in artistic majors of 93 colleges and 
professional schools nationwide. In the end, together with these semi-professional 
participants, 400,000 people auditioned in ten regional contests starting from October 
2006 through March 2007. The final contests of each area were broadcast between 
January and March 2007, and their 67 finalists entered the final contest held in Beijing in 
late March 2007. Since then, all the final contests had been regularly broadcast as a 
reality show featuring both expert judges and netizens’ votes. The final episode of this 
reality show was broadcast on June 9, 2007, and 9 people were finally chosen for three 
roles in the new Red Mansions. After this reality show, there was never a lack of news 
on the progress of the actual shooting until the show’s debut on September 2, 2010.  
The story of ordinary people being selected as one of the lead actors in an 
important show, shown in intensive and extensive coverage in various media outlets, 
reinforced the naturalness and ordinariness of the media world while the boundary 
between the ordinary and the media worlds are well disguised by the “reality” show. The 
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connection seems so natural and real that it becomes a belief that leads to people’s 
ritualized behavior in their everyday lives. The Shanzhai Red Mansions is one of these 
examples. 
In 2008 during the Spring Festival, Chen Weishi, a college student spending his 
winter break with family members, decided to shoot a clip of the Red Mansions for fun 
because “the excessively hyped new Red Mansions didn’t suit his taste at all” (Xiao, 
2008). Chen’s cousin playing Daiyu, a major role in the novel, said “all my families love 
the original work. We didn’t like the new Red Mansions, it was too fashionable. My 
cousin knows video editing stuff. We figured if they [the reality show of People in the 
Dream of Red Mansions] can play the Red Mansions, why can’t we?” (Interview with 
Chen Weishi’s sister, June 15, 2010). This quote could be well interpreted as the 
grassroots make-do with the Internet to challenge authority. However, with the reference 
to ordinary people in that reality show and since they chose the Internet to present their 
own version of the Red Mansions, their Shanzhai production falls into the media rituals 
where ordinary people attempt to enter the media world and to get an opportunity of 
expression on the Internet (Q. Wu & Li, 2008).  
The previous examples illustrated how ordinary people are influenced not by a 
single media text, but by a trans-media ritual that is repeatedly performed for them in 
news and reality shows as well as through Internet participation, which prescribe a way 
to use media based on certain cultural beliefs. Couldry’s five dimensions of the 
naturalization of media power all manifest in the Shanzhai cases: framing, ordering, 
naming, spacing, and imagining (2000). First, the trans-media ritual consists of 
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“framing” specific media presentations into a socially shared, serious belief rooted in life 
experience, such as ordinary people becoming celebrities (or entering the media world) 
or celebrating the Spring Festival with a mediated gala. The trans-media ritual also 
consists of the Internet’s promise of equal access, a cyber reality show for ordinary 
people. Second, the lecture show and news reports “name” themselves as fact 
announcers. The announced factuality both naturalizes and consolidates media’s 
authority as the symbolic center of our society. Third, people also “order” the media 
reality as “higher” than their quotidian life, and thus arduously align theirs to the 
mediated, trans-media presentation. Fourth, the Shanzhai producers’ emotional and 
affective investment in their productions reflects the “imagining” dimension. They 
deeply believe in the factuality and the higher status of the trans-media presentations vis-
à-vis their everyday life. Fifth, however, the success of their attempts still depends on the 
“spacing” mechanism which separates the media world and the ordinary world. If they 
could be incorporated into the media world, then they become the successful ordinary 
people, which, in turn, reinforce the social reality show and the Internet’s promise. 
Indeed, they succeeded. 
Shanzhai Becomes Sacred 
By being covered in various media, the producers of the three cases, largely to 
their own surprise, became media persons. They, although portrayed as ordinary people, 
joined other media stories to reinforce the trans-media reality show and further suggest 
the route for other ordinary people to live their everyday lives. In this section, I will 
illustrate three types of evidence that attest to the Shanzhai cultural production’s power 
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to present itself as a socially shared, but mediated, reality. They appeared to be ordinary 
and natural, but are indeed a part of the larger trans-media, trans-genre ritual. 
First, the stories of Shanzhai producers and their productions are picked up by 
powerful media, and Shanzhai producers are granted the celebrity status as well as the 
corresponding symbolic power to comment on, or construct, the social reality. Han 
Jiangxue’s Shanzhai Lecture Show videos didn’t go viral on their own. After being 
rejected by the CCTV Lecture Show, Han put his video in the video-log service at 
www.sina.com, a leading Chinese portal website, on September 18, 2008. However, it 
didn’t draw much attention in the first few days. On October 5, Yan Chongnian, a 
famous speaker at the CCTV Lecture Show, was slapped by a reader at a book-signing 
event in Wuxi, Jiangsu province, allegedly for Yan’s sympathy for Manchurian abuse of 
Han people during the Qing Dynasty. Sina.com put a link of Han Jiangxue’s Shanzhai 
Lecture Show beside the news and gave the series video the title of “Grassroots 
challenges cultural domination.”5 Han admitted that since that day, the viewership of his 
videos spiked, and he got many interview requests from various news media nationwide. 
Han told me: 
[The title] was “Grassroots challenges cultural domination.” They [sina.com] 
named it. My father asked me how they were cultural domination. Media like to 
stir up something and engage the two sides in a big fight. Then the Chengdu 
Trade News entitled me “Shanzhai.” At first Shanzhai meant bad quality and 
fake, and later it meant folk. Then I felt, whatever, whatever you media want to 
call it. (Interview with Han Jiangxue, May 31, 2010) 
 
                                                 
5
 The Chinese title given by sina.com should be “Grassroots challenges cultural hegemony” if translated 
literally. However, hegemony connotes consensus on the ideology of the dominant group, rather than by 
force. The Chinese phrase “wenhua baquan” does not imply consensus, but rather infers the domination of 
mainstream culture in major media channels. I therefore translate wenhua baquan into cultural domination 
rather than cultural hegemony. 
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From this moment on, Han, being reported by many media and with his video 
going viral, entered a trans-media reality show that featured him as an ordinary person 
who challenges the established power, symbolically. Like the “immediate buzz” Sue 
Collins (2008) described, Han also received news interviews, and invitations for talk 
show appearances and online lecture shows. In addition to numerous visits from 
journalist every day, he was also invited to a few talk shows on television stations and 
websites where he met the other celebrities rising from the CCTV Lecture Show that he 
admired. He also met with other Shanzhai personalities there. He was asked to comment 
on broader topics beyond his own production, from Shanzhai culture to cultural 
innovation, to the structure of discourse power in contemporary Chinese society. These 
Shanzhai producers are celebrities in the sense that they are granted the authority to 
comment on broader social issues. However, they are presented as ordinary people to 
blur the boundary between the media world and the ordinary world. This blur, in turn, 
disguises the media power in a ritualistic way. 
Lao Meng’s story was first reported by the Jinghua Times, a metropolitan 
newspaper in Beijing. A reader of the Jinghua Times spotted Lao Meng’s mini-van with 
the slogan “Challenge CCTV, wish the people a happy Spring Festival.” After being 
reported by the Jinghua Times, his story immediately spread online and drew the 
media’s attention nationwide. A symbolic picture first appearing in Southern Weekend 
was widely circulated online and carried in multiple newspapers. In this picture, Lao 
Meng stood beside his old-model van with the inflammatory slogan running across the 
van’s body.  In the background was the newly built modern building of CCTV’s 
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headquarter as if looking down and weighing on Lao Meng and his van in the lower part 
of the picture. Lao Meng was portrayed as a grassroots challenger to the powerful 
CCTV. Since Lao Meng has made two galas on two consecutive Spring Festivals and the 
preparation of each lasts for two to three months, the news coverage on him and his 
shows was continuous and extensive. I will specifically examine the discursive 
construction of Shanzhai production in Chapter four. Here I simply present the fact that 
there were 79 news articles retrieved just on Lao Meng’s two productions in 2009 and 
2010 in 11 popular newspapers. All these news stories constitute a live social reality 
show about an ordinary person, though Lao Meng had already been a media personality 
at this point and had successfully challenged the dominant power to achieve his own 
goals or, in other words, he had been turned into the extraordinary. 
The same as Han Jiangxue, Lao Meng was also invited as a celebrity to attend 
talk shows, to be asked to comment on larger issues beyond the Shanzhai Spring Festival 
Gala. In fact, he was so famous that he used his symbolic power to leverage with 
government officials and commercial sponsors which I will elaborate in the next chapter 
on Shanzhai producers’ strategies. However, Lao Meng’s capitalizing on his celebrity 
status is part of the power that a media person has to construct a favorable reality, not 
representative of the ordinary world, but appearing to be ordinary. 
The family who cast themselves in their Shanzhai Red Mansions also became 
celebrities, though to a lesser extent than Han Jiangxue and Lao Meng, at least judging 
from the number of their news reports. Although, Chen’s cousin, the actor who 
portrayed Daiyu, was also invited to an audition for a movie (S. Zhou, 2008).  
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Second, their sacred status as media people is not only constructed and confirmed 
by media reports, but also by their own deeds as “performances” in accordance with the 
way they are “supposed to be.” Han published a few blog posts after he was labeled as 
the grassroots challenging cultural domination. On October 10, 2008, he posted “What is 
cultural domination?” where he apparently fit himself into the media discourse and sided 
with the young man who slapped Yan Chongnian, not for his deeds, but for his rebellion 
against established cultural power. He said: 
What is cultural domination? It is that only you can say something, while I 
can’t…To exculpate for that reader, I don’t think the one he slapped was Yan 
Chongnian, but the cultural domination, the power, in order to find a way to 
express opinions. (J. Han, 2008) 
Even though Han admitted that he didn’t think of “that layer of meaning” as 
challenging cultural domination before his video was linked to Sina.com’s news 
homepage, he still made such a remark as if it were his own real and original opinion in 
the blog. This is written by Han himself, not scripted by the media; however, it is 
nonetheless a performance to fit Han’s role as a grassroots hero. 
Lao Meng’s performance is even more interesting in the sense that he partly saw 
through the social construction of his celebrity but had to ride the tide and perform to the 
end. Because each of his two productions, especially the first one, stretched for a couple 
of months during which many unexpected obstacles occurred, ranging from a 
government ban to sponsorship withdrawal and disputes with actors, he had experienced 
enough of the unnaturalness of an ordinary person labeled as a grassroots hero. He told 
me: 
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I didn’t expect it to become so big. You are pushed by a lot of things, step by 
step. You ended up with some position you’ve never thought of. I thought of 
giving up in the process, because there were moments when I really felt that I 
couldn’t handle as a person in the street. But I couldn’t [give up]. You know, 
dozens of people were working on this on voluntary basis, news reports were 
everywhere. I really thought I’d be an example for grassroots, and if I quit, I’d 
disappoint a lot of people. (Interview with Lao Meng, May 28, 2010) 
 
Thus, part of Lao Meng’s persistence in the gala productions was a performance 
of the role as a grassroots model. He repeatedly thought of quitting when the boundary 
between the media world and the ordinary world was so hard to cross. However, he went 
the distance and performed as a Shanzhai producer who looked, as well as was reported 
to be, very natural to outsiders. He, or more precisely the reports about him, reinforced 
the media rituals of, first, an ordinary person achieving extraordinary things on the 
Internet, second, celebrating the Spring Festival with a televised gala. 
Chen Weishi and his family crew also performed to meet the expectations of 
netizens in their role as grassroots celebrities. Shortly after Chen’s videos were reported 
and went viral, Chen gave a name to the family crew, “Flower not Flower,” and created 
a blog to release updates of their productions.  Because many people liked Chen’s 
cousin’s performance in the videos, they decided to continue to shoot the third episode 
during his cousin’s next winter break. He also tried to make the productions more 
professional and even wrote continuity scripts for later episodes. More importantly, 
Chen even extended an invitation to netizens to compete for the role of Jia Baoyu, a 
male lead character in the Red Mansions. Since he is already an exemplar ordinary 
person in the news report, the reality-show-style invitation for public auditions can be 
suitably seen as a performance to confirm both his celebrity status and the replicability 
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of his own story of an ordinary person turning into a celebrity. In other words, it 
confirms both the sacred status of him and his story, a trans-media reality. 
The third type of evidence to illustrate the sacred status of Shanzhai is through 
people’s “ordering” activities (Couldry, 2000).  Couldry called the distinction between a 
shared social experience and the private quotidian life as a hierarchy with the media 
world prioritized “ordering.” It is a way to consolidate the media power in a ritualistic 
way, and often times, it is reflected in people’s daily talk and their attitudes toward the 
media world. I distinguish this type of evidence from the previous two types because 
those analyzed previously mainly come from Shanzhai producers’ appearances and 
performances in media. It is a validation from within the media world. The evidence 
here mostly reflected other ordinary viewers’ discourse and activity that order Shanzhai 
producers’ celebrity higher than the ordinary world. This ordering dimension makes 
their celebrity more natural. 
After the Shanzhai lecture show, the Shanzhai gala, and the Shanzhai Red 
Mansions, there are many other Shanzhai producers who produced their own online 
lecture shows on various topics. However, I wouldn’t argue that there’s a chain of 
influences of the media ritual from the original trans-media ritual to these famous 
Shanzhai producers and their productions as other trans-media rituals, then to further 
attempts of similar productions. When the famous Shanzhai producers and their online 
productions entered the media world, they become a part of the already-existing trans-
media ritual and reinforced it. Later imitators lived in the media environment saturated 
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with all these stories. The trans-media ritual, with their joining, just became ever more 
impressive and convincing, or from the audience perspective, more real. 
It is hard to survey the Internet to exhaust similar productions and to interview all 
the producers to prove the connection between the trans-media ritual and later 
productions. However, since the stories of the CCTV Lecture Show speakers, those of 
the CCTV Spring Festival gala, and those of the reality show of actor selections of Red 
Mansions, as well as stories about these famous Shanzhai productions, are so ubiquitous, 
circulating in different media and presented in different genres, it is safe to say that later 
producers are also living in the same tran-media ritual that keeps getting more real. At 
least three types of discursive evidence can suggest the influence of the trans-media 
ritual of the early Shanzhai productions on later ones. First, many productions are named 
after a Shanzhai version that is apparently under the influence of media coverage on 
Shanzhai. Second, some later producers’ blogs analogized their production to the three 
famous Shanzhai productions, or compared themselves with those early producers 
(Jiang, 2008). Third, many later productions that went viral were shared and labeled as 
Shanzhai by other netizens. There are the Shanzhai Zijia Jiangtan [Self Lectures], the 
Shanzhai Lvlin Jiangtan [Forest Outlaws’ Lectures], Mou Guiling’s Shanzhai Lecture 
Show, the Shanzhai lecture show on Chinese characters, the campus version Shanzhai 
Shuihu, the Shanzhai Sanguo, the Shanzhai Xiyouji, the Shenzhen Shanzhai Spring 
Festival Gala, the Zhongyuan Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala, etc.  
Other than the discursive confirmation of Shanzhai’s ritual power, people also 
carried out activities that confirmed the higher social status of the Shanzhai productions. 
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After the Shanzhai Red Mansions was reported by various media, the director of the new 
television series of Red Mansions, for which the actor-selection reality show was held, 
visited the family crew of the Shanzhai Red Mansions. Unlike Han Jiangxue having the 
chance to go to meet the CCTV Lecture Show speakers, Chen’s family was paid a visit 
by other famous people. In Couldry’s theorization (2003b), this is may be seen as a 
pilgrimage which confirms the Shanzhai producers’ distinction from the ordinary world. 
The symbolic significance of this visit is that it confirmed Chen and his family’s 
celebrity status, though they are still portrayed by media as ordinary as everyone else. 
With the media reports of it, this visit contributes to the already-existing trans-media 
ritual of Shanzhai. 
One more example of people’s ordering of Shanzhai producers as more important 
than themselves happens in the Shanzhai gala. Informant No. 6, a performer in the 
second Shanzhai gala, found that one of the differences between the two Shanzhai galas 
was that the first one featured a lot more grassroots performers while the second gala 
received a lot of applications from professional performers. She said, “Many young 
people in artistic majors, many of them. What’s weird is that now quite a few of those in 
the [professional] troupes like the Navy’s Art Troupe or the Air Force’s Art Troupe 
came to him [Lao Meng] and wanted to get in” (Interview with Informant No. 6, 2010). 
Shanzhai as a now-legitimate way of cultural production is confirmed by the recognition 
of those in the mainstream who have more access to the traditionally legitimate 
channels. This informant also cited an incident where one of the sponsors insisted on 
taking a picture with her after her audition because she “will appear in the show and 
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become famous.” She said, “after the audition, some investor [sponsors] came to take 
pictures with me. I am not a celebrity, why take a picture with me?” Even though she 
didn’t recognize herself as a celebrity, she’s apparently recognized by other people as 
having turned into a media person from an ordinary person.  
Thus, with the three types of evidences presented above, it can be argued that 
Shanzhai has become sacred in the eyes of many ordinary people, and is apparently seen 
as the “supposed-to-be” reality which guides people’s actions and reactions in everyday 
life. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that Shanzhai can be seen as an example of media ritual 
which is based on the coordination of multiple media channels and media genres. It is a 
way in which ordinary people attempt to enter the media world guided by the social 
reality constructed in the trans-media narratives. At the same time, some successful 
Shanzhai cases that became a part of the media world reinforced the trans-media ritual to 
further pattern ordinary people’s media uses for their own ends. 
To make this argument, I first reviewed factual media genres and their 
relationships to the society from a ritual perspective. News as a factual genre presents a 
convincing social reality, often live, to the public. At the time, people use news to 
monitor the social environment, and they are also oriented to a shared belief of social 
reality which in turn patterns people’s behavior. There are many techniques in news 
production to preserve the naturalness of the social reality presented by news such as 
professional objectivity. They serve to disguise the boundary between the media world 
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and the ordinary world, hence concealing the power of media exerted on people’s life 
experience. 
Popular factual genres ranging from docu-soap to reality game shows are more 
powerful in the sense that they are popular entertainment, and they feature ordinary 
people in the media world. The entering of ordinary people into the media world further 
conceals media power to represent/construct the social reality which, in a highly 
mediated society, becomes the totality of ordinary people’s life experience. The 
opportunities given to ordinary people to participate, as Couldry argues (2008), 
substitute for political democracy and threaten the delivery of people’s voices. Ways of 
constructing the hierarchy between the media world and the ordinary one include 
framing, ordering, naming, spacing, and imagining, which all are evidenced in the 
Shanzhai phenomenon. 
Internet participation and media convergence further provide the entry point of 
the media world for ordinary people to try on. The Internet is not guarded as strictly as 
traditional media, thus theoretically everybody has “equal” access to it, considering the 
issue of digital divide is often ignored. Then ordinary people’s participation in the media 
world via the Internet, either by voting for reality shows or by uploading videos, 
consolidates the shared social experience of equality and possibility. What is more, the 
rise of lottery celebrities (Andrejevic, 2004) in Internet participation and, more broadly, 
in the media convergence finally highlights the democratic nature of the Internet and 
reinforced people’s ritualistic use of it. But at the same time, the boundary between the 
media world and the ordinary world is further naturalized, so is the media power.  
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Then, I analyzed two phases of Shanzhai cultural production from a ritual 
perspective. The first phase is early Shanzhai producers’ uses of the Internet under the 
influence of an existing trans-media ritual. Han Jiangxue saw the rise of ordinary 
intellectuals on the CCTV Lecture Show presented in multiple media and genres as a 
convincing reality and took advantage of the Internet’s open access to try to live this 
reality personally. Lao Meng, based on the media ritual of the Spring Festival Gala, tried 
to create a Shanzhai gala online. He is both restricted in the ritualistic way of celebrating 
the Spring Festival with a gala and the ritualistic use of the Internet for migrant workers. 
Chen Weishi’s family shot the Shanzhai version Red Mansions based on the belief that 
anybody can perform it, inspired by the reality show of actor selection for the remake of 
the Red Mansions television series. Chen put his video online to practice the serious 
belief that ordinary people can be featured in media. 
Shanzhai didn’t become a sensation, itself a sacred social reality, until they were 
picked up in trans-media coverage. They are reported in various media, the producers are 
invited as a media person to comment on broader social issues, they are paid a 
pilgrimage by both ordinary people and media people, which is also covered in the 
media. More importantly, the fact that there are later productions by ordinary people that 
discursively connect themselves to Shanzhai and also are connected to Shanzhai further 
confirmed Shanzhai as a social reality, a shared belief, and a prescribed pattern of media 
use on the societal level. For later Shanzhai producers, early producers’ stories are like 
trans-media reality shows which are too real to question. With the joining of later 
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Shanzhai producers, Shanzhai cultural production is turned into a self-reinforcing trans-
media ritual. 
Thus, media, and their convergence, propagate certain ways of behaviors and 
thinking to govern people from a distance. Foucault’s enclosed institutions such as 
prisons and hospitals become the converging and total media environment. The 
converging media system can be seen as the surveillance assemblages that serve as both 
panopticons and synopticons that selectively construct a social reality. People living in 
the mediated reality are oriented to a sense of shared social beliefs which are associated 
with a certain social order. 
As Ouellette and Hay argue (2008), seeing media in an analytic of government 
helps us understand the relationship, as well as the convergence, between media and 
society. On the one hand, the media indoctrinate beliefs about the possibility of ordinary 
people’s lives through the converging and constructed social reality. The beliefs 
highlight possibility, equality, democracy, and the disinterested chances of social 
mobility. Thus, media promote the mentality of pursuing personal goals with 
hardworking, self-improvement, and self-reliance, a neoliberal rationality. However, the 
structural inequality in the contemporary society is defused by the “real” stories of 
ordinary people getting self-actualized through the patterned media uses. The exemplar 
Shanzhai producers, often times presented as grassroots challenging the dominant, 
provide a non-representative reality of powerful ordinary people symbolically, which 
could disguise structural and yet substantial marginalization of grassroots people, like 
Shanzhai producers. The freedom and democracy ordinary people have, as presented in 
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the trans-media reality shows, “is not the opposite of control but is a matter of how one 
controls oneself by exercising freedom ‘correctly’ through various technologies and 
rules of self-governance” (Ouellette & Hay, 2008, p. 15). The media ritual perspective 
provided explicates the cultural mechanism of the internalization of this rationality as a 
serious life experience, as unquestioned social reality. It explains the process of 
“learning and mastering ‘the rules’ of individual and group governance” (Ouellette & 
Hay, 2008, p. 4). On the other hand, the media ritual also prescribes specific ways of 
using media to pursue these personal goals as disciplines. There could be other creative 
ways to exercise the neoliberal mentality to carry out their personal life projects. 
However, the trans-media ritual formulated specific media uses as the way to live a 
reality. In other words, there is a co-existence of both discipline and governmentality in 
the case of Shanzhai to exercise power over the people, to govern the society from a 
distance, through media.  
I should clarify that the notion of power in Couldry’s media power and in 
Foucault’s formulation are not exactly the same.  When I use the phrase “media power” 
drawing from Couldry’s works, the power refers to media’s cultural authority to present 
a certain reality and to orient people to the beliefs of it. In the Foucauldian sense, this 
power doesn’t exist until people internalize the beliefs as the logical basis for their 
actions and carry out the actions to live their lives. Thus, people are not disciplined or 
governed by media per se, but rather by their internalization of the disciplines and 
mentality that are represented, reproduced, and reinforced in the convergence of media.    
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By theorizing Shanzhai as a trans-media ritual, I concentrated on the construction 
of social reality and its maintenance on the macro social level. However, there are three 
points I would caution readers against. First, ordinary people, including Shanzhai 
producers, are not dupes. The media power is breached from time to time and it does 
raise people’s suspicions, especially for those who actually involved in Shanzhai 
productions. And this suspicion, seemingly directed toward the media, actually 
jeopardizes their internalization of the patterned media uses and the DIY mentality. 
Second, the ritualized media participation does meet some of the Shanzhai producers’ 
ends, ranging from personal expression to entertainment, though they could still be 
picked up by the trans-media environment to as representative of the social reality even 
though they are not. Third, the relationship between media and government in China is 
quite different from that in the Western world. The situation is further complicated by 
China’s opening up and reform that brought much hybridity in its media system. In the 
next chapter, I will look into the strategies that Shanzhai producers used to carve out a 
space for their own ends, vis-à-vis both the government and the commercial media and 
sponsors.  
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CHAPTER IV 
STRATEGIES IN SHANZHAI PRACTICES 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Shanzhai practices reflect the ritualistic uses 
of media for the participants’ own purposes. The Spring Festival Gala was imitated by 
Lao Meng and his grassroots followers because it is the way to celebrate the lunar New 
Year’s Day cultivated by the CCTV’s galas over the past two decades. Han Jiangxue 
imitated CCTV’s Lecture Show because he saw the stories of ordinary scholars turned 
into celebrities by this show as real and representative of ordinary life, like a reality 
show. The family shot the Shanzhai Red Mansions because they were inspired by the 
reality show that auditioned ordinary people for the reproduction of the television 
version of Red Mansions. What is more, putting their amateur videos online also reflects 
the serious belief that the Internet is a democratic stage for everybody. It provides equal 
opportunity for everybody to pursue their life projects with their personal efforts. Thus, 
Shanzhai culture, from imitating the original television shows to the online display of the 
Shanzhai videos to the further imitators inspired by early Shanzhai producers, is largely 
based on the ritualistic, and nevertheless constructed, belief of media’s roles in the 
society. They reflect the media-prescribed ways to live ordinary lives, which exercise 
both disciplinary power and governmentality in the contemporary Chinese society. 
In these ritualistically patterned media uses, people pursue their own different 
ends. Their views of media and the meanings of their uses reflect the social spaces they 
occupy. These different social spaces, or habituses as Bourdieu called them, are also 
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generative in the sense that they allow actors to carry out actions and reactions. These 
actors are autonomous subjects, not just agents, though within a certain structure 
(McRobbie, 2005). Thus, it will be fruitful to examine the strategic and tactical actions 
and reactions that various parties employed, in the production, distribution, and 
regulation of Shanzhai online videos, so that the power dynamics in China’s media 
system and, more broadly, the governance and resistance in the society through media 
could be mapped out.  
Media Strategies and Social Changes in China 
There have been discussions on the strategies that different social actors use in 
responses to the changes of the Chinese media landscape. The Chinese government has 
initiated a series of strategies to consolidate its control over media as well as to facilitate 
development of the media sector in face of foreign competition. First, the Chinese 
government initiated a commercialization process in the state media sector in hope of 
reinvigorating media sector as an economy stimulus and a competent competitor in a 
more open market. In the 1990s, China carried out a series of attempts to commercialize 
some newspapers, the television production sector, and radio stations by allowing entry 
of domestic private capital, by restructuring media’s advertisement sectors, reducing 
subsidies, and allowing more autonomy in personnel management in media (Y. Zhao, 
1998).  Later, in face of the accession to the WTO and the opening of  the publishing 
sector to foreign competitors, Chinese started a new round of media commercialization 
(Sun, 2004). Publishing houses and party presses conglomerated to establish stronger 
media groups, under the direct arrangement of various levels of governments. However, 
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the achievements of the conglomeration strategy are ambiguous as Sun argued. 
Secondly, in dealing with the non-state-owned media, a cultural hegemonic norm is 
promoted while economic containment is carried out by the Chinese government. Weber 
and Lu (2007) studied the implementation of self-regulation in China’s Internet sector, 
which is mostly commercialized. They found that the “trust-building” strategy was used 
to secure the government’s cultural leadership and its economic benefits in China’s 
Internet. Other than promoting a hegemonic norm with self-regulation, the Chinese 
government also uses economic containment. For example, to prepare for the handover 
of Hong Kong and Macau, as Lee witnessed (1997), mainland-based companies were 
ordered by the Chinese government to advertise favorably on pro-China media in Hong 
Kong and Macau. On the one hand, this helped those pro-China media in Hong Kong 
and Macau survive the 1997 economic crisis of Southeast Asia. On the other hand, this 
strategy successfully contained radical critical discourses against China, if not 
successfully promoting the favorable ones. 
At the same time, media are carrying out their own strategies to survive in the new 
political economic context too. Under the government’s hegemonic strategies, “strategic 
ambiguity” and “intensified objectivity” are increasingly found in Hong Kong media vis-
à-vis the Chinese state power (Fung, 2007). To avoid involvement in the political 
struggle between Hong Kong locals and Chinese authority, those newspapers that have 
large advertisement revenues from and circulations in mainland China tried to be very 
objective and neutral. However, this didn’t help diversify opinions in Hong Kong as 
Fung argued. On the mainland, commercial media such as metropolitan newspapers 
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enthusiastically embrace the Western journalistic values (Yuezhi Zhao, 2008). Even 
state mouthpiece media journalists are experiencing the struggle between a Marxist 
journalist model and the Western one (Chan, et al., 2004).  
Online media also have adopted various strategies. Self-censorship is a common 
and effective one (Harwit & Clark, 2001; Tsui, 2003). Scholars found that ICPs 
conducted self-censorship, on the one hand actively, to secure their business legitimacy 
in mainland China, a vast market for commercial companies, and on the other hand 
passively, to succumb to a panoptical surveillance of the government. However, there 
are also companies like Google which openly challenged the Chinese government’s 
Internet policies (Helft & Barboza, 2010). 
It seems theorization of strategies is bifurcated. When scholars look at the 
strategies of state authority or transnational corporations, only the structuring influences 
on other actors are usually in the foreground. When scholars look at audience/Internet 
users, local, small businesses, and their strategies, the tactics in de Certeau’s terms (De 
Certeau, 2002), are usually defensive, reactive, and often-times idealist, such as 
poaching meanings and forming fan communities to construct their own narratives 
(Hebdige, 1979; Jenkins, 1992). 
The first research question in this chapter asks what are the strategies different 
parties employ in the process of Shanzhai production, distribution and regulation? I will 
try to avoid the demarcation between structural strategies and subjective tactics, but 
examine the political, economic and cultural power relationships as a totality as 
advocated by Mosco (2009). 
 113
In terms of the broader impacts of the strategies, which reveal the changed power 
dynamics in the media system, there are two essentialized tendencies. One celebrates the 
liberalization and democratization of media diversification and new media technologies, 
while the other frowns on more panoptical surveillances. I have laid out in the Chapter 
two the context of general economic reform, and the commercial reforms, specifically in 
China’s media system. These reforms are initiated, led, and also regulated by the 
governments at various levels. They lead to structural social changes in terms of 
domestic population migration, multiplying of media channels, and a cultural turn from 
orthodox Marxist ideology to consumerism justified with the “Socialist Market 
Economy”. Seeing these changes as chain reactions, some scholars optimistically 
celebrate the liberalization and democratization of Chinese society. Those who focus on 
economic changes celebrate commercialization and globalization as a force of eroding 
the state’s authoritarian power. Giese (2004) argued that “by subdivision into particular 
fields of interest and topics, the fragmented nature of this highly commercialized 
network [the Internet] in China provided individuals with ample space for self-
realization” (p.23). In addition, the accession to the WTO is also seen as an irresistible 
force promoting development of the freedom of the press (Sun, 2004, p. 125). Others 
who study broader social realms attribute some regulatory changes and even legislative 
amendments to the spill-over of changes in the media system. As documented by Yuezhi 
Zhao, it was the series of investigative reports conducted by metropolitan newspapers in 
southern China and the online discussions around them that pushed the mistreatment of 
migrant workers into public debates and eventually led to the abolishment of the old 
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shelter and repatriation rules. It is the combination of Internet-wide critiques by Chinese 
netizens and reports by some liberal media that finally forced the Ministry of Industry 
and Informatization to withdraw the requirement of mandatory installation of a 
malicious information filter, the Green Dam (Chao & Feng, 2010). 
Some of those who focus on the communication system itself also celebrate 
changes optimistically. The technical nature of new media is seen as contributive to 
more evenly distributed media access and to subverting government restrictions (Kluver, 
2001). Cartier and her colleagues (Cartier, Castells, & Qiu, 2005; J. Qiu, 2008) found 
that cheaper technologies designed to incorporate those information-have-less are 
empowering, though far from equalizing access. Specific new media applications are 
also theorized as liberal. Esarey and Qiang (2008) studied the subtle forms of political 
expressions in China’s blogsphere. They found that strategies such as political satires in 
blogs allowed netizens to make sophisticated critiques of the government without harsh 
repression. Giese (2004) prefers the analogy of BBS to a “speech corner,” rather than 
Bentham’s panopticon. Though he recognized the limited potential of China’s Internet to 
pose a serious challenge to the Communist Party, he saw the Internet as an increasingly 
important substitute for the traditional social institutions, such as the danwei or the 
working units, as a model for social identification and a framework for interpersonal 
reference. More broadly, Li (2003) even predicted the demise of propaganda in the face 
of the Internet in China. He sees the loss of “much control over information and image 
that circulate through Chinese society” as a failure of China’s effort to control the 
Internet and other new media. 
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Meanwhile, there are also counter-arguments on the social and political implication 
of China’s economic reform and new media development. Hughes and Wacker (2003) 
argued that the Internet is not likely to be the cause of significant social change, though 
it’s not politically irrelevant either. They argued  
[A]s long as the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] propaganda department and the 
SARFT [State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television], its media extension, 
exist, the single-party system in the PRC [People’s Republic of China] will remain 
a hindrance to plan to make ICT an engine for economic growth. This is because 
the CCP views control over the media as vital for its survival at a time when 
economic liberalization is bringing a host of new challenges, including the treat of 
social unrest as foreign competition throws millions out of work. (p.98) 
 
Meng (2009) critiqued the celebratory views of social changes in China by 
pointing out that the democratizing discourse of economic development and ICTs was 
trapped in the following three pitfalls. First, those optimistic scholars assume that the 
market and the state are inherently in conflict. Yet they neglect the fact that the Socialist 
Market Economy reform in China is a top-down process initiated by the state, and it 
actually contributes to the legitimacy of the party-state. So commercialization doesn’t 
necessarily challenge the state power. Instead they might work in collaboration. Second, 
optimistic scholars usually suggest a monolithic state agency, ignoring the conflict of 
interest among various state and provincial agencies. Third, the liberal-democratic 
framework is based upon a more or less romantic notion of the market being an 
autonomous and inclusive sphere.  
Jens Damm (2007) neatly summarized this debate. He distinguished three 
discourses on the Internet, or more broadly ICT development, in China. The first one is 
the Western mainstream Liberation Discourse. It assumes that technologies help liberate 
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China, promote democracy, and create the civil society. However, in this view, agencies 
are deliberately reduced to two: the state and the user. The role played by the major 
Chinese companies in shaping the Internet is neglected. The second discourse is the 
Control Discourse. Disillusioned scholars tend to interpret every single action taken by 
the Chinese authorities as “crackdown” and as censorship. The third discourse is actively 
taken by various agencies within China, the Leap-Frogging Discourse. The government, 
media, Internet companies, and even many users astonishingly emphasize the 
development of the infrastructure and new technology as a catch-up strategy in China’s 
modernization process, ignoring the power relationships in this process.  
When new media uses are seen as a cultural form, a similar debate exists. Fiske 
(1989) summarized two directions in studying popular culture. One is celebratory, a 
democratic vision of elite humanism, without talking about power; while the other 
emphasizes the power of the dominant. In the latter view, mass culture produces a 
“quiescent passive mass of people” (p.20).  Hence, Fiske argued against any attempt at 
essentializing popular culture as either a carnival or an order. This caution applies to my 
study of Shanzhai online video, both as a political economic struggle and a popular 
culture phenomenon, both as governance of the society through media and resistance to 
the governance.  
Thus, my second research question is how the strategies available to different 
parties involved in the Shanzhai culture influence the actors’ positions and power in the 
larger social structure? In other words, what are the implications of Shanzhai as a media 
phenomenon on contemporary Chinese society? 
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Shanzhai provides an ideal site to observe the power dynamics for several reasons. 
First, it involves multiple actors with different political, economic, and cultural concerns. 
These parties range from netizens residing in different positions in the social structure to 
the government, the state media, commercial media that include overseas television 
channel, metropolitan newspapers, and commercial websites, etc. Secondly, Shanzhai is 
not a product, but a process that involves various dimensions of the communication 
system from production to distribution and regulation, etc. The strategies each actor 
employs are dynamic and constantly in reaction to others’ actions. They are actions upon 
actions, which manifest the exercise of power and resistance in a Foucauldian sense. On 
this site, strategies employed by all the social actors in relation to each other will provide 
a peek inside the power dynamics in contemporary Chinese society. 
The Bourdieusian Framework 
Here, Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu & Nice, 1984; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1998) and Kopytoff (1986), in combination, provide a 
useful analytical tool on power dynamics. Bourdieu argued that dominant social groups 
had various strategies to reproduce the social inequality in all kinds of fields for their 
self-interest while these strategies appear to be disinterested in societies. People usually 
misrecognize the nature of the social system as disinterested, and submit to their 
domination. Based on Marxist Political Economy, Bourdieu extended the concept of 
economic capital to “all the goods, material and symbolic, without distinction, that 
present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after in a particular social 
formulation” (Bourdieu, 2007, pp. 178, original emphasis). For Bourdieu, culture is a 
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form of capital that can be both actively acquired such as education and passively 
inherited such as appreciation of certain art forms, as the result of a long period of 
socialization. Bourdieu distinguished three types of cultural capital, the embedded, such 
as languages, the objectified, such as a piece of art work, and the institutional, such as 
academic credentials. Capital can also be symbolic. It is the resources that are available 
to certain people based on their prestige or recognition (Calhoun, 2002). People can gain 
economic favor or other forms of resources with the social recognitions they possess. 
Durable social networks are also precious resources which Bourdieu called the social 
capital. Bourdieu saw it as instrumental and often deliberately constructed. Bourdieu 
analyzed how these forms of capital are inherited, exchanged and transmitted in family, 
schools and other milieus as unspoken habituses. Bourdieu argued that, in order to 
struggle for the dominant position in their respective social fields, people make choices 
in their daily practices based on their dispositions in the society which is associated with 
different types and amounts of capitals. 
Bourdieu’s theory is also carried on by other scholars whose works will benefit my 
analysis. Since Bourdieu is widely known for his work in Algeria and on the French 
higher education system, his other arguments on the role of the government and mass 
media were not as influential. Nick Couldry (2003a), as a media scholar, furthered the 
Bourdieusian framework to argue that the media, as well as the state, have a type of 
meta-capital which influences what can count as capital and the exchange rate among 
different capitals in a certain field. Media and the state work in conjunction to, first, 
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define what counts as capital in each field, and, second, set the agenda for many specific 
areas of life. 
 Bourdieu’s theory sheds light on the reproduction of social inequality and the 
mechanism that makes people misrecognize the disinterestedness of social structure. 
However, Bourdieu is also criticized for his concentration on structure and reproduction, 
downplaying social agents’ tactical uses of habituses (J. Hall, 1992). Sarah Thornton’s 
study of club culture (1996) gave subculture a legitimate status in cultural studies and, at 
the same time, avoided theorizing it as purely a collective response to the material and 
situated experience of class as British cultural studies tend to do. She coined the notion 
of subcultural capital to recognize the club goers’ own cultural autonomy. However, as 
Carrington and Wilson (2004) recognized, Thornton did not say much about the relation 
between the subcultural hierarchies and the social hierarchies in general. Jensen (2006) 
in his study of underprivileged non-Danish youths argued that, to both understand 
subcultures in their own rights and the social structure where they are situated, a variety 
of socio-structural variables is necessary to be considered. 
The Bourdieusian theoretical approach is valuable because, seen from the field of 
cultural production in Chinese society, various social agents such as Shanzhai producers, 
regulators, media, commercial sponsors and so on, are constantly struggling in this social 
field with different kinds of strategies. Involved in these strategies are negotiations, or 
trade of different types of resources, as well as attempts of inclusion to and exclusion 
from trading different types of capital. Culturally, the state has the meta-capital 
(Couldry, 2003a) to define not only the legitimate taste, but also the content of legitimate 
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cultural expressions, enforced by its Ideological State Apparatus (Althusser, 2006). Of 
course, it also has other state agencies to physically enforce its authority. It aims to 
maintain its own power of definition and to reproduce this definition by promoting a 
state-sanctioned culture. The commercial media, on the one hand, need to accumulate 
profits as their economic capital, with the state approval. On the other hand, they also 
have the partially autonomous, but still powerful, meta-capital to define the taste of mass 
audience, which I would call the media subcultural capital, and to grant symbolic capital 
(Couldry, 2003a). The Shanzhai producers, who originally went viral on the Internet, are 
endowed with symbolic capital in the limited field of the Internet. They need both the 
economic survival, if not profit maximization, and the subcultural capital of Shanzhai to 
maintain or increase their symbolic capital. 
However, in addition to Bourdieu’s discovery of the seemingly disinterested social 
system that reproduces social inequality through capital transmission and exchange, as 
Kopytoff (1986) observed in his anthropological field work in pre-colonial Tiv society in 
central Nigeria, human society is never a free market of commodification and exchange 
of various capitals or goods. Commodification is a process rather than an “all-or-none” 
state of being. Sometimes things, or forms of capital, are singled out from an exchange 
system, while sometimes they are limited to a certain period of time or space. People, 
residing in different positions in the social structure, resort to different ways to 
singularize goods from this commoditization process. Sometimes, prohibition of trading 
certain material or symbolic goods is cultural and upheld collectively. These things can 
be simply pulled out of the commodity sphere. In other circumstances, some things such 
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as slaves, cattle, or ritual offices are less commoditized than far more numerous items 
like yams or pots. Meanwhile, things can also be singularized with sacralization or 
terminal commoditization in which further exchange is excluded by fiat. The author also 
argued that exchangeability of goods in simple societies are more homogenous than that 
in complex societies because perceptions of exchangeability depend on complex social 
identities on personal, group, and network levels. In terms of exchangeability of cultural 
capital, either embedded or objectified (Bourdieu, 2001), Kopytoff (1986) said that 
“behind the extraordinarily vehement assertions of aesthetic values may stand conflicts 
of culture, class, and ethnic identity, and the struggle over the power of what one might 
label the ‘public institutions of singularization” (p.81). 
 The continuum of commoditization-singularization can also be seen in the field of 
Shanzhai; only the goods are not cattle or yams any more, but economic, social, cultural, 
or symbolic capital. The State has the meta-capital to define the values and 
exchangeability of different types of capital. It wants to harness the media sector as an 
economic drive, but fears the commercial media gaining so much meta-capital to 
outweigh its authority, especially in terms of defining popular taste, an important part of 
the cultural capital. The commercial media recognize the powerful influence on millions 
of the audience they have and want to trade it for economic interest. However, they also 
have to negotiate with the state for their legitimacy in the trading system. Shanzhai 
producers have to have cultural capital to use the Internet and make videos, but have to 
negotiate with the state to stay in the exchange system (not being censored), relying on 
the media to turn their cultural capital into symbolic or economic capitals. Meanwhile, in 
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the negotiations, they also have to compromise part of their own cultural capital, the 
grassroots Shanzhai style that they want. The commercial sponsors want symbolic 
capital by advertising themselves in Shanzhai shows, for economic interest in the future. 
However, this exchange network, or the field, of Shanzhai practices is also a site of 
power struggles. Each party has their advantages in certain capitals, and each of them 
also needs other capitals to survive or thrive. The strategies to manipulate or negotiate 
the exchange relations are indeed a reflection of the power structure in contemporary 
China, even though most of the strategies are dealing with media, sometimes in 
ritualistic ways. 
I will divide the rest of this chapter into five strategies. In each of them, I will first 
explain these strategies and describe what each actor did with examples from news 
coverage or my interviews. Then I will theorize the strategy in terms of exchanges or 
exclusions from exchange of various capitals, to show to what extent traditionally 
marginalized social groups gained cultural expressions in the power dynamics. 
In the conclusion, the power dynamics of cultural production in contemporary 
China will be summarized and discussed within the framework of social governance and 
resistance through media surveillance. 
Strategy One: Policies Regarding Cultural Productions Exclude Non-Profit 
Cultural Producers from Economic Hegemony, but These Producers Willingly 
Subscribe to the Economic Hegemony by Putting on a “For-Profit” Coat 
In my interviews and the news coverage on the development of the Shanzhai cases, 
it is evident that government regulators are trying a combination of direct reactive 
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commands and proactive policies on non-official cultural productions. But it is 
increasingly evident that proactive policies, that favor corporate, for-profit cultural 
productions and that exclude those by individual or non-profit cultural producers, are 
preferred. Commercial parties as well as some Shanzhai producers voluntarily submit to 
the economic hegemonic pressure in their production and distribution process.  
In the early age of commercialization reform in some media sectors, the 
government had met increasing tension from commercialized players within the system. 
These commercial players challenge regulators’ authority driven by their economic 
benefits. However, as Zhao (1998) documented, the government still was a last 
legitimate resort when these commercial media sectors are still state-owned. It is the 
personnel control. The government controls these commercial media’s recruitment quota 
and the appointment of high officials, though some officials might be selected on a 
competitive basis.  
With more private enterprises set up in television and radio content production, and 
Internet business, it is getting harder for the government to control these newly emerged 
players with funding or personnel. On the one hand, it is seen that the government still 
tries to grip strict control as they do to state media, which, as Qiu (2004) argued, stems 
from an institutional legacy. On the other hand, more policies are imposed on 
corporations, especially their business operations, to promote economic hegemonic 
pressure, and leaving individual or non-profit cultural activities to the government 
reactive and rather arbitrary judgments. 
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In my analysis of the existing regulations, in addition to interviewees’ statements, it 
is seen that cultural and media regulators concentrate on regulating corporations, rather 
than individual producers or users, and on regulating for-profit operations rather than 
non-profit ones. Here, by “regulating,” I mean the government requiring and providing 
specific procedural instructions on obtaining legal approval. Individual and non-profit 
cultural activities, in this regulatory environment, are not unregulated or deregulated, but 
simply are not provided specific ways to obtain legality. The Law of The People's 
Republic of China on Assemblies, Processions and Demonstrations (Chinacourt.org, 
2003) says recreational activities, sports, traditional folk activities, etc. are subject to 
regulations by corresponding government agencies. However, among the regulations 
issued by the Ministry of Culture, there was none on non-profit cultural activities. For 
example, the Ministry of Culture issued The Administrative Rules of Law Enforcement 
on the Cultural Market (文化市场行政执法管理办法) (Gov.cn, 2006) to clarify its 
jurisdiction over individual and corporate for-profit cultural activities. But there is not a 
counterpart regulation on non-profit cultural activities. This gives the government a gray 
area subject to their more arbitrary and case-by-case judgment on approving or 
prohibiting individual or non-profit cultural productions. 
There are even more detailed regulations on specific for-profit cultural activities, 
such as performance and online video sharing. The State Council issued the Regulations 
of For-profit Performances(营业性演出管理条例) (Xinhuanet.com, 2005a) specifically 
to regulate commercial performance shows. The Ministry of Culture issued Rules for 
Implementation of the Regulations of For-profit Performances(营业性演出管理条例实
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施细则) (Xinhuanet.com, 2005b) as a matching guideline to the State Council decree. 
Then, in accordance with these regulations, local governments clarified procedures of 
obtaining approval of for-profit performance in line with the Administrative License Law 
of People’s Republic of China (e.g. Bjdch.gov.cn, 2010). These are the basis of the 
surprising investigation Lao Meng, the organizer of the Shanzhai Spring Festival gala, 
received from Beijing Cultural Law Enforcement during his preparation of the first gala 
in 2008. However, as the cultural law enforcement didn’t find evidence of commercial 
operation that year, Lao Meng was also visited by policemen from the local police 
station. As Lao Meng said, he was not afraid of the cultural administrator because his 
first gala in 2008 was not commercial at all. However, he did imagine that he could be 
arrested by the police for some arbitrary reasons such as illegal assembly or disrupting 
public order.  
The same policy orientation targeting commercial corporations is also evident in 
regulations of online content which is germane to the circulation of Shanzhai videos. In 
2003, the Ministry of Culture issued The Interim Provisions on the Administration of 
Internet Culture (Chinaitlaw.org, 2005); it distinguished for-profit and non-profit 
organizations that provide cultural works on the Internet. For for-profit organizations, it 
is required they acquire approval from local cultural administrations, and they have to be 
registered as commercial corporations at the local Industrial and Commercial Bureaus. 
In addition, the Ministry of Culture requires a minimum of registered capital of one 
million Yuan RMB (about $154,000 USD), while China’s Corporate Law requires only 
a 30,000 Yuan RMB (about $4,600 USD) registered capital for companies without 
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specific regulation. In The Administrative Rules on Internet Audio-Video Programs 
Services (Cnci.gov.cn, 2008)  jointly issued by the State Administration of Radio, Film, 
and Television (SARFT) and the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) in December 
2007, it is stated that, to provide audio-visual content in the Internet, the subject must be 
a commercial corporation that is either state-owned or with a majority state-owned stake. 
Only the corporations that have successfully acquired a service certificate from SARFT 
can provide video uploading and sharing services for Internet users. According to this 
regulation, individuals, non-profit organizations, and foreign enterprises are not qualified 
as an online audio-video content provider. However, half a year later, to legitimize those 
foreign-invested video sharing websites established before the issuance of this 
regulation, SARFT issued a procedure of applying for a License of Broadcasting Audio-
Visual Programs via Information Networks (ChinaSARFT.gov.cn, 2008). It confirmed 
the qualification of those early foreign-invested video websites to apply for a certificate, 
but set a very high entry condition for those established and new applicant corporations. 
Corporations that apply to provide Internet audio-visual services should have a 
registered capital of no less than 10 million Yuan RMB (about $1.5 million USD). Those 
providing multiple categories of audio-visual content such as news, drama, 
entertainment and professional, etc. should have  registered capital no less than 20 
million Yuan RMB (about $3 million USD).  
In this regulation, non-profit Internet audio-visual content providers were allowed 
and exempted from the requirement of a minimum registered capital; however, they have 
to be established by news propaganda institutions. The news business is still in the firm 
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grip of the government and not commercialized. It is not even listed in the market areas 
that China promises to open after accession to the WTO (WTO, 2001). Thus, an audio-
visual sharing service becomes an exclusive privilege for large state capital and some 
large early foreign investors. 
While the regulations only clarify how to obtain legal approval for for-profit 
cultural activities, and, in the above case, for non-profit institutional cultural 
productions, these regulations are also biased against individuals. The Administrative 
Rules of Law Enforcement on the Cultural Market (Gov.cn, 2006) regulates both 
individuals and corporations, but detailed regulations on performance and performance 
brokers are addressed only to corporate subjects. How individuals can obtain legal 
approval was not mentioned at all. This regulation orientation is also confirmed in my 
interview with a SARFT official (Informant No. 1). He said that government 
administrations regulated only corporations, not individuals because individual citizens 
are under the jurisdiction of the Public Security Ministry and its local offices. This 
statement is not legally true since some regulations like The Administrative Rules of Law 
Enforcement on the Cultural Market do confirm the cultural administration’s jurisdiction 
over an individual’s cultural activity. However, individuals or corporations in those 
Rules must be conducting for-profit cultural activities such as performances, audio, 
video import, retail, showing, operations of Internet cafes, trading of art collections, etc. 
In practice, there is no specific regulation at all on individual non-profit cultural 
activities, which most Shanzhai online videos are. 
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In face of these policies that target corporations and for-profit operations, the 
corporate operators themselves and cultural producers like Lao Meng voluntarily adhere 
to such policies in order to get approvals and avoid arbitrary interference from different 
government agencies. First, non-profit cultural producers like Lao Meng turned their 
production into a commercial one in hope of securing government approval and avoiding 
arbitrary judgment by the government. To prepare for the second Shanzhai Spring 
Festival gala in 2009, Lao Meng applied for the License of Commercial Performance 
from the government of Dongcheng District in Beijing in the name of an established 
artistic troupe, because only a commercial art troupe can apply for approval of a 
commercial show. In the application, according to the procedures, he was required to file 
not only places and the schedule of the performance, but also the content of the show, 
including lyrics of songs, scripts, etc. This content is subject to the censorship of the 
cultural administration in terms of the principles of “serving the people, serving 
socialism, prioritizing social benefits, enrich and enhance people’s spiritual lives” 
(Xinhuanet.com, 2005a). But an unexpected scenario that later developed was when the 
Dongcheng District cultural administrator was contacted by a journalist regarding 
approving the Shanzhai gala. Officials had no idea that the approved application was 
filed by Lao Meng because the application was filed with Lao Meng’s full name, which 
is not well-known, and with the title of Folk Spring Festival Gala, instead of the 
Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala. Later, Lao Meng told me, the officer called him and told 
him to bring the approval document back for a review. Lao Meng refused to do so and 
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only agreed to provide any supplementary documents if specified. This interlude ended 
with no conclusion. 
Secondly, Lao Meng’s decision of applying for approval as a commercial 
performance is also a result of sponsors’ and the video sharing websites’ pressure. These 
commercial actors involved in Shanzhai productions took serious considerations 
regarding the legality of this production before deciding to participate. Informant No.2 
who is a public relations agent for a domestic company said they had been tracking Lao 
Meng’s gala and its news coverage since 2008. But they didn’t decide to provide 
sponsorship until 2009 when he knew Lao Meng had gotten approval from the cultural 
administration of the local government. It is the same for informant No.3, a manager of a 
video sharing website that hosted Lao Meng’s second gala for the 2010 Spring Festival. 
Unlike a commercial performance’s goal of maximizing economic benefits, 
Shanzhai producers’ subjecting their non-profit productions to the economic hegemony 
is not out of as much concern of maximizing profit as that of economic survival. Lao 
Meng actually paid much of the expenses of the first gala with his personal savings. He 
said, “This time [the second gala], even if I’m losing money as a failed commercial 
operation, I am at least legal, though I really couldn’t afford paying that much money on 
my own again. So, I was worried about an arbitrary ban in the first year, while in the 
second year I was worried more about money.” But here, by “money” he didn’t really 
mean profit, but simply defraying the cost. 
These for-profit and corporate-biased policies kill two birds with one stone. First, 
grassroots cultural producers are excluded from gaining legality for their productions 
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within an exchange system of various capital. In other words, by not specifying 
procedures for them to obtain legality of their cultural productions, these productions are 
subjected to the arbitrary judgment of government agencies. If the government allows 
non-profit cultural producers to enter this exchange system, it means their cultural tastes 
and content are sanctioned by the State as legitimate capital which can be used to trade 
for economic benefits.  However, since these grassroots cultural producers are not profit-
oriented, they are less likely to surrender any resource in exchange for economic 
benefits. Hence, it would be hard for the government to lure them into cultural 
compliance with economic hegemony. Even if they opt in to the economic hegemony in 
practice, they are less afraid of losing, or gaining less, economic benefits by defending 
their capital taste and content. Thus, it would be hard for the government to control these 
cultural expressions in a hegemonic manner. More importantly, if they entered the media 
system, their cultural capital can be publicized and even popularized. Then they could 
gain tremendous symbolic and social capital, which threatens the State’s ability of 
defining culture. Thus, subjecting them to domination would be a safer and more 
efficient way of maintaining the government’s cultural dominance. This is why the local 
cultural administrator wanted to review, or maybe take the chance of review to revoke, 
the approval already issued to Lao Meng’s second gala, after knowing the application for 
commercial performance was filed by such a grassroots cultural producer. This means 
that even if Shanzhai producers gained approval by turning themselves into commercial 
performers, and even if they are also under the economic hegemonic pressure from 
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commercial sponsors and media, the government still doesn’t trust their cultural 
obedience and tries to exclude these producers from this exchange system.  
The second bird killed by the commercial and corporate biased policies is the 
security of the cultural compliances of the commercial cultural producers. In the paired 
strategies of promoting economic hegemony and voluntarily adhering to it, the state and 
commercial cultural producers, as well as commercial media, engage in an exchange of 
economic benefits and cultural capital. On the one hand, some commercial cultural 
producers willingly sacrifice their own cultural capital presented in the content and taste 
of their products, or the authenticity in cultural expressions, in order to enter the 
exchange process in the field of cultural production in China. By turning their 
production into for-profit cultural activities, Shanzhai producers have to give up the final 
say on the content and taste of their cultural expressions, as attested by the fact that they 
had to submit performance content, lyrics, scripts, etc. to the administrator for 
censorship. They have to compromise their Shanzhai cultural capital under the economic 
hegemony of sponsors and commercial media even if they just want to defray their cost 
by going commercial.  
On the other hand, commercial media need real profit for their economic survival. 
By setting a high entrance barrier with a very large registered capital, the government 
put high economic stakes on these commercial media, from television and radio content 
production, to all kinds of online services (metropolitan newspapers still have to affiliate 
with some party organ, which puts additional political stakes on them), to ensure their 
obedience to the cultural parameter in their products. As illustrated in the previous 
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examples, commercial media decided to opt in to hosting Shanzhai videos only after 
Shanzhai producers had gotten government approval as legal for-profit cultural 
activities. In order to stay in this lucrative business legitimately, commercial media have 
to give up part of their media power, or the meta-capital, such as their autonomy in topic 
choices, the perspectives of presenting social issues, etc. Under this policy orientation, 
media become allied with the state in controlling unruly cultural expressions that want 
public access. 
Thus, in spite of the government’s effort to singularize non-profit cultural 
productions from the exchange system, producers, as well as commercial corporations, 
tried to position Shanzhai cultural production as for-profit activities in response to the 
government’s strategic hegemonic policy. They gave up part of their cultural capital in 
exchange for economic survival, or the legitimacy of their production. This strategy does 
result in an increased diversity of cultural expressions appearing in media. However, a 
side effect of this strategy is that, by allowing private capital in cultural productions, the 
cultural capital of the producers is now not only subjected to the check of the state, but 
also to that of the cultural taste of commercial agents, such as commercial media and all 
kinds of sponsors. 
This strategy is both an exercise of disciplinary power over cultural production and 
governance through a market-oriented neo-liberalist mentality with economic hegemony. 
The inclusion in and exclusion from the capital exchange system is actually a battle for 
display or censorship in the surveillance assemblage of media. To be picked up by the 
panoptic media surveillance with state-sanctioned criteria, cultural producers have to 
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perform in the disciplined manner in order to gain the privilege of being displayed in 
media synopticons. This means that they have to obtain legal approval from the 
government as a for-profit cultural activity, usually at the cost of their cultural 
autonomy. Otherwise, they would be outlawed, censored, or excluded from the exchange 
system. Meanwhile, the market-driven, competition-based mechanism for cultural 
production promotes the neo-liberal rationality in cultural producers’ pursuit of their 
cultural expressions, including the Shanzhai producers.  
Strategy Two: The Government Issues Directives to Intervene in the Content of 
Cultural Production 
In the previous strategy, commercial media and grassroots cultural producers opted 
in to the economic hegemony to get government approvals of cultural production. By 
following the for-profit biased policies, commercial media gained economic capital and 
cultural producers sacrificed their cultural capital in exchange for symbolic capital 
through government approval which is the meta-capital the state owns. But other than 
maintaining cultural compliances through the strategy of economic hegemony, the state 
also tries to dominate cultural production through direct intervention in their content. In 
order to enter the media world, non-official cultural producers have to negotiate, even 
compromise, their specific cultural capital in order to stay in the media synopticons, 
which brings them more resources. 
The government regulators have inertia to use direct administrative command in 
regulating cultural productions and distributions, especially those in media. Before the 
media commercialization in the 1990’s, since all media were, by definition, the 
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mouthpiece of different levels of CCP organizations, the Party principle (dangxing 
yuanze) was the only and ultimate guideline of media work in China. As Yuezhi Zhao 
(1998) summarized, the party principle meant (1) “news media must accept the Party’s 
guiding ideology as its own”, (2) “they must propagate the Party’s programs, policies, 
and directives”, (3) “they must accept the Party’s leadership and stick to the Party’s 
organizational principles and press policies” (p. 19).  
The Party has multiple mechanisms for directing media’s work. There are internal 
messaging channels to convey the general rules and parameters for news operations. In 
addition, the Party sometimes gives specific instructions for reporting important 
domestic political and social issues, and it often mobilizes a media campaign for a period 
on defined topics to be given attention. But these instructions are limited to internal 
channels and never publicized. 
In today’s partially commercialized media system in China, the government is still 
using direct directives to supervise cultural productions. The following is one example of 
a directive in the production of the first Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala. Guizhou TV is 
the official television station of Guizhou province. Its satellite channel, which is 
accessible nationwide, wanted to co-produce and live-broadcast Lao Meng’s first gala. 
After a red-carpet-style news conference announcing the cooperation among Lao 
Meng’s Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala, Guizhou TV, and a major portal website, many 
media outlets devoted considerable coverage of this rare cooperation between an official 
medium and a grassroots individual (JinghuaNews, 2008). However, a week after this 
conference, SARFT issued a document banning television and radio stations from 
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“involving” or “hyping” the Shanzhai Spring Festival Galas (Q. Wu, 2008). Though this 
document was not referring to Lao Meng’s gala specifically, since there were other 
grassroots Spring Festival Galas in preparation, it was apparently addressing the 
cooperation between Guizhou TV and Lao Meng. 
Directives are not only imposed on state media, but also on privately owned 
commercial media, because they are subject to the license system of the government. In 
fact, as Informant No.3 admitted, their video sharing website that hosted Lao Meng’s 
Shanzhai gala has a special email address to receive the directives from the municipal 
propaganda department. They not only follow the arrangement and promotion of topics, 
but also arduously censor their video content according to these directives. Online video 
websites, since they have to acquire a license from SARFT, had to follow the ban on 
“involving or hyping” Shanzhai. Thus, the website that Informant No. 3 worked for 
didn’t cooperate with Lao Meng in 2008. 
These direct directives to state media, private media, and other institutions are 
different from those traditional instructions to report important issues or mobilizations 
for a media campaign for a given period. Instead of promoting important topics, the 
government commands media to tone down certain topics, which Zhao (2008) called 
passive censorship. This strategy has been repetitively used to neglect oppositional 
remarks of elite intellectuals and leave them in their small circles because public 
criticism of deviant ideas often has the reverse impact of increasing publicity of these 
ideas and creating high-profile dissidents and symbols of public opposition, what Liang 
Limin called “hooks” (2010). Liang examined the controlling strategies of the Chinese 
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government during the Beijing Olympic Games. One of the suggestions from a high-
profile Chinese lawyer who was advised by an American professor changed the 
government’s attitude toward dealing with potential troublemakers during the Games. In 
a letter titled “Spears vs. Hooks,” the lawyer suggested the government draw a line 
between destructive terror attacks, or the “spears” which wouldn’t draw public 
sympathy, and the “publicity campaigns by rights groups with an intention to provoke 
the Chinese government into overreaction so as to get media attention,” the “hooks” 
(Liang, 2010, p. 15). But this time, it was a grassroots individual who drew extensive 
newspaper, online, and television coverage that became a hook. As Lao Meng’s friend 
told him, “you get famous because SARFT bans you.” Later when a metropolitan 
newspaper asked for confirmation of this banning directive from SARFT, the 
interviewed official denied such a document and said “in terms of the Shanzhai culture, 
it’s a new phenomenon. We haven’t had time to issue any administrative measures 
regarding that yet” (Informant No.4).  
However, direct directives are only effective to institutions regulated by 
corresponding administrations. For example, SARFT supervises state television and 
radio stations, and it licenses non-news-non-commentary television and radio production 
institutions and online audio-visual service providers. However, it doesn’t directly 
regulate media based outside mainland China. Those media usually have a very limited 
penetration in mainland China, mainly in the areas adjacent to Hong Kong or Macau 
where they are based. Since their viewership on the mainland was not a crucial economic 
stake, these media do not follow the directives as strictly as mainland media. So 
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SARFT’s prohibition from involvement in Shanzhai galas was not quite effective to 
MASTV based in Macau, which actually broadcast the first Shanzhai gala during the 
2009 Spring Festival. Meanwhile, newspapers also fall out of SARFT’s jurisdiction. 
Even after the secret directives banning involvement in or hyping the Shanzhai Spring 
Festival gala, newspaper and text-based websites kept reporting on Lao Meng and his 
team, even with the rumors regarding SARFT’s directive on banning Shanzhai. The lack 
of a trans-media arrangement on the one hand hinders China’s ICT development as Ian 
Weber argued (2010); on the other hand, it leaves cracks for diverse cultural expressions 
to emerge out of it. 
In terms of the exchanges of or exclusion from the exchange of various capital, the 
directives work in two ways on commercial media and grassroots cultural producers. 
First, directives that aim to exclude individuals and civil institutions from being reported 
in the media actually function to prevent these individuals and civil institutions from 
obtaining symbolic capital. On the one hand, the authority of the directives intervening 
in cultural productions is derived from meta-capital of the State which decides what 
counts as cultural capital and what is not (Couldry, 2003a). Under this “No involvement, 
no hype” directive, Shanzhai’s cultural capital is denied the exchangeability by the State. 
On the other hand, as Couldry argued, media also have meta-capital. The directive of 
passive censorship insulated Shanzhai producers from symbolic capital granted by 
media’s synoptic displays. Thus, the cultural expression of this marginalized group was 
not able to get recognition, let alone prestige, via media. Without the recognition of their 
cultural expressions, these grassroots producers cannot capitalize on it in order to 
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exchange for other social resources, such as bargaining with the government or 
commercial sponsors. Also, without these social resources, these producers and their 
productions are subjected to the government’s arbitrary disposal.  
However, as the empirical evidence suggests, Shanzhai producers are far from 
being insulated from any possibility of expression. Text-based websites and metropolitan 
newspapers still provide symbolic capital. As Lao Meng said, some “warmhearted rich 
people” actually donated money to his team during the preparation of their first gala. 
This is not really sponsorship since the donor didn’t ask for publicity in return. But their 
authentic cultural expressions of the masses, or Shanzhai’s cultural capital, and the 
symbolic capital granted by online media and newspapers did bring them economic 
capital, though not much. 
Secondly, the directives, which circumscribe the parameter of allowed and 
prohibited content, serve to cultivate cultural producers with the habitus of the state-
sanctioned cultural capital. Bourdieu’s notion of cultural capital is not a one-shot 
directive or a printed manual, but the competence or grasp of unspoken rules (habitus) 
apprehended in long-term inculcation (Bourdieu, 2001; Bourdieu & Nice, 1984). For-
profit producers, in order to secure the legality of their commercial operation, willingly 
and arduously learn these boundaries and align themselves with the official cultural 
capital. This is similar to Bourdieu’s description of how a child is nurtured with specific 
cultural tastes in her early age in a bourgeois family. However, only commercial 
producers, included in the exchange system under the preceding strategy, have the 
privilege to receive these directives like a parental guide in a family. The non-profit and 
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individual cultural producers, discriminated against by policies mentioned in strategy 
one, are actually excluded from this possibility of inculcation. 
From a Foucauldian perspective, the state directives are sorting standards in the 
media surveillance assemblages that decide what can be publicly displayed in the 
synopticons and what can’t be. The sorting function of the media surveillance system is 
also one of the mechanisms of social governance to promote docile and disciplined 
model citizens while confining and isolating cultural deviants. Media’s proficiency with 
the sorting standards, as the cultivated cultural habitus, is a resource for themselves to 
survive and to economically succeed. However, we should not assume that media, 
especially commercial media, are loyal enforcers of the official cultural standards, 
wholeheartedly promoting and cultivating their audiences with the official cultural 
capital. Commercial media also have their own professional standards and other choices 
of sorting standards (cultural capital) which could bring them more benefits. The next 
strategy will address the autonomy of media and the tensions between the official 
cultural capital and the grassroots one. 
Strategy Three: The Government Promotes Cultural Hegemony While Commercial 
Media and Shanzhai Producers Manipulate Their Messages as Voluntary Self-
Censorship  
Censorship has been a routine resort and an effective method of controlling media 
discourses in China (Wacker, 2003; Zhang & Fleming, 2005; Y. Zhao, 1998; Yuezhi 
Zhao, 2008). It involves the Party’s direct involvement such as issuing directives to 
promote or to ban certain topics, even shutting down certain media outlets. 
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In face of the commercial drive and the user-generated content in new media, the 
traditional censorship measures are losing their effectiveness. It is almost impossible to 
censor those media content in a centralized manner. As Bill Clinton said, the Chinese 
government’s attempt to control free speech on the Internet was like trying to nail Jell-O 
on the wall.  
New strategies are implemented to promote a hegemonic norm in addition to direct 
interference. The first strategy already discussed is the government’s effort to promote 
an economic hegemony by regulating and allowing only for-profit, corporate cultural 
activities, and leaving non-profit or individuals’ cultural productions to a more 
subjective, case-by-case judgment. In addition to that economic hegemony, the 
government also encourages strategies that promote consensus among cultural workers. 
Government-appointed media managers explicitly promote consensus on the political 
boundaries among media workers to convert overt censorship into self-censorship (Y. 
Zhao, 1998, p. 121). In new media industry like the Internet, model enterprises and 
professional association take the lead in drafting self-regulation to implement self-
censorship (Weber & Lu, 2007). 
It is also evident in the cases of Shanzhai I examine herein that sponsors, 
commercial media, and Shanzhai producers are constantly guessing the parameters, 
negotiating for their space, and voluntarily repackaging their messages or even telling 
lies as self-censorship.  
One example concerns the guessing and testing of online discourse parameters as 
self-censorship. Though there were guidelines for prohibitive content in the regulations 
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of cultural activities and online video sharing services, they were usually very general 
and vague. Cultural producers, service providers, and commercial sponsors have to 
constantly guess and test the parameters. For example, in The Administrative Rules of 
Internet Audio-Visual Content, issued by SARFT, ten items of online audio-visual 
content were listed as prohibited for service providers to host. They include content 
deemed unconstitutional; harming national unity or sovereign and territorial integrity; 
leaking national secrets; harming national security, national honor or interest; disrupting 
social order or breaking social stability. For example, when Han Jiangxue was invited to 
record a lecture show on Napoleon by a commercial website, he and the website editor 
couldn’t agree on a small detail that mentioned the current Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. 
Han pointed out in his lecture show that many historical figures had education or a 
career background in geology, from Napoleon’s Chief of Staff to George Washington, to 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. But the editor asked Han not to mention Chinese 
politicians at all to avoid any sensitive connotation. Han couldn’t agree since he didn’t 
mean anything negative about Premier Wen and refused to record this part again. He 
said he was simply presenting a historical fact. Then the controversy was reported to a 
manager of the website to make a decision. The final decision was that they would put 
the version mentioning Wen Jiabao online and see if there would be any reaction from 
the government. It turned out no objections from the government were sent back. Thus, 
this version survived. Successful media entrepreneurs have to know, at least intuitively, 
where the boundary of political discourses is. Like Hu Shuli, manager of Finance 
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magazine which is famous for its investigative journalism, said that they never crossed 
the boundary, but were constantly testing and pushing it (J. Chen, 2009). 
The second example of self-censorship concerns SARFT’s ban of television and 
radio stations’ involvement in Shanzhai Spring Festival galas. Though this was a direct 
interference into television and radio stations’ work, the way Guizhou TV and Lao Meng 
explained the discontinuity of their cooperation was apparently the result of self-
censorship. A few days after announcing that Guizhou TV and Lao Meng would co-
produce the first Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala, SARFT issued a document banning all 
mainland television and radio stations from “involvement with or hyping” Shanzhai 
galas. Guizhou TV had to give up its plan of co-production. However, when some 
metropolitan newspapers reported the discontinuity of the cooperation, SARFT denied 
the existence of this document and Lao Meng cited his being afraid of losing the 
grassroots nature of Shanzhai as the reason for breaking the deal. In my interview with 
Lao Meng, he admitted that this was an excuse agreed upon between him and the 
Guizhou television station, in order not to expose SARFT’s intervention since it had 
denied that. This lie protected Guizhou TV from further offending its central 
administrator, SARFT. By citing his personal decision Lao Meng also avoided putting 
himself opposite a government agency and possibly inviting more severe interference. In 
this case, cultural producers and even a state medium self-censored their public message 
by telling a lie to secure their own survival. 
Another example of self-censorship in Shanzhai production was the name change of 
the second Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala. After meeting the qualifications and acquiring 
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all required approvals, Lao Meng’s second gala was in good shape as a for-profit cultural 
activity hosted by a corporate subject. However, other than his own website and 
intermittent metropolitan newspaper reports calling it the Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala, 
this activity appeared as the Folk Spring Festival Gala in all the application documents 
for government approval and video sharing websites that host its videos. 
Lao Meng decided to substitute “Folk” for “Shanzhai” more because of the 
pressures from cooperative commercial media and sponsors than his own will. First, he 
was told by the video websites that they couldn’t host his video if it was still called 
Shanzhai. These video websites work under the license of SARFT. They proactively 
self-censored the “Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala” based on SARFT’s reaction to the 
first Shanzhai gala a year before. Second, some sponsors were reluctant to provide 
support because they considered Shanzhai not compatible with their brand image. For 
example, a world-renowned camera equipment enterprise agreed to provide video 
cameras for their recording. However, they insisted on dropping the label of Shanzhai. In 
this last case, Lao Meng, based on the pressures from sponsors, cooperative media, and 
government agencies, self-censored his gala by changing its name. The websites hosting 
videos of the Folk gala also self-censored by naming all related video clips the “Folk 
Gala”. However, these video clips are also tagged as the Shanzhai gala, so users can still 
find these videos when they search with “Shanzhai.”  
Unlike avoiding or deleting certain content as self-censorship, in the last two cases 
cultural producers and media channels carried out a new measure of self-censorship. 
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They reframed certain content and even lied to avoid confronting the parameter set by 
the government in order to secure the survival of their message. 
The commercial media and commercial cultural producers, as described in Strategy 
One, are granted legitimacy to (re)produce culture that is sanctioned by the state. Their 
economic capital (both registered capital and possible future profits) are like bail bonds 
in the exchange to legitimacy of cultural production. If they don’t acquire enough and 
correct official cultural capital, their economic stake is jeopardized. 
The second strategy, as I argued previously, is both a way to exclude non-corporate 
or non-commercial cultural producers from the field of cultural production, and a way to 
cultivate legitimate producers about the rules or habitus of the official culture, in order to 
acquire the official cultural capital. 
However, in this strategy, other than the compliance relationship between the 
government and the cultural producers illustrated in the second example, in example one 
and three, we see that these commercial media or cultural producers are not dupes, and 
they do their own calculations. The strategy of self-censorship in Shanzhai cultural 
productions is simultaneously the internalization of official cultural tastes and the 
attempts to test, negotiate, and even evade it. In the first example, we see that the 
websites struggled about self-censorship. Although this struggle seems to be between the 
individual Shanzhai producer Han Jiangxue and the website editor, the managers’ 
decision to keep the mention of the Chinese premiere reflects the website operator’s 
unwillingness to fully commit to self-censorship and a willingness to take an opportunity 
cost to test the boundary of censorship. Here, the cultural capital of producers or media 
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is not always unconditionally sacrificed in face of economic security, although they are 
willing to sacrifice it if objections are raised by the government. Rather, they would test 
the exchange relationship, in order to avoid unnecessary loss of cultural capital because 
of a misconception of the boundary of the official cultural capital.  
In the third example, the self-censorship achieved a conforming-cum-evading 
effect. On the surface, Lao Meng and the video websites did drop the name of Shanzhai, 
as a self-censorship of Shanzhai informed by their comprehension of the government’s 
cultural parameter. On a deeper level, they successfully evaded the censorship by 
changing the name into the Folk Spring Festival Gala. The content of their cultural 
production did reach the audience. What’s more, the websites tagged these videos as 
Shanzhai in order to be found by search engines. In this way, they successfully defended 
their own cultural capital without jeopardizing their economic benefits or legitimacy of 
production. Thus, self-censorship actually enabled the preservation of Shanzhai cultural 
producers’ subcultural capital, rather than, as a simplified view of self-censorship 
suggests, it served as selfish accomplices that sell their own cultural capital for an 
economic one.  
To fully understand self-censorship, Lao Meng and Guizhou TV station’s 
explanations of the discontinuity of their cooperation in the second example provide 
another perspective about how dominant cultural capital is naturalized, reproduced, and 
reinforced. Usually, we understand self-censorship as voluntary conforming to 
censorship directives. These directives are sometimes issued publicly, and sometimes 
not. When they are publicly issued, like the requirements for content of a commercial 
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cultural performance, the way dominant official culture is maintained is exposed to the 
public. It is not natural, thus it invites critical thinking and criticism. But as Bourdieu 
argued, to preserve the cultural capital of the dominant group, it is important to do it 
naturally, make it appear disinterested, and make people misrecognize it. In the second 
example, by denying the existence of the “No involvement, no hyping” directive, and by 
citing Lao Meng’s personal reason for discontinuing the cooperation between the 
Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala and Guizhou TV, the direct interference in cultural 
production by the government was concealed. Lao Meng and Guizhou TV’s self-
censorship, though protecting their survival, actually hid the way cultural dominance is 
maintained with a lie. Thus, the final preservation of the mainstream culture is not 
attributed to the government’s deliberate censorship, but rather to some random reasons 
that protect the government’s cultural legitimacy. 
Strategy Four: Shanzhai Producers Voluntarily Adopted Professional Taste 
If Strategy Two is various parties’ reactions to the promotion of the economic 
hegemony and Strategy Three is the reactions to the promotion of the cultural hegemony 
regarding media content, then Strategy Four is related to another aspect of cultural 
hegemony: taste or style of cultural products. 
The aesthetic sense is an important disposition that Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Nice, 
1984) theorized to illustrate how cultural capital marks class distinctions. For Bourdieu, 
it is “one manifestation of the system of dispositions produced by the social 
conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence” and it is also 
“a distinctive expression of a privileged position in social space whose distinctive value 
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is objectively established in relationship to expressions generated from different 
conditions” (p. 56). Aesthetic tastes, as manifested social spaces as wide as art works, 
clothes, cosmetics, home decorations, both unite people with the similar social 
dispositions and separate them from others. In fact, a taste is usually asserted in negation 
of other tastes. The competition between tastes or, more generally, between different 
types of cultural capital, is seen in the strategies different parties employed in Shanzhai 
practices. Meanwhile, the negotiation of tastes is also intertwined with socio-economic 
factors. 
All the Shanzhai producers and performers that I interviewed took actions to ensure 
quality production or at least to adhere to the norms of popular taste defined by media 
professionals. For example, Han Jiangxue tried hard to examine mainstream cultural 
products and then imitate them and practice to enhance his presentation skills and 
writing style. As I described in Chapter three, Han Jiangxue later, with more contacts 
with media, put his faith in arduous practicing in order to grasp the professional skills 
and styles, and no longer attributed his being denied by mainstream media to the lack of 
a legitimate title or affiliation. When talking about his second book on a heroic figure in 
Chinese history, he said:  
I consciously tried to write it better. In the past, I was done with it after finishing 
writing. I didn’t know how to make it enjoyable for readers. Now I have this in 
mind. I try to read more elegantly written books. In the past I concentrated more on 
the stories, the conflicts, the fights, and didn’t pay attention to how readable it was. 
Now I’m leaning toward the elegance of language use… I hope I could have 
someone giving me instructions, and disabuse me... Now I’m trying to figure it out 
myself. You fail, and then you realize some problems. Then you resolve it to make 
progress. (Interview with Han Jiangxue on May 31, 2010) 
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He also commented on Lao Meng’s first Shanzhai gala:  
He [Lao Meng] didn’t really know how to make a Spring Festival gala at that time. 
He was not competent, just like me in the early time when my works were for fun 
and not good enough. If you were given a chance, it flashes away, and you can’t 
grasp it. (Interview with Han Jiangxue on May 31, 2010) 
 
When I asked him how he practiced his presentation skills, he said, “Nothing, but speak 
more. I take your interview as a chance to practice speaking. I’ve been talking with 
many journalists, and some interviews were as long as three hours. I feel I’m better at 
speaking now than before” (Interview with Han Jiangxue on May 31, 2010). He 
especially told me that a popular speaker of the CCTV Lecture Show instructed him for 
about ten minutes, and he found it enlightening. During the recording of the Napoleon 
lectures for a video sharing website, he was also instructed by an editor with a 
professional media background. He felt that he made progress in making that show and 
that he understood more about professional media production, which he should have 
learned. To Han Jiangxue, a good presentation or elegant writing comes from work 
experience in mainstream media and suggestions from professional media workers. As a 
strategy, he took every chance to align himself with the professional standard of 
presentation and writing style or taste. 
Another example of opting in mainstream production style is the second Shanzhai 
Spring Festival Gala. As Lao Meng said, there were more volunteers with professional 
media backgrounds and more hired media professionals involved in the preparation and 
performance of the second gala. He realized the “poor” quality of the first gala, which 
was like an “amateurs’ get-together,” and that it wouldn’t help Shanzhai’s long-term and 
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sustainable development. Then, in the grassroots audition for the second gala, he and 
other judges agreed to pay attention to performers with more media experience. They 
also used a professional studio and crew to shoot the second Shanzhai gala. 
The third example is the Shanzhai Red Mansions. The Shanzhai videos clips 
imitating the TV drama of Red Mansions got popular not only because they were shot 
during a family reunion during the Spring Festival holiday in 2009, and the background 
of the videos is family members watching television and playing mahjong, but also 
because, as a news report and many online posts suggested, it’s a “20 Yuan budget 
production” (Z. Chen, 2009). However, after gaining viral popularity on the Internet and 
being widely reported on by newspapers, the family crew, especially the director-as-
cameraman, started to write the continuity shooting scripts and paid more attention to 
clothes, makeup, lighting, and other professional aspects. They even gave their crew 
team a name, “Flower-Not-Flower.” 
These actions of adhering to professional standards and taste are widely witnessed 
after certain Shanzhai products, including those of cell phones, got popular whose 
producers wanted to secure their long-term survival and appeal to broader 
audiences/customers.  
In my analysis of Shanzhai video producers, it seems they did this both due to the 
pressure from media and sponsors and out of their own will. Lao Meng’s second Spring 
Festival Gala was explicitly required to be better produced by some sponsors and the 
video sharing websites as a premise of cooperation. A manager of one of the websites 
said “in a mainstream online medium like ours, they [Shanzhai video makers] won’t 
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survive in the long run, neither will our cooperation, if they keep their DIY style, 
because our audience won’t buy it” (Informant No.5). Han Jiangxue kept practicing 
following the styles of mainstream cultural products because he believed in the virtues of 
mainstream styles, though he admitted this was not the fun part of his writing, even 
when he insisted that he wrote for fun. 
Behind these adoptions, producers also experienced struggles between maintaining 
grassroots autonomy and following professional advice. Han Jiangxue had a number of 
disagreements with the website editor who had a background in professional media 
production. They couldn’t agree on how and when to release a suspension in Han’s 
presentations, and they had different opinions on the placement of captions in the videos. 
While in most cases he at last gave up his insistence and followed a professional’s 
opinions, Han felt his own way of expression was compromised. A few performers in 
Lao Meng’s gala I interviewed also had mixed feelings toward professional standards. 
On the one hand, they agreed with the better production quality and better promise of 
long-term development. But on the other hand, they felt they were kept-under and even 
disparaged by members in their crew who had professional backgrounds. While 
sometimes they thought they had creative ideas, professionals usually saw them as 
weird, unfeasible, or simply nonsense. But these struggles didn’t prevent most Shanzhai 
producers from opting into professional taste and production standards, which is a 
popular strategy of these producers for their survival. 
Undoubtedly, media coverage grants Shanzhai cultural producers enormous 
symbolic capital. Han Jiangxue’s lecture show was promoted to the front page of 
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sina.com, one of the top Chinese Internet portals. That link brought his video more visits 
in a few days than in the weeks after he uploaded it to his video-log. Metropolitan 
newspapers also thronged around him to request interviews. Lao Meng’s Shanzhai 
Spring Festival gala drew extensive attention after first being reported by a metropolitan 
newspaper in Beijing. With the circulation of his story in various media ranging from 
local TV stations to metropolitan newspapers nationwide and Internet news portals and 
BBS, his fame as a grassroots hero soared. Chen Weishi’s Shanzhai Red Mansions, after 
being shared across the Internet and reported by local metro newspapers whose reports 
also went viral on the Internet, made Chen a local celebrity.  
Such symbolic capital is valuable for Shanzhai producers who lack other types of 
capital and are generally marginalized. Han Jiangxue received some opportunities to 
make lecture shows and to freelance for some magazines. Lao Meng got many 
volunteers nationwide to participate in his gala. Chen Weishi even got a job offer from a 
local media production company.  In the next strategy, I will describe how these 
Shanzhai producers even used the symbolic capital to negotiate the government’s 
suppression.  
However, these Shanzhai producers gained the symbolic status with a cost. By 
opting into professional standards and tastes, they had to sacrifice their own cultural 
capital of Shanzhai, or the authenticity of grassroots spirit as some see it. 
As illustrated in the examples above, producers had to sometimes give up the final 
say of their works to professionals. Han Jiangxue, though he disagreed on the 
presentation style and details of video editing, had to follow the website editor’s 
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opinions. Lao Meng, in order to gain support from video sharing websites, had to favor 
professional performers, some of whom were even paid workers rather than volunteers, 
in the auditions for his production crew. Chen Weishi’s later production of Red 
Mansions, as himself becoming a media professional, was produced with more 
professional polishing. The pursuit and attempts of maintaining symbolic capital greatly 
compromised Shanzhai producers’ authentic subcultural capital. 
The reason why commercial media constantly pressure Shanzhai media is out of  
consideration of their own economic benefits. As Nick Couldry (2003a) argued, media 
have the meta-capital to define popular tastes. They use this power, on the one hand, to 
lure cultural producers to comply with their tastes with symbolic capital (media 
exposure), and on the other hand, to harvest economic capital for themselves. The 
popular taste defined by the media, especially commercial media in this case, are more 
aligned with that of the urban elites who have higher commercial values but are not 
necessarily the audiences Shanzhai productions are originally intended for. As the 
manger of a video sharing website (Informant No. 5) said:  
[G]ames, beauties, hot social issues, otherwise, nothing is mainstream…we consider 
the content of videos from the perspective of our advertisers. They won’t advertise 
in poorly made videos…We don’t want to bear social responsibility, which is too 
risky for a business. 
 
This manager who was directly involved in Han Jiangxue’s later lecture show on 
Napoleon said that Han was too “stubborn” in defending his own style. 
Thus, Shanzhai producers are not only subjected to the discipline of official cultural 
tastes, though not necessarily recognized as discipline by Shanzhai producers, as 
illustrated in the previous strategy. Shanzhai producers are also subjected to the popular 
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taste defined by commercial media. They have to negotiate and, most of the time, 
compromise in face of two different cultural tastes. Meanwhile, they have to diligently 
learn to acquire both the official cultural capital and the popular cultural capital, and 
suffer constant struggle with their own subcultural capital, in exchange for legitimacy of 
cultural production and economic survival, if not profit maximization.  
A problem of the Shanzhai producers who adhere to the mainstream tastes is that 
they, as Bourdieu said, “misrecognize” this style change as something disinterested, 
without seeing the power relationship behind the cultural negotiation. Han’s later change 
of his explanation of his failure to enter the mainstream is a perfect example. At first, he 
thought he was rejected by CCTV because of his lack of a legitimate title, or the 
institutionalized cultural capital. But, at that time, he didn’t question his own 
competence of presenting his history knowledge. However, later with more media 
exposure and opportunities to present himself, he came to attribute his rejection to his 
incompetence in presenting things in an appealing way, rather than the discrimination 
against his cultural capital. The mechanism through which the dominant culture 
maintains its hegemony was misrecognized by Han as the process of learning elegant 
words and appealing presentation skills for his own good. While he saw himself gaining 
more official cultural capital with arduous learning, he didn’t really think it’s also a loss 
of his own cultural capital, or suppression of his cultural expression. This perfectly 
delineated the process of internalization of a neoliberal mentality of self-improvement 
toward a market-decided “professional quality,” without realizing the structural 
inequality and discrimination. Shanzhai producers’ adherence to professional standards 
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manifests how the neoliberal rationality “enterprises” subjects as the “technology of the 
self” (Foucault, 1988; N. Rose, 1992). Meanwhile, the pleasure of producing Shanzhai 
videos arises not only from the making-do itself, but also from the success of 
enterprising the self with “the technology of the self”.  
However, again, we need to caution against an essentialized image of Shanzhai 
producers as passive dupes. There is never a lack of struggle among Shanzhai producers 
regarding defending or surrendering to media professionals’ pressure. In my interviews 
with the performers who attended Lao Meng’s second Spring Festival gala, there are 
abundant accounts of different opinions on professionals’ involvement or take-over. 
Informant No. 6, a 22 year old freelancing actress in Beijing, said that the thing that she 
disliked most in the process of the Shanzhai gala production was the condescending or 
even disparaging attitudes of those performers and directors who had more professional 
experiences toward those who had less. Informant No. 7, though seeing the commercial 
operation and the professionals’ involvement necessary for Shanzhai’s long-term 
survival, insisted on the presence of “folk, even vulgar” elements in the Shanzhai 
performance to maintain its identity. But Informant No. 8, a graduate of an artistic major 
who’s preparing to enter graduate school, supports more professional production and 
mainstream tastes in Shanzhai production. He explained that “for us in the production, 
we feel the fun of the amateur production, but the audience can only see your final 
products and products like these are not good enough to meet their expectations.” The 
same for Han Jiangxue: though he arduously tried to acquire the popular cultural capital 
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by reading mainstream books, talk to mainstream producers, he also had odds with the 
website editor on production details during his later lecture shows. 
But we don’t have to lament the weakness of Shanzhai producers. The symbolic 
capital at the cost of some of their authentic subcultural capital also empowers Shanzhai 
producers as illustrated in the following strategy. 
Strategy Five: Shanzhai Producers Use Media Exposure as Leverage in Negotiation 
with Media, Sponsors, and Government Agencies 
All Shanzhai producers and their works received extensive attention in the media. 
Some of them were spotted by traditional media first, and then were followed upon by 
other traditional media or went viral on the Internet. For example, Lao Meng’s Shanzhai 
Spring Festival Gala was first reported by a metropolitan newspaper that got a tip from 
one of its readers. The reader saw a mini-van carrying a banner saying “Shanzhai Spring 
Festival Gala: Challenge CCTV, Wish the People a Happy New Year” and called the 
news hotline. Then visits to the website of the Shanzhai Gala spiked since the day it was 
reported. As Lao Meng told me, dozens of media visited his office or called for 
interviews in the first few days after the gala was reported. Also because of the extensive 
coverage by many metropolitan newspapers and the circulation of these news stories 
online, Lao Meng drew the attention of Guizhou TV station, which decided to co-
produce and broadcast the first Shanzhai Spring Festival gala. 
Some other Shanzhai producers first went viral on the Internet and then were 
followed by traditional media. Chen Weishi’s Shanzhai Red Mansions was circulated on 
BBS and video sharing websites first. Then some local metropolitan newspapers in the 
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Sichuan province where Chen lived reported on him and his family crew. These local 
reports were posted and shared online with the videos, and drew wider attention of 
media nationwide. In follow-up reports, more detailed stories were written on Chen, 
Chen’s sister, the performer of Lin Daiyu, a lead character in the video clips, and the 
shooting of these videos. Han Jiangxue, who produced the Shanzhai Lecture Show, also 
was first popular online. About two weeks after he uploaded his videos, they were linked 
to the homepage of a large portal website, Sina.com, and then went viral on the Internet. 
Newspaper and television stations followed up and gave him even more exposure. After 
getting famous, these Shanzhai producers were not only interviewed about their own 
lives and works, but also were asked to comment on broader topics such as popular 
culture, innovation, and so on. In other words, after entering into the “media world” and 
becoming “media persons” (Couldry, 2003b), they were granted tremendous symbolic 
power by the media like other celebrities. 
Shanzhai producers also know the importance of media attention, which leads to 
more resources, and do not even hesitate to cheat to maintain media enthusiasm about 
their works. Most of these Shanzhai producers were born after the opening up and 
reform policy, and are baptized with the ideology of commercialization. Just as Naomi 
Klein described the emerging generation of activist artists in New York, Shanzhai 
producers “will not concern themselves with old ethical dilemmas like selling out since 
they are a walking sales pitch for themselves already, intuitively understanding how to 
produce prepackaged art, to be their own brand” (Klein, 2002, p. 294). For example, 
right after Lao Meng’s Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala was covered in newspapers, more 
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journalists flooded into his office. But he had no applicants to participate in his Shanzhai 
gala by that time, and he even hadn’t designed an application form. He admitted that he 
then designed an application form and made up more than ten of them with his friends’ 
information before journalists came to interview him. During the interviews, he showed 
these forms to the journalists but didn’t allow them to take pictures of these forms or to 
contact these applicants. He told the journalists that the applicants “are not here, and 
they have their jobs. Please don’t disturb their lives before we decide to select their 
performances.” Lao Meng said that “the media and I use each other. They need my story 
to attract eye-balls, and I need a time difference. They reported on me, and I got more 
applicants with that [media coverage].” 
Shanzhai producers also use media attention to leverage government decisions. 
Government agencies in China’s more dynamic media landscape are constantly in the 
media spotlight. State media serve as the mouthpiece of the CCP and rarely challenge 
government administrations. Their “media supervisions” (or oversight) functions are 
very limited compared to their supposed role to sing the praise of their bosses. Most 
negative exposures are limited to blaming individual officials or institutions and are 
usually a part of an orchestrated media campaign. However, with the spinning off of 
commercial sectors from party organs, these more liberal media have felt the push of 
market competition and started to conducting more investigative reports with critical 
stances (Yuezhi Zhao, 2000b). These commercial media, such as metropolitan 
newspapers and business magazines, tend to report on the dark side of lower level 
administration more than their own political affiliations (C.-c. Lee, et al., 2006, p. 593), 
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or of the regions outside the jurisdiction of their political affiliations (yidi jiandu), 
though the yidi jiandu was later discouraged by the central government to appease some 
local officials (Yuezhi Zhao, 2008). Other than the commercial drive, these media also 
have a stronger adherence to Western journalistic norms. As Informant No. 9, a 
metropolitan newspaper journalist, said, they tried hard to maintain their objectivity and 
provide direct evidence and quotes of the news subjects. Government officials, then, see 
them as instigators of social unrest with controversial news issues. These officials try 
hard to restrain from “falling into their traps” and even refuse to comment to avoid 
misinterpretation or being quoted out of context. When asked about metropolitan 
newspapers’ interviews with him regarding Shanzhai, Informant No. 10, a producer of 
the official China Central Television, said “I refuse to comment on that. No matter what 
I say, I am always wrong.” 
Shanzhai producers take advantage of government officials’ reluctance to be 
involved in Shanzhai news directly to negotiate for their benefits. When the Law 
Enforcement of Culture in Beijing came to investigate Lao Meng’s preparation of the 
first Shanzhai gala and accused him of organizing an unlicensed commercial 
performance, Lao Meng immediately contacted the Macau-based satellite television 
station. During the investigation visit, the primary inspector from the Beijing Law 
Enforcement of Culture told Lao Meng, in a bossy tone, that “the Shanzhai Spring 
Festival Gala is a good thing, but…”, Lao Meng immediately took note of it, interrupted 
the official and said that journalists were on the way and he would tell media this 
comment. The inspector immediately denied his positive attitude toward Shanzhai. The 
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investigating team finally gave Lao Meng some “advice” and decided that it was a non-
commercial performance and left before the Macau television crew arrived. Lao Meng 
carved out his space by playing the media card with the government officials, so the 
government would not be able to arbitrarily ban his show without substantial evidence. 
In contrast to government agencies’ avoidance of media exposure, the sponsors 
have mixed feelings about media coverage. On the one hand, advertisers and various 
media wanted to be involved in Shanzhai production and distribution to gain more public 
attention and viewership. There were public relation companies that offered goods and 
money to Lao Meng’s gala in exchange for the appearance of their clients’ logos or 
mention of their clients’ products in the show. The Guizhou television station and a 
handful of websites offered to broadcast the show or even to collaborate in production. 
But on the other hand, they also tried to avoid negative coverage in the media on 
Shanzhai issues. 
One example of Shanzhai producers taking advantage of commercial sponsors’ 
mixed attitudes happened between Lao Meng and a vacation resort, which provided his 
team free meals, lodging, and studio space during the first gala. With plenty of news 
coverage on Shanzhai production and wide circulation of these productions online, 
Shanzhai had obtained tremendous symbolic capital. At this point, it was hard for the 
government to ban Shanzhai without a legitimate reason. Then, government agencies 
had to turn to other parties in the Shanzhai production to stop or discourage it. Various 
agencies of the local government ordered some commercial media and sponsors to 
secretly withdraw their support. At the time these commercial actors had to follow the 
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directives from the government. They couldn’t tell the real story when media reported 
the reasons of their withdrawal since it was a secret order by the government. During the 
preparation of the first Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala in 2008, a very large and famous 
resort in suburban Beijing offered Lao Meng free accommodation and meals for his 
team, which was comprised of volunteer performers from different provinces. One day a 
manager of the resort told Lao Meng and his team to leave and refused to provide further 
support. Lao Meng was told privately that the resort was under pressure from the local 
public security department. Later, in the presence of the resort manager, Lao Meng told 
reporters that the resort withdrew their sponsorship, and he would give up the whole 
activity. Immediately, the resort manager contacted his boss regarding this. Before long, 
the resort agreed to continue supporting Lao Meng secretly, but asked the journalists to 
stop reporting their withdrawal. They also toned down their presence in the whole gala 
as a sponsor. 
In this strategy, we see that Shanzhai producers used the symbolic capital granted 
by media in exchange for all kinds of resources that are important to their cultural 
production. First, the producers tried their best to maintain public attention through news 
coverage. They even called the media themselves to provide information about their 
progress. This helps Shanzhai producers get a continuous supply of symbolic capital in 
order to “buy” other resources. Second, in face of the government agencies, though 
Shanzhai producers are excluded from a capital exchange system as much as possible 
and are subjected to arbitrary judgment, they can capitalize on their substantial symbolic 
capital to bargain with the government for their survival and development. Third, 
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Shanzhai producers’ symbolic capital is an important attraction to commercial sponsors. 
In order to get media exposure along with Shanzhai products, these sponsors are willing 
to contribute their economic capital to Shanzhai productions. 
However, we should also be aware that, though Shanzhai producers harvested 
enormous symbolic capital, this capital is granted mostly by commercial media such as 
metropolitan newspapers, video sharing websites, and syndicated entertainment shows 
on television and radio, which the government does not fully trust. As shown in Strategy 
four, the symbolic capital of Shanzhai producers is earned at the cost of their subcultural 
capital. They had to sacrifice their cultural expressions in terms of taste and content and 
follow the popular cultural taste defined by commercial media. Strategy two, regarding 
government’s censorship, and strategy three, regarding cultural producers’ self-
censorship, also showed that media-sanctioned cultural capital is not necessarily in line 
with the government-sanctioned one. Their relationships are under constant negotiation 
and struggle. Thus, excessive symbolic capital from the media could also invite the 
government’s negative attitude. In fact, SARFT’s banning television and radio stations 
from involvement or hyping Shanzhai emerged amidst extensive and intensive news 
coverage on the cooperation between Guizhou TV station and Lao Meng. Thus, the 
symbolic capital of Shanzhai producers could be either leverage to negotiate with the 
government or a well-marked target inviting government interference. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of this chapter, I asked two research questions. First, what 
strategies are employed by different actors in the process of Shanzhai cultural 
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production, circulation and regulation? The second is regarding the implications of these 
strategies on the power dynamics among these actors. 
There are five strategies presented: (1) policies regarding cultural productions 
exclude non-profit cultural producers from economic hegemony, but these producers 
willingly subscribe to it; (2) the government issues directives to intervene in the content 
of cultural productions; (3) the government promotes cultural hegemony and commercial 
media, and Shanzhai producers manipulate messages as voluntary self-censorship; (4) 
Shanzhai producers adopt taste and production standards defined by media 
professionals; (5) Shanzhai producers use media exposure as leverage in negotiating 
with media, sponsors and government agencies. 
Using the conceptual frameworks of Bourdieu and Kopytoff, I analyzed the 
strategies of various actors in the field of Shanzhai cultural production in terms of capital 
exchanges or inclusion in/exclusion from it. I tried to avoid an essentializing stance on 
the empowerment or disempowerment of Shanzhai cultural producers in the current 
communication system in China. Instead, the complex relationships of power dynamics 
are presented in terms of capital acquirement and surrender. 
From the perspective of social governance and resistance through the assemblages 
of surveillance, all these strategies that are employed by different social actors involve 
media surveillance. To evade censorship, or the hostile panoptic gaze, commercial media 
and Shanzhai producers repackaged their messages, such as turning a Shanzhai gala into 
the “folk” gala. To gain access to the synoptic display in the media assemblages, many 
of which are commercial in nature, Shanzhai producers opt in to the economic 
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hegemony, the state-sanctioned cultural hegemony, and/or the media-sanctioned cultural 
hegemony. But in order to preserve their subculture and, sometimes, economic benefits, 
these producers also use the symbolic capital granted by media to challenge these 
hegemonies, which co-exist as discrepant sorting standards in the Chinese media 
assemblage. Media, on the one hand, are the site where these negotiations, governance, 
resistance, or compromises are made. On the other hand, media themselves are also part 
of the assemblage that change the availability and rates of capital exchange. 
Thus, it is found that, in the current communication system, grassroots cultural 
producers do have more opportunities to acquire social capital, symbolic capital, and 
even economic capital in exchange for other types of resources. The government does 
not have an ironclad power of decision as traditionally conceptualized and has to control 
cultural production with a combination of multiple measures. However, in order to 
survive, the cultural producers in this exchange system have to subject themselves to two 
partly overlapping but independent cultural habituses, one of the official-sanctioned 
culture and the other of popular taste constructed and backed by commercial media. The 
alliances among actors are constantly shifting depending on the exchange relationships. 
The subjection to media cultural hegemony and the government cultural hegemony 
are different in the way Shanzhai producers think about them. On the one hand, the 
Shanzhai producers use self-censorship to repackage their message simply to pass 
through it. It manifests the state’s disciplinary power exercised upon media and Shanzhai 
producers. They know the existence of the disciplines articulated in regulations, 
directives, and even in their guesses, and internalize them to carry out certain aligned 
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actions. On the other hand, it is evident that some Shanzhai producers are subject to the 
media cultural hegemony by putting real faith in it. It is identified by Bourdieu as 
misrecognition. In this case, it is the market-driven, self-improvement mentality that is 
internalized while also being misrecognized. Shanzhai producers carried out creative 
actions based on this rational calculation in order to “improve” their products, by 
learning, practicing, and favoring professional participants and operations, etc. 
However, Shanzhai producers as a social group should also not be essentialized. 
Among themselves, there were conflicting opinions about the strategies that should be 
used and on valuation of their own sub-cultural capital. Not only the different Shanzhai 
productions, the gala, the Red Mansions, and the Lecture Show, employed different 
strategies under their respective conditions, but also participants in one production, such 
as the Shanzhai gala, also disputed the directions for the show to follow. Every single 
Shanzhai producer is a social agent out of his/her own habitus, and their habituses are 
generative of social interactions on the macro level. With the study of strategies of 
Shanzhai cultural production, circulation and regulation, we can see complex power 
dynamics in the communication system that is rooted in the complex social structure of 
contemporary Chinese society. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE DISCOURSE ON SHANZHAI: CONFLICTING DISCIPLINES 
 
In the previous chapters, I examined the production, circulation, and regulation of 
Shanzhai videos as ritualistic uses of the media/surveillance system and the strategies 
different parties utilized to carve out spaces in the surveillance assemblages either to be 
spotted and displayed or to evade gazes and to avoid censorship. Hence, I argued that 
Shanzhai practices manifest the governance and resistance of how people live their lives 
through media. It is a combination of disciplinary power and governmentality that is 
promoted and resisted simultaneously. However, in the media assemblage, we should 
not assume a monolithic standard that decides model citizens or deviants. There are 
internal conflicts in terms of the sorting standards of the media surveillance system, 
considering that the official and commercial media co-exist in a complex relationship. 
The reason why Shanzhai became a prominent phenomenon and the reason for 
which these investigated cases here are widely seen as representatives of Shanzhai 
cultural productions are attributed, at least to a great extent, to extensive media coverage. 
It is rare for spontaneous grassroots cultural activities to draw such attention from all 
kinds of media, not only the commercial ones, but also the official ones. In fact, the 
commentary on Shanzhai in Xinwen Lianbo, one of the flagship news show broadcast by 
CCTV everyday at 7 pm and relayed by the primary channels of all provincial stations, 
invited extensive interpretation in other media. Not only domestic media, but also 
overseas media, from Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV to the Wall Street Journal and New 
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Yorker reported and commented on this unique Chinese phenomenon. Media 
representation, or construction, of the Shanzhai phenomenon must have interacted with 
how Shanzhai is viewed by Shanzhai producers, audience, and officials. 
Thus, this chapter will concentrate on how China’s domestic media constructed 
Shanzhai culture discursively. Since Shanzhai has been reported and commented on by 
both commercial media and the Party’s mouthpiece media, specifically, I want to know 
how Shanzhai culture was framed, and how the frames might be different in media of 
different natures. This is a key question to ask in order to understand Shanzhai because 
the struggle in discourses is the site of the construction of the “normal” culture. It is this 
negotiated standard(s) that define the function of the surveillance assemblages and, more 
broadly, the governance and resistance of social expressions through the media system. 
It is necessary to study the discourses regarding Shanzhai because, first, discourse 
is not a route to social reality, but part of the social reality. Under the umbrella of a 
strong social constructivist epistemology (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), the constitutive 
nature of discourse has been discussed in multiple academic contexts. John L. Austin 
views speech as actions (1962). According to Speech Act scholars, words are not always 
passive descriptions of a given reality, but actions and performances that can be used to 
invent and affect realities. An utterance has not only its ostensible semantic meanings, 
but also an “illocutionary force” that is intended by the speaker, as well as a 
“perlocutionary act” or the actual effect, be it persuading, convincing, enlightening, or 
scaring. Ethnomethodologists (Garfinkel, 1967) called for a shift away from seeing talk 
as resource to seeing talk as a topic, or as itself a behavior to be explained. Writer 
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Rushdie said in a radical way that “the things that make up the social world -- including 
our very identities -- appear out of discourse” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 2). Thus, 
Potter (1997) summarized that the analysis of discourse  
[H]as an analytic commitment to studying discourse as texts and talk in social 
practices. That is, the focus is not on language as an abstract entity such as lexicon 
and set of grammatical rules (in linguistics), a system of differences (in 
structuralism), a set of rules for transforming statements (in Foucauldian 
genealogies). Instead, it is the medium for interaction; analysis of discourse 
becomes, then, analysis of what people do. (p.146) 
 
In the variety of discourse planes, in critical discourse analysis terms, media 
discourse is undoubtedly an important one deserving careful examination. We are living 
in a more and more mediated world, and our social realities partly rest on the media 
discourse we consume every day. Couldry (2003b) argued that in the modern world, 
mass media occupy the center of our society. It is the cultural center that is constructed 
by mediated communication (Carey, 2009). Down to the micro levels, Gitlin (1980) 
pointed out that media discourse serves as interpretive packages that are “largely 
unspoken and unacknowledged” (p. 7), what Gamson and Modigiliani (1989) called 
“media frames.” 
News media are especially important and powerful in their construction of the 
social reality (Tuchman, 1978). News media “organize the world both for journalists 
who report it and, to some important degree, for us who rely on their reports” (Gitlin, 
1980, p. 7). They organize the world by persistent selection, emphasis, and exclusion of 
topics and images (Gitlin, 1980), and their discourses function on multiple structures of 
syntax, script, themes, as well as rhetoric (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).  
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This cultural center is so important, powerful, and effective that it has become a 
site where various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition 
and construction of social reality (Gurevitch & Levy, 1985). Studying the media 
discourse around Shanzhai promises a better understanding of how the meaning, or the 
social reality, of a grassroots cultural practice is constructed in contested ways. It will 
also provide insights into not only the discursive nature of Shanzhai culture, but also the 
power dynamics in governance in contemporary China through media. 
Secondly, it is found that new-media-related discourse studies are still 
underdeveloped. Tomasello, Lee and Baer (2009) examined the publication patterns and 
outlets on Internet and related digital technologies over a 17-year time frame. While we 
don’t know in the journals of journalism, mass media, technology, telecommunications, 
advertising, public relations, etc., which accommodated the majority of new media 
research, how many articles about new media actually tapped into issues of discourse, it 
is sure that fewer new media research made it into journals of discourse, rhetoric, 
oral/speech, and nonverbal than those made to media-oriented journals. 
Thus, studying media discourse of Shanzhai will also help mitigate this gap in new 
media studies. This chapter’s topic incorporates discourse in different types of traditional 
print media and grassroots user-generated new media content. It will provide an 
additional spin to both studies of media discourse and new media. 
This chapter will be set up in the following structure. First, I will review the 
notions of cultural authenticity and legitimacy in the Chinese and the Western contexts 
to provide a conceptual backdrop of my analysis. Then I will review the 
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commercialization reform in China’s media sector and the roles of metropolitan 
newspapers and Party newspapers in the current media system. After that, I will review 
the approach of discourse analysis, specifically on media discourse. Next, sampling 
methods and the sample will be described. It will be followed by analyses of categories 
and themes with examples. Last, a discussion will be provided to interpret the found 
themes, categories and dimensions to connect empirical evidences with theoretical 
understanding of Shanzhai. 
Mass Culture and Popular Culture: Authentic Culture in China and in the West 
Although by no means I am suggesting that there’s a complete discontinuity 
between China and the West in terms of their understandings of mass culture, as 
Hong(1994) pointed out, the seemingly similar debates on mass culture in China are 
quite irrelevant to the Western ones. 
Hong (1994) summarized the contemporary Chinese understanding of mass culture 
with three debates throughout the ruling period of the Communist Party. The first one 
happened between the early 1930’s and the mid 1940’s. This debate was between the 
feudalist culture and the new democratic culture, a Chinese-styled mass-culture as 
formulated by Mao. Mao suggested in The New Democrative Culture6, the first 
systematic blueprint of the “new democratic culture” that it should be a "national, 
scientific and mass culture," and should be "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal" (p. 90). 
This Maoist understanding indicated that because a given culture is the reflection of the 
politics and economy of that given society, China’s mass culture should belong to the 
                                                 
6
 This title appears in Hong (1994). However, there are other sources citing this piece of Mao as “On New 
Democracy” or “New Democratic Politics and New Democratic Culture”. 
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people and "should serve the toiling masses of workers and peasants who make up over 
90 percent of the nation's population" (from Hong, 1994, p. 90). Mao’s talk in the 
Yan’an Literature and Art Forum put an end to the first debate and became the basis of 
the Maoist cultural theory. It stated that the purpose of creating a mass culture is to 
gradually reduce the domain and weaken the influence of feudal culture. The culture 
should be a remarkable trademark of the working class. Because many workers, 
peasants, and soldiers were illiterate and uncultured as a result of the prolonged rule of 
the feudal and bourgeois classes, they badly needed a widespread campaign of 
enlightenment with the works of new revolutionary writers and artists. 
The second debate started in the 1950’s between the proletariat culture and 
bourgeois culture. Mao proposed a policy called “Letting One Hundred Flowers 
Blossom and Letting One Hundred Schools of Thoughts Contend” in multiple occasions 
in the 1950’s. The Party encouraged the debate and was hoping that writers and artists 
could gain a clear understanding of the socialist mass culture and align their works to it. 
Mao viewed that the turbulent class struggle had ended and, in the socialist construction 
period, the class struggle will mainly appear on the ideological fronts. Thus, Mao in his 
summary of the second debate, the speech on the National Convention of Propaganda 
Cadres of the Chinese Communist Party in 1957, pointed out that the socialist mass 
culture should be proletariat-based (Hong, 1994). 
The third debate happened in the 1980’s after China’s opening up and reform. This 
debate was on the relationship between China’s traditional culture and the Western 
culture, on that which should be the post-Maoist mass culture for China. Some saw 
 171
traditional Chinese culture as the essence of the national identity, while others saw it as a 
social and historic burden to China’s modernization. While there is not an official end of 
this debate, the democratic movement in 1989 did constrain this debate and reinforced 
the Party-line in interpretation of mass culture. It is proposed that although culture 
should prosper under the principle of “Letting one hundred flowers blossom and letting 
one hundred schools of thought contest,” it should be serving socialism and serving the 
people in the first place (Hong, 1994). 
Though the three debates happened in different historical and social contexts, they 
all reflected the Marxist view of culture. According to Marxism, truth is assumed to have 
been found in Communist ideals, “communication thus functions to propagate and 
elaborate this” (P. S. N. Lee, 1997, p. 90). Mass culture in this view is positioned as an 
educator to indoctrinate correct ideology to the people (Seldes, 1957). This means: 
take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate 
them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to 
the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as 
their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action. (Y. Zhao, 1998, p. 24) 
 
This understanding makes the debate on mass culture in China mainly focus on the 
question of content and theme without questioning the power relationship in cultural 
expressions because the prevailing culture represents the masses, is correct, and is under 
the leadership of the Party.  
Thus, in the Chinese sense, the authentic and correct culture has three 
characteristics. First, it has to follow the mass line. Second, the mass line is manifested 
in the Party line which the culture should follow. Third, culture should guide and 
indoctrinate people. 
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In the West, especially in the contemporary capitalist societies, mass culture 
usually refers to the commodified, industrially produced, and standardized cultural 
products that are promoted, sold, and consumed by a mass audience. To critique its 
commercial nature, academics usually juxtapose mass culture with authentic culture, 
originally mainly folk culture. However, there is not an authentic culture in the sense 
that it is pure and static. As Hall (1998) argued, culture is the site of power struggles; 
thus, the definition of authenticity is both dynamic and historicized. Different schools of 
scholars concentrate on different types of culture for the discussion of cultural 
authenticity, oftentimes juxtaposed with the commercial mass culture. Scholars of the 
Frankfurt School have long been in agony over the “industrialization” of culture and the 
loss of “aura.” They believe that it is not only the mass production per se, but also the 
written-to-be-a-hit nature of art works that jeopardizes the spirit of human aesthetics 
(MacDougald, 2004). Horkheimer said the definition of the beautiful as an object of 
disinterested pleasure had its roots in the purely aesthetic feeling that is “the reaction of 
the private atomic subject,” “the judgment of an individual who abstracts from 
prevailing social standards” (Horkheimer, 2004, pp. 158-159). 
These scholars, some of whom are high artists themselves, prioritize individuality 
over social values and ends, especially the prevailing economic system which carves all 
men to one pattern. Benjamin summarized that the eliminated element as the “aura,” or 
“the uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being imbedded in the fabric of 
tradition” (1969). Horkheimer and Adorno (2004) further commented the role played by 
media in destroying the aura. They said “modern communication media have an 
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isolating effect… The lying words of the radio announcer become firmly imprinted on 
the brain and prevent men from speaking to each other” (p. 181). For Frankfurt School 
scholars, mass communication establishes uniformity among people by isolating them. 
In their opinion, audiences blindly enjoy the pseudo-individuality in the mass media 
while their minds are standardized by the industrialization of culture. 
While scholars of the Frankfurt School still fantasize about an uncontaminated 
high art in pessimism, scholars of Cultural Studies have celebrated the authentic 
“making do” of the weak people in this inevitable age of mechanical reproduction. This 
time, mass culture is positioned against popular culture of certain groups of consumers, 
the sub-culture. Thus, the issue of real or authentic art is divested from how consumers 
are subjected to mass culture and directed toward how consumers use commercial 
cultural products for their own ends. The similarity between the two schools of thought 
lies in, as mentioned before, the Western concern of the power relationship among 
different cultures. 
Authenticity is an important concern in subcultures. For example, Hebdige (1979) 
examined the styles of punks and especially the meanings of these styles in the 
consumerist society, which tends to incorporate and commodify everything. Jenkins 
(1992) studied content and the meaning of texts in different fan communities. The 
everyday appropriation of commercial texts by punks and fans help them find the 
authentic “aura”, not in a pure esthetic pleasure, but in the tensions with 
commodification or incorporation. As Hall (1998) noted on the popular culture, it is not 
who possesses a certain culture that makes it authentic or not, but rather the 
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contradiction between the power bloc and the popular force. The contradictions make the 
notions of “popular” and “authentic” dynamic and historically situated. 
In this highly mediated and commercialized society, subculture practitioners seek 
authenticity in two ways, both of which manifest the contradiction Hall theorized 
(Moore, 2004).  The first is to try to evade the influences of the culture industry and 
hence to renounce “the prevailing culture of media, image, and hypercommercialism” (p. 
307). Here, it is not the ultimate truth or absolute real that matters, but the antithesis 
between the artifice and the sense of real. “[A]uthenticity must be defended against 
artifice; the terms only make sense in opposition to each other” (Lack, 1995). However, 
this tactic tends to drive subcultures underground and insulate them from the 
“superficiality of postmodern culture.” These fan activities are usually seen in DIY 
productions like “fanzines” in independent media or interpersonal networks in 
opposition to corporate media.  For example certain punk groups label theirs as the 
“hardcore” or “straight-edge” subcultures, or the culture of authenticity. People 
following these strategies tend to evade the panoptic surveillance of the media system 
and isolate themselves as the deviants from the “norm.”  
In contrast to the first way of hiding underground to achieve authenticity in 
celibacy from commercialization, the second way is in direct appropriation of 
commercial texts with dominant meanings. Some subculture followers such as the early 
punks recycle cultural images to parody them so as to deconstruct their dominant 
meanings (Hebdige, 1979). These artists who claim themselves authentic could be 
trained in orthodox schools of art (Frith & Horne, 1987), or simply raised in the mass-
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mediated, consumer-driven environment to be a natural “sales-pitcher” like some 
cultural jammers (Klein, 2002). The signs and spectacles which fall victim to 
consumerism are turned against themselves in these subcultures. In the subculture of 
punks, those who appropriate, parody, and ridicule the consumerist culture are called the 
nihilists in contrast to the straight-edge ones. Grossberg (1992) pointed out in his study 
of rock music that in a postmodern response to the anxiety and ambivalence experienced 
by the baby boomer generation, consumer culture is parodied as a parody itself. The 
reflexive hyper-authenticity is what Grossberg called postmodern sensibility, which is 
defined as a logic of “ironic nihilism” or “authentic inauthenticity” (Lack, 1995). These 
people tend to compete for media attention rather than evade the gaze. They are self-
sales-pitchers and usually comfortable with being displayed in the media synopticon. 
Many Shanzhai producers and performers are like them, only their relationship with the 
mainstream culture is more complicated. 
The authenticity of popular culture should not be essentialized, either as absolute 
“authentic inauthenticity” or as really free from incorporation. In the whole continuum 
between the two poles, subculture followers are involved in complex power relationships 
against the dominant bloc. As Fiske (1989) said, in capitalist societies, there is hardly a 
so-called “folk culture” against which to measure the “inauthenticity” of mass culture (p. 
27). What is important is the complexity and tension between the dominant strategy and 
the guerrilla tactics.  
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Legitimacy of Culture: Containment and Resistance 
No matter how much a culture involves commercialization, professionalism, or 
state intervention, in other words how “authentic” a culture is, as Hall said, containment 
always goes together with resistance in the culture. This notion of “popular culture” as 
pointed out by Raymond Williams is “not identified by the people, but by others”  
(Williams, 1985). Once a cultural expression is recognized as a part of the dominant 
structure, it is partly contained and becomes legitimate in the sense that it conforms to 
the dominant norm. The containment, or legitimization, could be facilitated by 
“industrialization, social mobility, mass communications, politicization, 
commercialization, musical, theatrical, artistic, and literary professionalism, and a dozen 
other forces” (Stites, 1992, p. 1).  
In China, the legitimate culture for the masses is contained, on the one hand as 
suggested by the review above, by following the Party’s cultural leadership such as 
censorship and government approval. On the other hand, in the attempt to harness the 
cultural industry as an economic force, legitimate culture for the masses in China is also 
contained within the logic of commercialism and professionalism, which is also the 
concern of many Western scholars. 
I will call a culture’s state of being sanctioned, or contained, by the power bloc 
“legitimacy.” The Oxford dictionary ("Oxford Dictionary of English," 2010a) has two 
explanations for “legitimacy.” One of them is “conformity to the law or to rules.” The 
other is the “ability to be defended with logic or justification, validity.” When the 
externally justified legitimacy refers to laws and regulations, this dimension can also be 
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understood as “legality” which the Oxford dictionary defines as “the quality or state of 
being in accordance with the law” ("Oxford Dictionary of English," 2010b). Thus, 
legitimacy refers to a broader and more general status of a culture being legitimate. It 
could be externally justified with factors such as financial viability, the cultural taste of 
the dominant class, or professionalism. By legality, I only refer to the legal legitimacy, 
or the abiding by government regulations and laws. 
In summary, legitimacy, though referring to different aspects, from commercial 
viability or government approval to professionalism of cultural production, represents 
the power bloc’s containment of culture in both China and the West. It will be seen 
working together with the notion of authentic culture in the case of Shanzhai discourse 
based on China’s political, cultural, and historical specificities.  
China’s Press Reform 
Since I am studying the newspaper discourses on Shanzhai video productions, it is 
necessary to contextualize the discussion within the contemporary Chinese media 
system, especially in the newspaper field. I have covered the reform and current 
structure of Chinese media in general in the second chapter. Here I will concentrate on 
the reform and commercialization of China’s newspapers and especially the ownership 
structure, the social and political roles of newspapers, and the interaction between the 
Party journalism and the western journalistic professionalism. 
To correct the ultra-left orientation during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), 
Chinese media reform started as early as the late 1970’s. As Zhao (1998) argued, it 
returned to the earlier ideals of the Party press such as “seeking truth from facts” and 
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having relevance to the everyday lives of the people. During this period, Chinese 
journalists started to become more receptive to the western journalistic concepts such as 
objectivity and timeliness. 
Throughout the 1980’s, the momentum of changes in media’s role and structures 
was fermented. On the one hand, journalist professionals demanded more autonomy and 
independence in the editorial process. On the other hand, high level leaders started to 
stress the roles of media, such as supervision over the government, informing the people 
of important events, and as forums for people to participate in discussion of important 
issues (Y. Zhao, 1998). In this period, although the basic principle of Party leadership 
was not substantially challenged, there were multiple voices in the continuum between 
reformers and the hardliners such as democrats, neo-authoritarians, and technocrats.  
However, after the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in 1989, the 
debate on media reform was shut down, and the Party principle was reinstated as the 
theoretical guideline for journalist work. As Zhao (1998) documented, Jiang Zemin 
reiterated the mouthpiece theory, and Li Ruihuan, who was in charge of  propaganda and 
ideology work, emphasized the tradition of positive propaganda. Liberal leaders were 
purged from the central governing body, and the daily practice of editors and journalists 
was restricted again. 
The return to the reform discourse didn’t come back until the iconic talk Deng 
Xiaoping made during his inspection trip to southern China in 1992 (Chan, 1993). Later 
that year, Deng’s proposal of a socialist market economy was officially adopted in the 
Fourteenth National Party Congress, and the pragmatic orientation overrode ideological 
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debates. But the practical changes in the media sector, which is so closely related to the 
political control, lagged behind until the mid-1990s. 
The changes in the newspaper sector during the reform period happened both in the 
operation of newspapers and the distribution side. From the early 1990s on, publishers 
started to contract out the editorial operations of newspapers. While the license holder of 
newspapers received fees from contractors and still supervised the newspapers, the 
contractors actually operated the newspapers on a daily basis both editorially and 
financially. In terms of the distribution system, as Zhao (1998) argued, the street 
newspaper sellers greatly contributed to the change of the city landscape in reform-era 
China. Because they tended to sell evening dailies and radio and television weeklies, 
which were general interest papers, these non-Party-organs boomed in the 1990s. The 
evening news usually catered to everyday urban life and carried more soft news than 
Party papers. They are more entertainment and audience oriented, rather than leader 
oriented. Though they still operate under the Party principle, the approaches are less 
straightforward. In contrast with the Party-line newspapers, Yuezhi Zhao called them the 
“mass-line” newspapers (1998, p. 131).  
After the first wave of organizational innovation within the traditional Party press 
structure, the second wave witnessed the flourish of tabloid papers and weekend editions 
in 1990s (Yuezhi Zhao, 2000b). Though tabloid papers had been accused of “spiritual 
pollution” for focusing on sex, murder, and gossip in the mid-1980s, they continued to 
be popular throughout the 1990s. In addition, the weekend editions of Party newspapers 
developed rapidly in the 1990s in China. These “special economic zones” are seen by 
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their parent Party newspapers as an opportunity to circumvent the confines and cover 
whatever sells. Most of the journalism work in that period was caught between the two 
extremes of the Party line and the bottom line. In this tension, those that balanced the 
two strengths well were increasingly hailed as the model journalism, such as the Beijing 
Youth Daily (Y. Zhao, 1998). 
Into the 21st century, the commercialization of the Chinese press has gone beyond 
the contracting or weekend edition and beyond the audience of general interest to joint-
venture, urban-elite-oriented metropolitan newspapers. The first metro paper was 
launched in 1995 in Chengdu by the Party organ of Sichuan province, the Sichuan Daily. 
It applies market calculation and targets the mass appeal market in an urban area. This 
practice was copied throughout the country. In 2001, the central Party organ People’s 
Daily launched its subsidiary Jinghua Times in Beijing jointly with a state-owned 
enterprise. These metro papers:  
operate as semi-autonomous business units of the traditional provincial Party 
organ, serving as the perfect media for the Party to reach the rising urban consumer 
strata, thus reconstituting them as the new power base, while simultaneously 
functioning as the ‘cash cow’ that cross-subsidize and sustain the traditional party 
organs. (Yuezhi Zhao, 2008, p. 81) 
 
Along with the rise of commercialism, was the struggle between the traditional 
Party journalism paradigm and the Western professional journalist paradigm. It was 
found that the more market-oriented press was eroding the Party-press ideology and 
giving rise to journalistic professionalism such as objectivity and job autonomy (Chan, et 
al., 2004; He, Lee, & Huang, 2007; C.-c. Lee, et al., 2006; Pan & Chan, 2003; Pan & Lu, 
2003). This was also confirmed in my interviews with metro paper journalists who 
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reported on Shanzhai productions. They confirmed that the orientation of their report 
was objective and informative. They tried to present facts and leave the interpretation to 
the audience, rather than render their articles opinionated. 
However, this shift in the perceptions of journalistic paradigms is also complicated.  
Zhongdang Pan, Joseph Chan and their colleagues (Chan, et al., 2004; Pan & Chan, 
2003) empirically tested the perceptions about the Party media paradigm and the 
Western professional media paradigm among journalist professionals in Shanghai. On 
the one hand, journalists in general tend to think that professional media are more 
desirable than Party organs in relation to their professional ideals. On the other hand, 
journalist professionals’ job satisfaction was both related to job autonomy, a distinct 
Western journalistic value, and the interpretive role of press, a Marxist view of media’s 
social function. It was found that the Xinmin Evening News, a mass-appeal urban 
newspaper, was perceived as the Party paradigm, when compared with a well-
acknowledged liberal outlet, the Southern Weekend. However, the interpretive role was 
not found to be related to the Xinmin Evening News. The authors explained that “evening 
or urban papers targeted at urban residents or services-oriented TV or radio shows, while 
still toeing the Party line, may concentrate on providing practical information to or 
expressing grievances among target audiences” (Pan & Chan, 2003, p. 668). 
Another characteristic that is related to the nature of these mass-appeal papers is 
their elite bias. Yuezhi Zhao (1998) attributed the decline of newspapers for peasants to 
the commercialization of newspaper operation and distribution. In terms of the content 
of metro papers, she pointed out that the elite-biased views on civil rights and legal 
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justice limited metro papers’ views and their ability of mobilizing the civil society . 
These papers’ appeals to urban middle class readers do not help mitigate the existing 
urban-rural divide in Chinese society; if anything, it amplifies it. 
Thus, by examining the news coverage of Shanzhai in both metropolitan 
newspapers and Party newspapers, I expect to see different frames and discursive 
strategies. These frames and strategies to represent Shanzhai are actually an active 
construction of Shanzhai culture. How Shanzhai culture is defined, be it grassroots and 
authentic, vulgar and illegal, or educational and informative in line with the socialist 
mass culture, actually reflects the struggle for power or, in Hall’s terms (1998), the 
contradiction between the popular force and the power bloc. Meanwhile, these media 
discourses on Shanzhai also serve as the sorting criteria for further synoptic display or 
censorship of Shanzhai videos in the media assemblage. They are the contesting 
disciplines in the media system that are both effective and need Shanzhai producers, 
video websites, sponsors, regulators to negotiate with. 
Discourse Analysis of Media 
Because I intend to analyze the discourse of Shanzhai in the newspapers of 
different natures, it is necessary to review the discursive devices examined in the 
literature of discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis provides an approach to tackle 
the underlying meanings embedded in our daily uses of language (Johnstone, 2008; 
Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Wood & Kroger, 2000). There is a wide range of discursive 
devices from macro to micro level discussed in the literature. Johnstone (2008) discussed 
the structure of paragraphs. A paragraph could consist of statements of a problem, 
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solution, topic, restrictions, illustrations, etc. (p. 87). The narrative structure could 
include abstract, orientation, complicating action, result, evaluation, and coda, etc. (pp. 
92-93). The structure of narrative is a set of pre-formed expectations that simplifies 
information processing. It is similar to what van Dijk called a cognitive schema (Van 
Dijk, 1986). Frame is also a cognitive structure that links the attributes of constructs to 
each other to form a web of relationships. Thus, activating one node in this web might 
activate others (pp. 187-188).  
Discourse analysis also provided some guidance on analyzing participants of social 
practices. First, the indexical aspect of their conversation and the performance in 
conversation could help researchers understand discourse participants’ social 
identification (Johnstone, 2008). Second, positioning could also serve as a replacement 
for traditional concepts of roles because the selves are multiple and shifting under a 
constructive perspective. “Position is what is created in and through talk as the speakers 
and hearers take themselves up as persons” (Wood & Kroger, 2000, p. 100). Third, the 
agent-patient distinction is another important perspective to understand the discursive 
construction of Shanzhai participants in media. An agent is someone who is seen to 
make choices, follow plans, and orient to rules while a patient is someone who is seen to 
suffer the consequences of external forces or internal compulsions (p. 101).  Fourth, 
discourse analysts also draw metaphors to help the analyses of participants. Metaphors 
could make certain attributions available to the subject matter (p. 104). Analyzing 
metaphors used in media could help explicate the construction of an intended reading of 
Shanzhai. 
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Most of the above constructs are derived from discourse analysis of conversations 
and literary works. An analytical approach that suits the characteristics of media 
discourse was later developed by scholars in discourse analysis (e.g., Fairclough, 1995; 
Richardson, 2007; Van Dijk, 1988, 1991). Fairclough (1995) proposed to study the text, 
the discourse practice which includes both text production and text consumption, and the 
socio-cultural practice of particular communication events. Furthermore, he also 
proposed to study the more general order of discourse, which cuts across the private 
discourse and public discourse. 
Carvalho (2010) specifically proposed a framework for analyzing media discourse. 
He listed six important aspects of textual analysis, including layout and structural 
organization, objects, actors, language, grammar and rhetoric, discursive strategies, and 
ideological standpoints. First, like traditional content analysis, he advocated to study 
surface elements of the newspaper and of the text itself, such as the sections in which the 
articles were published, the page number, size, visual elements, etc. Second, objects 
refer to topic or theme, but connote a constructed nature of discourse, rather than a 
representational one. Third, actors are the individuals or institutions mentioned in news 
reports and constructed as certain social identities and relations. Fourth, language, 
grammar, and rhetoric help identify the relationship of key concepts to wider cultural 
and social ideological frameworks. Thus the verb or adjective choices, the metaphors, 
and writing styles all contribute to meaning constructions. Fifth, discursive strategies 
refer to the forms of discursive manipulation of reality by social factors, such as 
journalists and editors. They could include a variety of discursive intervention, such as 
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framing, selective inclusion and exclusion, and specific strategies of positioning, 
legitimation, and politicization. Positioning, as mentioned above, involves in 
constructing the relationship between a social actor and others. Legitimation consists of 
“justifying and sanctioning a certain action or power, on the basis of normative or other 
reasons” (p. 18).  Politicization attributes a political nature to a certain reality. These 
strategies could also be used in the reversed way as de-legitimation and de-politicization. 
Sixth, ideological standpoint is a concern to critical discourse analysis of media. 
Carvalho advocates the attention specifically to ideological closure where “the multi-
accentual ‘potential for meaning’ of the chosen signs…are filled in until the signs are 
‘closed,’ apparently uni-accentual” (p. 19). Meanwhile, the author also proposed two 
frameworks of contextual analysis: comparative-synchronic analysis and historical-
diachronic analysis, which treats the time plane of journalistic texts differently. 
These perspectives in discourse analysis will inform my further examination of the 
newspaper articles. They will be the lenses through which I extract consistent underlying 
meanings in the media discourse of Shanzhai. I will further describe my uses of them 
combined with the procedures of grounded theory in the section of reporting themes and 
categories. Before that, I will first describe my sampling strategies. 
Data Collection 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Shanzhai became a prominent 
social issue largely because of the extensive coverage not only on the Internet, but also 
in traditional mass media like television and newspapers. Thus, media discourses greatly 
contributed to the overall construction of the Shanzhai phenomenon. 
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My analysis in this chapter will be mainly based on newspaper coverage of 
Shanzhai cultural productions. This is because, first, as I reviewed above, the media 
reform in the past 20 years in China provides Chinese readers with newspapers of 
different functions and coverage orientations. Newspapers serving as the cash cows or as 
the Party mouthpieces could gate-keep differently on grassroots issues like Shanzhai, or 
position themselves differently in their overall agendas. Or, if Shanzhai makes it to the 
different types of newspapers, they could be framed differently. These discourses jointly 
contribute to how Shanzhai is understood in the Chinese society. Second, I found in my 
field work that newspapers were the first media to report the three cases of Shanzhai 
videos in this study. Though these videos or proposals of production were put online by 
these producers, the producers and journalists attested that they were first reported and 
popularized by various metropolitan newspapers. Then the reports and their videos went 
viral on the Internet, and more media of various types rushed into the coverage. Thirdly, 
newspapers can be more reliably archived compared with other media materials in 
China. Currently there is no database that provides transcripts of major television or 
radio shows in China. Neither are comprehensive audio-visual archives of television or 
radio shows available. On the Internet, on the one hand, the Shanzhai videos are cross-
posted on numerous websites. It is virtually impossible to get a comprehensive archive 
of how these videos are titled and tagged, as a part of the discursive construction of 
Shanzhai. On the other hand, as I found in my preliminary browsing of these videos on 
various websites, there were few replies, let alone in-depth comments, to these videos. It 
is not clear whether some of the replies were removed due to the filtering protocol, or if 
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viewers didn’t comment on these videos at all. The attested censorship of China’s 
Internet (MacKinnon 2010) rendered archiving reliable online records of Shanzhai 
videos and comments impossible. Thus, I will concentrate on newspapers in this study. 
I selected eleven metropolitan newspapers and five central level Party newspapers 
to study. The 11 metropolitan newspapers are all the Chinese metropolitan newspapers 
that are listed in the top 100 daily newspapers by total circulation released by the World 
Association of Newspaper and News Publishers ("2009 nian," 2009). There are 25 
newspapers in mainland China that appear on this list, and they include Party 
newspapers such as the People’s Daily, metropolitan newspapers, and evening 
newspapers. Since the evening news, as reviewed above, has an ambiguous role as the 
Party mouthpiece and the commercial leg of Party organs (Pan & Chan, 2003), they are 
excluded from my sample. The 11 metropolitan newspapers are the Information Times 
(Xinxi Shibao), Southern Metropolitan News (Nanfang Dushi Bao), Chutian 
Metropolitan News (Chutian Dushi Bao), Yanzhao Metropolitan News (Yanzhao Dushi 
Bao), Metro Express (Dushi Kuaibao), Peninsula Metro News (Bandao Dushi Bao), 
New Express (Xin Kuaibao), Western China Metro News (Huaxi Dushi Bao), Modern 
Express (Xiandai Kuaibao), Eastern Today News (Dongfang Jinbao), and Jinghua Times 
(Jinghua Shibao).  
The five Party newspapers are located according to the list in CCP’s Party 
Newspaper and Magazine Database (2006). All of them are central level Party 
newspapers. I didn’t include local level Party newspapers because they serve as the 
mouthpieces of local Party branches and therefore usually only concentrate on local 
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issues, while metropolitan newspapers of different areas, catering to more homogeneous 
urban elite readers, pay more attention to national social and cultural issues in addition to 
local news. Many metropolitan newspapers, though mainly in circulation in a certain 
area, are available for subscription nationwide. The five Party newspapers I included in 
my sample are People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), People’s Daily (Overseas Version) 
(Renmin Ribao Haiwai Ban), Guangming Daily (Guangming Ribao), Economy Daily 
(Jingji Ribao), and Liberation Army’s Daily (Jiefangjun Bao). Only People’s Daily 
appeared in the circulation list mentioned above. However, the discursive influences of 
these official newspapers should not be underestimated for the less circulation compared 
to the popular press. 
Since I failed to locate a comprehensive newspaper database that archives all the 
selected Chinese newspapers, I had to turn to the websites of these newspapers or 
Internet search engines. Fortunately, all of them have e-paper sites where I could either 
retrieve articles with certain key words directly or within which I could search for 
articles with certain key words with a third-party search engine. To concentrate on 
Shanzhai cultural production, I didn’t search for the word “Shanzhai,” which yielded 
many articles discussing or reporting Shanzhai cell phones. Instead, I searched for 
“Shanzhai Chunwan” (Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala), “Shanzhai Baijia Jiangtan” 
(Shanzhai Lecture Show), and “Shanzhai Honglou” (Shanzhai Red Mansions) in Chinese 
characters in these sites without limiting the time frame. I retrieved 109 articles with at 
least one of them in each article. All of the retrieved results are relevant to my subject 
matter, and thus entered my data pool (Table 1). 
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Table 1 Article-counts of Each of the Metropolitan and Party Newspapers 
 
Metro Newspaper Amount of 
Articles 
Party Newspapers Amount of Articles 
Jinghua Times 19 People’s Daily 5 
Information Times 12 People’s Daily 
(Overseas Ed.) 
6 
Southern Metro News 10 Guangming Daily 5 
Chutian Metro News 10 Jingji Daily 0 
Huaxi Metro News 18 Jiefangjun Daily 1 
Peninsula Times 9 Average 5.7 
Metro Express 2 Total 17 
Modern Express 5 
Eastern Today 5 
New Express 2 
Average 16.7 
Total 92 
 
  
 190
Themes and Categories 
In this study, I will ground my theorization of the media’s Shanzhai discourse in 
the data. In this process, I will combine the procedures of finding a grounded theory 
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and the analytical framework of 
discourse analysis I reviewed earlier (Carvalho, 2010; Fairclough, 1995; Johnstone, 
2008; Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Wood & Kroger, 2000).  
I follow grounded theory procedures not as a theory to guide data theorization, but 
an inductively derived representation of the Shanzhai phenomenon. Glaser (1978) 
described the process of data coding in two stages. “Substantive coding” is first-order 
and works closely with data. “Theoretical coding” is second-order which conceptualizes 
the substantive codes (p. 55). Strauss and Corbin (1990) provided more elaborate coding 
procedures. They distinguished between three phases of coding: open coding, axial 
coding and selective coding. According to the authors, open coding refers to the 
preliminary screening of data and the generating of basic categories. Axial coding 
involves reorganizing the data and connecting categories in new ways. The authors 
suggested analyzing conditions, contexts, action/interactional strategies, and 
consequences of the social process being categorized in axial coding (p. 97). Selective 
coding involves selecting the core categories and linking them in a systematic way. 
However, Glaser (1992) argued against any pre-conceived coding paradigm. He insisted 
that a grounded theory should emerge out of the data purely in an inductive manner. 
Despite Glaser’s critique, Strauss and Corbin’s guidelines proved to be popular 
among scholars and have invited further elaboration in the community of qualitative 
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methods. Lindlof and Taylor (2002) provided a three-step procedure of grounded theory 
involving open coding, integration, and dimensionalization. Open coding and integration 
correspond to Strauss and Corbin’s open coding and axial coding. Open coding is the 
categorization of data in an unrestricted manner. This opens up the inquiry, but every 
interpretation at this point is tentative. Lindlof and Taylor suggested using both 
codebook and memo to keep records of categories and rationales of categorization. The 
theoretical memos serve to flesh out the thematic qualities of the coding categories. 
These notes proved to be very helpful in the later stages of my analysis. Integration 
functions similar to Strauss and Crobin’s axial coding, which emphasizes on causality, 
context, strategy, and consequence. The dimensionalization step is derived from Spiggle 
(1994). It identifies the properties of categories and explores the attributes of 
dimensions.  
This study will follow Strauss and Corbin (1990), and the derived method guide 
(Dey, 2004; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002), rather than Glaser’s radical stance of pre-
conception-free version of grounded theory. It is hard for a scholar to start with 
absolutely no preconception since scholars always immerse themselves in literature and 
start their research with personal interest and enthusiasm in it. Rather, I would follow 
Dye’s suggestion to come to open coding with as many ideas as possible (2004, p. 85). 
Thus, I reviewed a variety of literature on discourse analysis and sensitized myself to as 
many discursive cues as possible, especially those that are suggested as important in 
studying media discourse. But these concepts will not be used as categories directly. As 
Wood and Kroger (2000) said, these analytical concepts are sensitizing concepts, not 
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categories. Categorization is the process of characterizing the meaning of a unit of data 
with respect to certain generic properties (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). Categories include 
the chunks of data that represent a more general phenomenon. At the same time, as 
Wood and Kroger suggested, I would also attend to not only what was there, but also 
what was not there (2000, p. 92). In the step of dimensionalization, I will identify the 
common attributes of different categories and draw examples from my data to justify my 
interpretation, which is what a grounded theory should do (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 
80). 
I will follow two ways to enhance the validity to achieve a better chance of more 
plausible, insightful, and useful interpretation of the texts. First, scholars have argued 
that corpus linguistics could benefit critical discourse analysis. Traditional discourse 
analysis, whose analytical frameworks I will follow in this study, usually concentrates 
on deep and thick reading of a limited amount of texts in order to gain insights to the 
subject matter. Mautner (2009) argued that corpus text could “help reduce researcher 
bias, thus coping with a problem to which CDA [Critical Discourse Analysis] is hardly 
more prone than other social sciences but for which it has come in for harsh and 
persistent criticism” (p. 123). Though I will not use software to facilitate my analysis, 
the merits of texts corpus will help gain validity of my interpretations.  
Another way is to “triangulate” multiple sources (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 241). 
I will concentrate my analysis on the newspaper articles I collected, but my 
interpretation will be triangulated with other sources such as other commercial or social 
media, and my interviews with Shanzhai producers and journalists. However, even with 
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these methods of validation, I would not say, as Lindlof and Taylor agreed, there is the 
right interpretation (2002, p. 240). 
After an iterative process of open-coding all articles from metropolitan newspapers 
and Party newspapers, ten codes were established. They include (1) the poor quality and 
inexperienced operation of Shanzhai producers, (2) the attempts of improving production 
quality, (3) the mass-appeal nature of Shanzhai programs, (4) tastes of established 
cultural productions, (5) evading sponsorship, (6) cooperation with sponsors, (7) the 
problematic legal issues of Shanzhai, (8) efforts of getting Shanzhai legalized, (9) 
Shanzhai as an expressive channel, and (10) incorporation into mainstream channels. 
In the axial coding process, these themes were integrated into 5 higher-order 
categories: (1) Quality of Shanzhai production, (2) Tastes of Shanzhai production, (3) 
Sponsorship in Shanzhai production, (4) The legal status of Shanzhai production, and (5) 
Shanzhai culture as an independent expressive channel. Table 2 illustrates the definitions 
and examples of each of these thematic codes as well as the first-order categories. 
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Table 2 Summary of Coding Categories 
First-order 
Categories 
Themes Definitions Examples 
Quality of 
Shanzhai 
Production 
1. Poor 
production 
Poor quality of Shanzhai 
programs, and lack of 
experience of Shanzhai 
producers 
In the Shanzhai Red Mansions, you can not only see sister Lin going to 
Jia’s mansion, but also some family members playing Mahjong in another 
room [a goof in the video]. The spirit of self-entertainment invites 
netizens’ respect. (Hu, 2010)  
2. The 
attempts of 
improving 
production 
quality 
Attempts and efforts of 
making Shanzhai 
production more polished, 
and the controversy 
around it 
The new year is approaching, and Lao Meng is staging a comeback for the 
Spring Festival Gala of the Year of Tiger. He claims to hire professional 
teams, and check on the quality of programs strictly. (Duan, 2009a)  
Tastes of 
Shanzhai 
Production 
3. Mass-
oriented 
nature of 
Shanzhai 
Statements about and 
attempts to stick to mass 
appeals. 
 [Red Mansions] was hailed by many netizens, it is not seen as blasphemy 
of the masterpiece, but an interpretation of the spirit of mass-appeal arts. 
("Huo," 2008) 
4. Tastes of 
established 
cultural 
productions 
Statements about and 
attempts of avoiding 
established cultural genres 
People feel repulsed by the lack of innovations, the lip-synching, and the 
sub-rules of CCTV’s Spring Festival Gala…How can we make sense of 
the life around us that appears to be coarse with the flawless pictures on 
television year after year. (Guodong, 2008) 
Sponsor-
ship in 
Shanzhai 
Production 
5. Evading 
sponsor-ship 
Statements and attempts of 
evading, stopping or 
avoiding sponsor 
involvements. 
The new message recently is that the grassroots festival that planned to 
hold the hand of television media has decided to break up with the 
contracted station, to avoid the rumor of being incorporated, and to 
guarantee to be more Shanzhai. (Bao, 2008) 
6. Coopera-
tion with 
sponsors 
Statements and deeds of 
contacting, negotiating, 
and introducing 
sponsorship 
Guizhou Satellite Channel will provide professional support, and guidance 
of art, technology, to make the Shanzhai Spring Festival to reach a higher 
level. (Hou, 2008) 
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Table 2 Continued 
 
 
 
  
First-order 
Categories 
Themes Definitions Examples 
The Legal 
Status of 
Shanzhai 
Produc-tion 
7. Proble-
matic Legal 
issues 
Questioning and intervening 
Shanzhai production on the 
bases of government 
regulations 
It is not known whether there will be commercials during the online 
broadcast, or whether the audience will be charged for admission. If so, 
the Shanzhai Spring Festival takes on a certain commercial nature. 
Commercial performance and advertisements have to be approved by the 
Industrial and Commercial Bureau and the cultural administration. It has 
to register for taxation, keep financial records, and pay taxes according 
to laws. Lip-synching is strictly prohibited in commercial performances, 
and if found, the performances will be banned and fined. ("Wangyou," 
2008) 
8. Efforts of 
getting 
Shanzhai 
legalized 
Statements and efforts of 
making Shanzhai production 
in accordance with 
government regulations 
On the morning of the day before, the organizer of the Shanzhai Spring 
Festival Gala, Lao Meng, was granted the performance license by the 
Cultural Committee of Dongcheng District, and he showed it to the staff 
excitedly. ("Shanzhai chunwan gengming," 2009) 
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Table 2 Continued 
 
First-order 
Categories 
Themes Definitions Examples 
Shanzhai 
culture as 
an 
expressive 
channel for 
people 
9. Shanzhai as 
an 
independent 
channel 
Stories of Shanzhai as an 
expressive channel for those 
lack of access to voice for 
themselves 
 
[After Han self-recommended to CCTV for the first time], the show said 
there were requirements for the speaker and it looked like I had nothing. 
They said you were not qualified because you had no reputation, no 
professional rank or title…The second time he called to ask for taking 
the speaker’s audition, and he was refused again for not having a 
published work. Later he thought to himself why not shoot a video of the 
lecture myself. After shooting it, he called the lecture show, and the staff 
said they had no time, and didn’t accept self-recommendation. 
("Shanzhai ban," 2009) 
10. Incorporat
ion into the 
main-stream 
Accounts on cooperation 
with established media or on 
mainstream’s channels’ 
incorporation of Shanzhai 
As an existing cultural phenomenon, we cannot turn a blind eye to it. 
We’ll actively guide it and provide some platforms for them. (Guo & 
Fan, 2009) 
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In the next part, I will present the dimensions that cut across all the themes and 
reveal the natures of discourses on Shanzhai in Chinese media.  
Dimensions in the Shanzhai Discourses: Authenticity and Legitimacy 
Following the dimensionalization step in analyzing themes and categories 
extracted from the news discourse (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Spiggle, 1994), two 
dimensions were found cutting across the different discursive categories. They are 
authenticity and legitimacy. 
As I reviewed earlier, cultural authenticity refers to different meanings in Western 
literature and in Communist China. In the West, authenticity of a culture is usually set 
opposite to the contamination of commodification or industrialization as a dynamic and 
historical power struggle. Thus, authentic cultural practitioners usually either hide 
underground to evade commercialization, or appropriate commercial texts and parody 
them to deconstruct their dominant meanings (Moore, 2004). Thus, the western sense of 
authentic culture concerns itself in relation to the power bloc, mainly the commercial 
power. In Communist China, after several debates over authentic culture for the Chinese 
people throughout the 20th century led by the Party, it is agreed that authentic culture for 
Chinese people, or the real mass culture in the Chinese sense, should be rooted in the 
masses, should be led by the Party, and should educate the masses with the correct ideas. 
The Chinese sense of authenticity concerns itself more with the content and themes of 
the culture. 
The other dimension is legitimacy. As I mentioned before, it refers to the state of 
being sanctioned by external standards in line with the interest of the dominant structure. 
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Corresponding to the categories in my coding scheme, legitimacy, in different 
categories, refers to a professional standard of production quality, the taste of 
mainstream cultural products, Shanzhai projects’ financial viability, or government 
regulations regarding copyright compliances, public assembly, and commercial 
performances. 
The relationships of the two dimensions vary in different newspapers. Sometimes 
the newspapers framed them as opposing each other, while for the rest of the time they 
are referred to as being compatible with each other. I would call the opposing 
relationship of authenticity and legitimacy the rivalry discourse, and the compatible 
relationship the harmony discourse. 
Next I will illustrate the rival or harmonic relationships in each of the categories in 
Table 2 with examples from the news articles. 
The “quality of Shanzhai production” 
In the category of “The Quality of Shanzhai Production,” there are two themes, 
“the poor production of Shanzhai” and “the attempts of improving production quality.” 
Across all the collected news articles, the poor quality and inexperience of producers are 
consistently framed as unique indexes of the DIY nature of Shanzhai production, hence 
the authenticity of the Shanzhai culture. Huaxi Metropolitan News reported on the 
Shanzhai Red Mansions with the title “Young Man from Luzhou Shot the Shanzhai 
Version of Red Mansions with 20 Yuan Budget, Went Viral Online” ("Luzhou," 2008). 
The mantle of a character was actually an almost 20-year-old bed sheet, and the article 
called it “a shining and magnificent dress.” The article also cited a netizen that “the 
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swaying postures of the bed sheet is much better than the linen mantle [used in the 
original TV series of Red Mansion shot in 1987].” Another article commented on the 
lack of sophistication in the production of the Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala that “from 
the angle of entertainment, providing a platform for the people to have fun [emphasis 
added]” which is “the biggest difference between a Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala and 
an ordinary television gala” ("Laomeng," 2008). In light of the meanings of authenticity 
reviewed before, the poor quality of Shanzhai production is apparently talked in a 
euphemistic way that brings the producers non-utilitarian fun that is free from 
commercial or state intervention. It is the “for the people to have fun” in which the 
politics of popular culture, the people versus the power bloc, is embedded (S. Hall, 
1998).  
However, the DIY nature is also framed as problematic in terms of the 
institutionalized standards of cultural production, or as a lack of legitimacy in quality. 
Thus, some people, including some producers, some audience, and media professionals, 
believe that Shanzhai videos are not legitimate cultural products. For example, Jiang 
Fangzhou, a young female writer still in college, shot a Shanzhai lecture with her 
knowledge on literature after Han Jiangxue’s Shanzhai lecture got famous. But 
eventually, she was “not courageous enough to put the videos online” because of their 
poor quality (Jiang, 2008). Netizens also commented on Han Jiangxue’s Shanzhai 
Lecture Show as “amateurish and not suitable for the hall of noble” ("Jiang Fangzhou," 
2008). A professional association of online audio-visual service providers cited “the lack 
of artistic quality” as a reason to discourage its members from broadcasting Shanzhai 
  
200
galas. In the same article, a major sponsor was cited as saying “As the major sponsor, we 
want the gala to be upgraded, and to emphasize quality” ("Shanzhai chunwan," 2009b). 
Here the poor quality of Shanzhai production is seen as an illegitimate feature that needs 
to be overcome. 
This is where the other theme, the attempts of improving production quality, comes 
in. This theme includes the efforts Shanzhai producers made to improve the quality of 
their production, but it is framed differently in the rivalry discourse and the harmony 
discourse. In the rivalry discourse, the improvement of quality is said to threaten the 
authenticity of Shanzhai culture. For example the Peninsula Metropolitan News 
questioned Lao Meng’s decision to advertise the offer nationwide to hire the general 
director for his show and Lao Meng’s vows to improve the “level of content” by asking, 
“Is it still the Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala that represents the grassroots spirit?” 
("Shanzhai Chunwan," 2009a). In another article, the Shanzhai gala was described by the 
journalists in the following manner:  
[t]he scene of the Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala was arranged quite presentably—a 
front and a back stage, lightings from different angles, sophisticated audio 
equipment, and five cameras shooting panoramic views, close-ups, and the 
audiences’ expressions. There is even an arm shooting performers from multiple 
angles. It’s almost become a professional gala. (Duan, 2009b) 
 
A Shanzhai gala with these professional features is “almost a professional gala” which, 
as the article concluded at the end, “raises people’s doubts about the gala’s purpose and 
the authenticity of its ‘self-entertaining’ nature.” 
But in the harmony discourse, the improvement of production quality is framed as 
a technical change, which does not influence the authenticity of Shanzhai. Of course, in 
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this discourse, the authenticity doesn’t point to the Western notion of cultural politics 
between the people and the powerful, but rather to the Chinese notion of socialist mass 
culture. In this sense, authenticity and professional legitimacy can be achieved in 
harmony. For example, in preparation for the second Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala, Lao 
Meng told Jinghua Times that he would “check on [programs’] quality strictly” and 
would be willing to pay for programs of higher quality for the benefit of the gala. His 
cooperation with a professional troupe was to “guard the gate of quality” (Duan, 2009a). 
An editorial in the People’s Daily also cited a scholar saying that “the selection and 
arrangement of programs are the weak points [of the Shanzhai gala]… The only way to 
strengthen the ‘grassroots’ Spring Festival gala is to speak with [high quality] programs” 
(Yuanyuan Zhao, 2010). Thus, in the harmony discourse, quality improvement, or 
legitimate professional production, is not framed as opposite to Shanzhai’s authenticity 
which is understood with the Chinese notion mostly appearing in Party newspapers. 
The category of the “tastes of Shanzhai production” 
There are also both the rivalry discourse and the harmony discourse in the category 
of the taste of Shanzhai products. The first theme of this category, mass-appeal, is 
explicitly applauded in the rivalry discourse and positioned against the guidance of the 
officially sanctioned culture, which legitimizes the Chinese notion of mass culture. For 
example, Qiu (2008), in the Eastern Today News, analogized a local Shanzhai gala to “a 
large bowl of stewed noodles,” a cheap, popular and traditional local food, which the 
local newspaper says “represents the simple, unadorned, and meaningful nature of 
central China’s culture.” It caters to the mass’s taste and is trying to resist or distance 
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itself from the officially sanctioned culture. The established cultural production such as 
the CCTV Spring Festival gala is said needed to be “awakened by some fresh air, 
otherwise it would be more and more like ‘chicken ribs’” and “moving away from the 
real life” (Y. Qiu, 2008) 7. Thus, the mass-appeal culture in this category is different 
from the mass culture as the Chinese understanding of an authentic culture. The mass-
appeal here connotes more of a popular culture in the Western notion, which signals the 
opposition between the people/the mass and the cultural authority.  
However, as an editorial in the Party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, stated, in the 
harmony discourse, “intervention” and “guidance” from the mainstream culture to 
Shanzhai is indispensible for Shanzhai to be a healthy mass culture (F. Li & Zhang, 
2008). The government sanctioned, established cultural productions are framed as not 
only comprising authentic mass culture, but also representing it and guiding other sub-
cultures. Another editorial published by the People’s Daily said: 
“in the development, the mainstream culture keeps thriving, and there are also 
some non-mainstream culture emerging… In order to build a harmonious society, 
non-mainstream culture is a necessary complementary to the mainstream culture, 
and the harmonious culture is the mutual tolerance and mutual advancement of the 
two of them” (Xiaoyu Li, 2010).  
 
Then, the Shanzhai culture is said to be “malleable” and “should be checked.” According 
to the harmony discourse, the forces of malleation and the criteria of the check should be 
found and guided by the government sanctioned legitimate culture. 
                                                 
7
 Chicken rib is an allusion from The Romance of Three Kingdoms [Sanguo Yanyi], one of the four classic 
ancient novels in China. It refers to tasteless or meaningful things that people are reluctant to give up or 
throw away. 
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Thus, the harmony discourse in the Party newspapers sees the tastes of established 
cultural productions as legitimate and representative of mass culture, which is authentic 
in the Chinese sense. The rivalry discourse in the metropolitan newspapers sees the taste 
of officially sanctioned culture as opposing the taste of Shanzhai culture. This rivalry not 
only manifests the difference of cultural tastes, but also is actually the struggle of 
cultural power in China. In the media system, the different interpretations will result in 
the appearance or censorship of cultural products of different tastes. Media outlets of 
different natures serve as synopticons. To enter the synopticons, the producers have to 
actively learn and adopt a certain cultural taste in order to catch the “gaze” in the 
panoptic media assemblage and be displayed. For cultural practitioners, they are 
contested disciplines that need to be internalized as cultural capital.  
The category of “Sponsorship” 
The same pattern can be witnessed in the category of sponsorship of Shanzhai 
productions. In both rivalry discourse and harmony discourse, the accounts in the theme 
of evading sponsorship are consistently framed as authentic. When Lao Meng was 
preparing for his Shanzhai Spring Festival gala, there were also other imitators in other 
parts of China organizing their own galas labeled also as the Shanzhai version. Some of 
them, seeing Lao Meng’s increasing cooperation with commercial media and sponsors, 
tried to differentiate themselves and emphasize their freedom from the 
sponsorship/commercial intervention. The producers of a Spring Festival gala organized 
by some netizens in Shenzhen claimed that “all the cost of this 3-hour long pure 
Shanzhai Spring Festival gala was provided by all participants, and the show was 
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absolutely grassroots” (Chen, 2010).  The 20-Yuan budget of the Shanzhai Red 
Mansions and the fact that Han Jiangxue shot and edited his Shanzhai lecture videos 
with his own savings are also mentioned widely in media reports, respectively. It is 
believed that doing Shanzhai with the producers’ own financial ability free of 
commercial involvement is a hallmark of the authenticity of “the people’s” production. 
This fits the Western notion of authenticity perfectly. However, the legitimacy of the 
self-reliance of Shanzhai production is also questioned in some accounts. The fact that 
Lao Meng owed 100 thousand yuan (about $15,000 USD) after emptying his own 
pockets for the first Shanzhai gala was reported in multiple articles. Another Shanzhai 
gala, the Southern Spring Festival gala, was reported to have been aborted for the lack of 
funds to pay for the transportation of performers (Xinxin, 2010).  
However, the theme of cooperation with sponsors in this category is framed in 
different ways, as compromising the authenticity of Shanzhai in the rivalry discourse, or 
as a legitimate method to help Shanzhai develop sustainably without influencing 
Shanzhai’s authenticity in the harmony discourse. For example, in the rivalry discourse, 
the fact that Lao Meng had attracted nearly a million yuan (about 150 thousand USD) 
sponsorship for his second Shanzhai gala made it to the headlines of several reports. One 
of the reports asks “Will Lao Meng’s Spring Festival Gala still be Shanzhai?” (Du, 
2009) The rumor that Lao Meng sold the recorded Shanzhai gala to some websites was 
also reported and tied to Lao Meng’s credibility to represent the spirit of authentic 
Shanzhai. As confirmed in my interview with some journalists of metropolitan 
newspapers who covered Lao Meng, there was increasing suspicion of Lao Meng’s 
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intentions in the later phase of his operation with more and more evidence of 
commercial cooperation with sponsors. 
However, in the harmony discourse, there are quotes of some Shanzhai producers 
framing authenticity and financial viability (legitimacy) as compatible with each other. 
For example, the Huaxi Metropolitan News reported Lao Meng’s plan of introducing a 
commercial model into the Shanzhai Spring Festival in the next year and that he wanted 
to “use commercialization to benefit the common good. In terms of allocation of profit, 
[Lao Meng] will have much say, but will also take netizens and other participants’ 
opinions broadly” ("Laomeng," 2009). The legitimacy of commercializing Shanzhai is 
also backed in Party newspaper editorials. Shanzhai production is repeatedly framed as 
“a niche market to cater to the personalized and diverse demands of netizens” (Xiaoyu 
Li, 2010), and a candidate of “a subject in the market competition” if “it goes beyond 
imitation toward innovations” (F. Li & Zhang, 2008). Thus in the Party newspapers, 
involvement of commercial factors is not at odds with the authenticity of Shanzhai as 
long as it follows the Party’s cultural orientation. 
The category of “Shanzhai’s legal status” 
The next category, the legal status of Shanzhai production, concentrates on the 
relationship between Shanzhai production and government regulations. In the theme of 
“the problematic legal issues of Shanzhai productions” there are accounts raising 
questions about Shanzhai’s legality in terms of government regulations on mass 
assembly, commercial performance, etc. For example, an editorial of the People’s Daily 
said, “‘Shanzhai’ doesn’t have a clear definition. It is usually comprised of novelty and 
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originality, and flashes of inspirations, but it could also include infringement and illegal 
operations” (D. Yang, 2009). Two metropolitan newspapers also pointed out specific 
legal barriers facing Lao Meng’s Shanzhai gala. “If Lao Meng accepts sponsorship and 
advertises for the sponsors during the show, the gala becomes commercial and needs to 
be approved by the government and to pay tax” ("Shanzhai Chunwan," 2008). Another 
paper cited a sponsor that provided accommodation and studios that “if approval is not 
obtained, when the guests exceed the number requiring approval of mass assembly,” 
they would withdraw support (Duan, 2009c). This theme concentrates on the 
problematic legal nature of Shanzhai. Authenticity is not spelled out explicitly in this 
theme. 
The other theme of this category, “efforts of legalizing Shanzhai,” is framed 
differently in the rivalry discourse and in the harmony discourse. In the rivalry discourse, 
Lao Meng’s strategy of substituting the word “folk” for “Shanzhai” in the gala’s name is 
reported as an effort to obtain government approval, which constrains Shanzhai’s 
autonomy. The authenticity of the legally-problematic Shanzhai is reflected in the 
concerns over seeking the government’s approval, or, in other words, over being 
overpowered by the government. For example, the Information Times reported netizens 
reactions to the change of name and that “Lao Meng did this against his will. 
Emotionally, he didn’t want to give up this name. It [Shanzhai] is not his creation, but 
represents many ‘grassroots’ wishes” (Hu, 2010).  
But on the other hand, the harmony discourse also manifests itself in Lao Meng’s 
statements regarding applying for and receiving government approval. Here it is framed 
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as a symbol of legal status rather than a substantial governmental interference of 
Shanzhai production. It is even indicated that the government approval protects the 
Shanzhai gala from the harassment of some government departments, thus guaranteeing 
the producers’ autonomy. As Lao Meng sees it: 
the Shanzhai gala doesn’t have to apply for the certificate of commercial 
performance because it does nothing to do with the commercial. It’s purely self-
entertainment, not selling tickets, not paying for the performers. He described it 
with an example, ‘just like a bunch of people going to Karaoke’. (Hu, 2010) 
 
The reason why Lao Meng decided to apply for the approval of the 2010 Folk Spring 
Festival Gala is “to ‘avoid some people picking a bone,’ and meanwhile ‘to encourage 
himself, and to give confidence to performers and sponsors’.” Thus, the government 
approval is not framed as interference, but a legal guarantee for the producers to carry on 
their authentic production. 
The category of “Shanzhai as an expressive channel” 
Other than reporting on Shanzhai video productions, news articles also discussed 
Shanzhai culture in general, as an independent expressive channel or as a part of the 
mainstream culture. In this category, Shanzhai is either portrayed as an alternative 
channel outside the mainstream, a voice for often-marginalized producers and 
performers, or is portrayed as a part of the mainstream cultural expression which needs 
guidance from the mainstream. Here I will analyze the discursive construction of the 
nature of Shanzhai in general in terms of the dimensions of authenticity and legitimacy. 
The category of Shanzhai as an expressive channel goes beyond the discussion on 
the quality, taste, government approval, or financial viability of particular Shanzhai 
productions and concentrates on the authenticity and legality of Shanzhai culture as an 
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expressive channel in the contemporary Chinese society. Similar to other categories, the 
first theme, Shanzhai as an independent expressive channel for the marginalized people, 
is framed as a hallmark of authentic Shanzhai culture. This is in line with Hall’s (1998) 
argument of seeing popular culture as a cultural politics between the established power 
and the marginalized people. There are some accounts explicitly praising Shanzhai as an 
alternative discourse channel to challenge the “cultural hegemony” ("2008 Shida," 
2008). In other reports, Shanzhai as a channel of expression for some underprivileged 
grassroots people is suggested with stories of their lack of access to express themselves. 
The Information Times reported three examples of grassroots applicants to the second 
Shanzhai gala. Han Zurong, also reported in other articles, is a poor migrant worker. He 
loves music and writes his own songs without even knowing musical scores. He was so 
poor that he owns only one pair of pants, but he bought an MP3 player with all his 
savings. Du Xiaohong is a “Beijing float” (Beipiao)8. He wrote his own song The 
Grassroots and said it represented the aspirations of people like him. Another example is 
an unidentified girl who had spent more than 3 million yuan RMB (about $450,000 
USD) of her parent’s savings to look for all kinds of opportunities to get famous. She 
was reported as “[having] undesirable body shape and only good at the bel canto which 
is too highbrow to be popular.” She was given an opportunity in Lao Meng’s Shanzhai 
gala because “it’s not her fault to look ugly, and she should not be deprived of the rights 
of entertainment” ("Minjian Chunwan," 2010). This girl, though from a family being 
able to afford 3 million Yuan, is not framed as a spoiled kid in a rich family, but a girl 
                                                 
8
 Beipiao refers to the group of migrants living in Beijing with temporary jobs, especially those in the 
media industry waiting for one-or-two-day casting jobs in TV dramas. 
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with a dream but discriminated against by society. The article quoted Lao Meng as 
saying that “like people going to karaoke together, those not good at singing should also 
be allowed to sing.” Thus, the girl’s dream is not framed in terms of getting famous or 
wasting parents’ savings, but as the equal right to pursue her dreams. And Shanzhai 
provides this opportunity for people like them. Another performer that was reported in 
multiple accounts was Xie Pengju who was diagnosed with cervical atrophy and had 
only approximately two years before becoming paralyzed. He is a music teacher in a 
high school with a formal musical education. However, he was not framed as a 
professional, but as a grassroots performer with limited time to realize his love of music. 
In the case of the Shanzhai Lecture, the producer Han Jiangxue was also consistently 
portrayed as a history fan with unique perspectives but repeatedly rejected by the 
establishment for lacking official or professional credentials. In this theme, the stories 
didn’t indicate the quality or tastes of these performances, but concentrated on Shanzhai 
as an alternative channel to help realize their dreams. In this way, the authenticity of 
Shanzhai is presented as a channel outside the mainstream to provide ordinary people an 
opportunity, especially those marginalized in different ways. In this sense, Shanzhai is a 
challenge to the power of cultural monopoly, a typical Western notion of authentic 
popular culture.  
However, the legality of Shanzhai as an alternative voice channel was raised by the 
deputy Minister of Culture (Guo & Fan, 2009). He confirmed the Chinese notion of 
authenticity by saying that “Shanzhai should not set itself opposite of the 
mainstream…Shanzhai is grassroots culture, we don’t have to worry too much. It is fine 
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to self-entertain.” However he continued that “If it [Shanzhai] is organized, being non-
commercial doesn’t mean the public good.” For this official, the leadership of the Party 
guarantees the “public good.” Thus, Shanzhai has to follow the Party’s cultural 
leadership, not stand outside of it as an alternative, to be authentic.  
Thus, in the theme of “incorporating Shanzhai into the mainstream,” the rivalry 
and the harmony discourses diverge on the relationship between the legitimate 
mainstream channels for people’s expression and the Shanzhai culture as the people’s 
expression. The rivalry discourse frames the incorporation as “enlistment for amnesty,” a 
strategy of the dominant to deprive the marginalized of the right of voice. A story is 
widely reported in multiple newspapers that Lao Meng announced the cooperation with 
the Guizhou Television Station’s Satellite Channel. The Huaxi Metropolitan News 
reported this with the title of “Go not for ‘enlistment for amnesty’, but for grassroots to 
the end” ("Buyao zhaoan," 2008). It quoted netizens as saying that:  
When Lao Meng announced a deal with Guizhou Satellite TV on the broadcasting 
of Shanzhai gala, it is like a death certificate issued for the Shanzhai gala…It is 
imaginable, that after being enlisted, the Shanzhai gala will change its face and 
become another victim after reality shows.  
 
Lao Meng also used a rivalry discourse to justify the discontinuation of cooperation 
between the Shanzhai gala and the Guizhou TV Station. Lao Meng, later, announced the 
discontinuation with Guizhou TV station, citing the concerns of losing the grassroots 
nature of Shanzhai. He said that “forced by netizens’ opinions,” he had decided to “keep 
the pure grassroots nature of the Shanzhai gala, and stop the cooperation with the 
Guizhou television station.” He also said that “what’s needed for the Shanzhai gala is 
bravery, and audiences nationwide will know that everybody can make a Spring 
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Festival.” However, in fact the cooperation was suspended by the Guizhou Television 
Station after the SARFT banned radio and TV stations from being involved in the 
Shanzhai gala. This was confirmed in some newspaper accounts, in my interviews with 
Lao Meng, and by a director of Guizhou TV that was involved in this cooperation. 
The harmony discourse in this category concentrates on incorporating Shanzhai as 
a part of the authentic mass culture which provides expressions for the people under the 
Party’s leadership. This discourse insists that it doesn’t hurt Shanzhai’s grassroots 
nature. The deputy Culture Minister said that they “will actively guide it [Shanzhai] and 
provide some platforms” (Guo & Fan, 2009).  An editorial in the People’s Daily said, 
“Shanzhai culture has its own principles of popularity. To construct a contemporary 
harmonious culture, guiding it [Shanzhai] following the principles is more beneficial 
than cracking down on it”. Thus the status of Shanzhai as an authentic culture is 
confirmed with its own principles; also, the legitimacy is guaranteed by being guided to 
become a part of the harmonious culture. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, I will discuss the dimensions of authenticity and legitimacy, as well 
as their relationships as framed in Chinese newspapers. The implication of these findings 
will be discussed in terms of the governance and resistance through contemporary media 
in China. 
First, readers should note that the compatibility or rivalry is between the 
dimensions of authenticity and legitimacy, not between the two themes in each of the 
categories. In fact, the two themes in each category are, for most of the time, set opposite 
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to each other. In the category “Quality of Shanzhai production,” when attempts of 
improving production quality are made, which is the second theme in this category, the 
poor quality, the first theme, will likely be changed. In the category of “Sponsorship in 
Shanzhai Production,” when the Shanzhai gala has obtained government approval, 
which is included in the second theme, the legal problems, the first theme, will go away. 
In fact, the divergence between the rivalry discourse and the harmony discourse lies in 
the dispute about whether the authenticity in Shanzhai culture, usually manifested in the 
first theme such as poor quality, non-mainstream taste, evading sponsorship, etc., will 
diminish when the second theme in each category joins to solve the problems.  
Second, authenticity refers to different notions in different contexts. I have 
reviewed the Western perspective and the Chinese perspective previously. In Western 
literature, the authenticity of cultures concentrates on the issue of struggle for cultural 
autonomy, or the freedom from, mostly commercial, interference. Though there is not an 
ideal authentic culture, the struggle for cultural authenticity, be it the individualist 
aesthetic for the Frankfurt School (Benjamin, 1969; Horkheimer & Adorno, 2004) or the 
popular culture for British Cultural Studies (S. Hall, 1998; Williams, 1985), manifests 
the continuous and historically contextualized cultural politics between “the people” and 
the power bloc. 
The Chinese notion of cultural authenticity is more concerned with the themes or 
content which should be in line with the Party’s view because Marxism assumes that the 
truths have been found, and the Communist Party represents the advanced culture. 
Moreover, because of the propagandistic role of culture in the Communist view, 
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authentic culture is the one that follows the Party’s instruction and educates people with 
the truth. Thus, culture as a form of power struggle is not part of the meaning in the 
Chinese notion.  
The rivalry discourse usually uses the Western notion of authenticity to argue that 
the solutions to the legitimacy problems will result in the diminishing of  authenticity. 
That is, with professional standards, established tastes, commercial sponsorship, 
government approval, and mainstream guidance, the Shanzhai culture will not stand on 
its own but surrender to the powerful. Thus, the notion of authenticity in this discourse is 
the Western one referring to the struggle of the people to resist established cultural 
powers.  
Then, if the Western authenticity refers to being free from “contamination” of the 
legitimating solutions, how can authenticity and legitimacy ever be achieved together in 
any discourse? Here, the existence of the harmony discourse depends on a different 
notion of authenticity from that in the rivalry discourse.  
When it is argued that authenticity and legality are compatible, it is usually the 
Chinese notion of authenticity that is referred to in this discourse. The Chinese notion of 
authenticity is concerned with the content and themes of the culture that belongs to the 
masses, but endorsed, guided, and propagated by the Party. Under the Communist 
cultural theory, because truths are assumed to have been found in Marxism, the 
dominant cultural quality standards, tastes, economic operations, and government 
regulations under the leadership of the Communist Party are authentic. Thus, the 
legitimating conditions themselves, such as the involvement of professional standards, 
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commercial sponsorship or government approval, are just technical and logistical 
improvements to Shanzhai culture, and the legitimacy and authenticity of Shanzhai can 
be achieved simultaneously if only it’s still under the Party’s correct guidance.  
Third, different parties in this debate over Shanzhai utilize the two discourses 
differently and, sometimes, even pragmatically. Mostly, the harmony discourse is seen 
made by cultural regulators and other established cultural authorities, both in the Party 
newspapers and in metropolitan newspapers. For example, there are multiple accounts 
on the deputies of the Political Consultative Conference during the convening period in 
March 2009. The deputies suggested that the government supports “benefit” Shanzhai 
culture (Xia, 2010), or “actively provide guidance and some platform” (Guo & Fan, 
2009). 
However, Shanzhai producers also use this discourse as a discursive strategy for 
survival. Shanzhai producers tend to justify their hiring professionals, their cooperating 
with sponsor and their applying for government approvals with the harmony discourse. 
By acknowledging that Shanzhai culture is consistent with the officially endorsed 
criteria, Shanzhai producers rendered the professional standards, commercial operations, 
and government approvals, or incorporation into mainstream channels as purely 
operational issues which are irrelevant to the nature of Shanzhai culture. By subscribing 
to this harmony discourse, Shanzhai producers, though discursively surrendering to the 
cultural authority, carved out a practical space for their own cultural practices and 
identity construction. Just like Lao Meng said, “Hiring professional directors and 
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soliciting sponsorship is meant to provide a gala of higher quality to the masses…the 
Shanzhai nature will not be lost, and it is still our own gala” (Du, 2009). 
It is noteworthy that in the official harmony discourse, if following the Party line, 
the commercialization of culture is not only endorsed, but also explicitly encouraged. In 
the harmony discourse, the commercialization of Shanzhai culture is suggested as 
improving legitimacy without hurting authenticity. The People’s Daily framed Shanzhai 
as, or encouraged it to be, a competitor in the cultural market catering to a niche market. 
This stance not only reflects the government’s intention to harness the Internet’s 
economic potential as an entertainment medium, but also indicates the pragmatic view 
on culture in general as an economic drive. From a Foucauldian perspective, this 
promotion of market oriented culture actually encourages the neo-liberal 
governmentality in cultural production. It is a way to govern grassroots culture from a 
distance. 
Fourth, other than attending to the discursive devices such as positioning, 
politicization, and legitimation (Carvalho, 2010), the time plane and media plane, 
including the outlets and genres, also reveal the discursive construction of Shanzhai. The 
rivalry discourse mainly appeared in metropolitan newspapers. Many Shanzhai 
producers and performers, netizens, and some scholars are cited in the rivalry discourse. 
In the early months of the Shanzhai cultural phenomenon, mostly in 2008 when the 
Shanzhai Lecture Show, the Shanzhai Red Mansions, the Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala, 
as well as other Shanzhai cultural products went viral, Shanzhai producers and netizens 
were cited predominantly in the rivalry discourse. It is a period of constructing the 
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identity of Shanzhai producers and their products as resistance to the established cultural 
order. 
Most articles in Party papers were also published in this period apparently as a 
counter-discourse to the commercialized metropolitan press. Shanzhai, in Party papers, 
was predominantly constructed in harmony discourse where authentic Shanzhai culture 
can be achieved under the leadership of the Party and the established cultural authorities. 
The Party newspapers were trying to avoid positioning Shanzhai as the opposite, or 
resistance, to the mainstream, officially endorsed culture. Instead, the Party papers tried 
to establish the cultural leadership over the newly-emerging cultural phenomenon to 
offset the rivalry discourse in metropolitan newspapers. This tendency can also be seen 
in other official media such as the most important television news show Xinwen Lianbo, 
and the Xinhua News Agency. They also commented on Shanzhai in this period. This 
official attention provoked netizens’ extensive discussion and reports of the official 
stand in metropolitan newspapers. 
But as time passed, the topic of Shanzhai cooled down, and most productions 
either faded out from public discourse or became commercialized. The preparation of the 
second Shanzhai gala starting in the fall of 2009 became much more commercialized 
than the first one. Regarding this, news reports in metropolitan newspapers turned into a 
combination of rivalry discourse and harmony discourse. In general, the metropolitan 
newspapers, in the later period, adopted a more critical stance toward Shanzhai 
productions. Because of the apparent incorporation of Shanzhai into the dominant 
cultural order, the official attention on this issue faded out with less discussion. There 
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were only four articles published in the Party papers during the preparation of the second 
Shanzhai gala among all 17 archived articles. 
In terms of genres, metropolitan papers mostly carried news reports, while Party 
papers had only one piece of descriptive accounts, and all other articles were editorials. 
The only exception is the overseas edition of the People’s Daily. It is listed as a separate 
Party organ in an official website. However, its genres and discourse constitution 
resemble those of metropolitan papers more than Party papers. This might be due to the 
role of the overseas edition as more of a briefing outlet about China to overseas Chinese 
than the role as propagandist. 
On the construction of Shanzhai producers, metropolitan papers had an evident 
elite bias. They consistently portrayed Shanzhai producers, especially in the early period, 
as humble grassroots producers with little access to established channels of expression. 
The metropolitan papers showed sympathy to these producers by selecting stories like 
Han Jiangxue being repeatedly refused by CCTV, the little girl’s being discriminated 
against for her obesity, Lao Meng’s identity as a migrant worker in Beijing, etc. 
However, these people are far from the most grassroots people in contemporary Chinese 
society. Han Jiangxue is a Beijing resident who can live on his savings earned in the 
stock market in his early years, Lao Meng has his own wedding catering business, and 
the girl spent her parents’ 3 million yuan for performance opportunities. Most of them 
are living better-off lives, are well educated, and have adequate access to ICTs.  The 
elite bias, the same as what Zhao (2008) recorded, is repeated in the discursive 
construction of Shanzhai. 
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All these strategic uses of the discursive devices manifest intertwined struggles for 
cultural powers in contemporary Chinese society, mainly through the media system. 
Under the theoretical framework of governance and resistance through the media 
assemblage, the rivalry and harmony discourses are actually competing for surveillance 
standards in the media assemblage. The two discourses try to define what a normal 
culture is, so that Shanzhai culture can be picked up by the interconnected media 
panopticons according to the sorting standard and be put to public display in media 
synopticons, or otherwise simply censored. For the official cultural authorities, they 
want to use the harmony discourse to propagate their version of authentic culture that 
follows the Party line.  
Thus, the rivalry discourse and the harmony discourse manifest the co-existence of 
multiple, competitive standards in a media assemblage. This argument helps correct a 
pessimistic view of the monolithic, functionalist, and powerful surveillance assemblage 
of media theorized by some scholars (Bogard, 2006; Haggerty & Ericson, 2000). As the 
different discourses of Shanzhai and the different notions of cultural authenticity show, 
there are competing sorting standards, or “norms,” in contemporary Chinese society. 
There are also multiple social constituents other than the people and the state such as 
sponsors, commercial media, and netizens. Their involvement in this discursive 
construction of Shanzhai culture is indeed a battle of cultural politics where the sorting 
standard in the media assemblage is one important focus.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In the previous chapters, I have examined the Shanzhai phenomenon from various 
perspectives. As Su Shi, the great ancient Chinese poet, wrote in the Inscription on the 
wall of the West Woods Temple,  
It is a range viewed in face, and a peak viewed from the side; assuming different 
shapes viewed from far and wide; of mountain Lu we cannot make out the true 
face; for we are lost in the very heart of the place. 
 
To really understand Shanzhai, like grasping the true face of the mountain Lu, we 
need to jump out of the phenomenon and assume a holistic view with the social, 
political, economic, and cultural implications of Shanzhai in sight.  
Thus, in this chapter, based on the arguments I made previously, I will provide a 
discussion on the relationships between Shanzhai practices and the Chinese society: the 
implications of Shanzhai on the governance and resistance in contemporary China. I will 
also discuss potential topics on Shanzhai for further explorations. 
Summary of the Findings 
Shanzhai has become part of the popular vernacular only in recent years, though it 
has a much longer history. The prominence of the Shanzhai phenomenon lies not only in 
the variety of artifacts Shanzhai can refer to, ranging from cell phones to amateur online 
videos, but also in the rich cultural connotations Shanzhai practices and artifacts have. 
The Shanzhai phenomenon exists in those artifacts, but it also exists in grassroots 
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producers’ negotiation with the government, in media coverage, and online posting, as 
well as people’s daily conversations. 
This study is based on the in-depth interviews and analyses of news coverage on 
three famous Shanzhai online videos, the Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala, the Shanzhai 
Lecture Show, and the Shanzhai Red Mansions. The Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala is 
created by Lao Meng and his followers. They attempted to make a grassroots gala, 
imitating CCTV’s gala, for migrant workers who can’t go home during Spring Festival 
holiday. The Shanzhai Lecture Show was made by a young man in Beijing, Han 
Jiangxue. He recommended himself to CCTV’s Lecture Show, and was repeatedly 
rejected for his lack of officially recognized credentials. Then he made a multi-episode 
lecture show following CCTV Lecture Show’s format, and put the video online. The 
video went viral later and Han became a famous grassroots hero. The Shanzhai Red 
Mansions was shot by a family during 2009 Spring Festival. The amateurish but sincere 
performance was applauded by netizens. The family was interviewed by many 
journalists as their videos were shared widely online. All of the three cases are amateur 
imitations of popular television shows in China. They raised netizens enthusiasm to 
participate and to watch them, and they drew extensive media attentions. 
I adopted a Foucauldian framework of surveillance, discipline, and 
governmentality in modern societies because it provides insights into the power 
relationships inherent in the Shanzhai phenomenon. Foucault’s discussions cover various 
modalities of power from panopticism and disciplinary power to the governmentality as 
the control from a distance. Both of the modalities help explain specific choices people 
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who are involved in Shanzhai production, circulation, and regulation made. In addition, 
Foucault’s attentions to the “actions upon actions” in the analysis of power provide an 
important perspective to look at how power is exercised and embedded in the Shanzhai 
phenomenon. Other scholars’ appropriations of Foucauldian theory on power are also 
referred to in my analyses. Synopticon and surveillance assemblages are introduced to 
explicate how power is exercised and resisted through media uses.  
In this framework, Shanzhai is a microcosm comprised of  civil society, ICTs, the 
government, the media of different natures, the regulations, the cultural and professional 
norms, and the discourses, etc. It is through the strategic and tactical uses of various 
media that the power relationships manifest in Shanzhai practices. Thus, Shanzhai can 
be seen as a drop of water which reflects the whole world in it. Nevertheless, it also 
constitutes the ocean of society. 
I adopt this framework in order to argue that the current media system in China 
serves as assemblages of surveillance where panopticons and synoptcons are combined 
to both present and shape the ideas and behaviors of different social groups. In this way, 
people are disciplined by certain rules and governed by certain mentalities in their 
everyday lives. The media system is not only channels of expressions, but also 
technologies of governance. Nonetheless, there is both resistance from the monitored 
subjects in the assemblages and inherent conflicts between the monitoring agencies in 
these assemblages. These forces also transform the surveillance assemblages themselves. 
In other words, the power relationships are dynamic and are undergoing constant 
negotiations. 
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Shanzhai also exists in the unique context that has many inherent conflicts. The 
structure of China’s media system is designed both to indoctrinate people with the 
Party’s ideas and to cater to people’s needs as an industrial sector. There are complicated 
relationships among the government, the official media, the commercial media, as 
manifested in the journalistic values, regulation and censorships, etc. The conflicts of 
power and interest are even more intense on China’s Internet. The constellation of 
China’s Internet consists of the government’s promotion of the Internet, its censorship of 
it, netizens’ consumerist Internet uses, and popular resistance. 
In Chapter 3, I assumed a media ritual perspective to understand how the 
disciplinary power and the power of governmentality are internalized by the people 
through the converging media system. I argue that Shanzhai is actually the ritualistic 
uses of media under the influence of a convergent media environment. The ritualistic 
uses are the ways people are governed by certain disciplines and rationalities. I argue 
that there are two layers of ritualistic uses of media in the Shanzhai cultural production. 
First, the Shanzhai producers saw the shows they imitated as media rituals, or a 
prescribed way to live their everyday lives. People’s shared life experience synchronized 
by reality media genres and their convergence are life rituals that direct people to live 
their real lives in specific ways. The media ritual perspective explains the cultural 
process of internalizing the discipline of our lives, a power exercised on people through 
media. 
The second layer of ritualistic media uses is that all Shanzhai producers “happened 
to” use the Internet as their platform. The discourse constructed around the Internet as a 
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democratic forum is uncritically received as a serious belief, or a media ritual. It is 
perceived as an “equal opportunity” platform without discrimination, or the way for 
ordinary people to express themselves. In this sense, putting the Shanzhai videos on the 
Internet is oriented by the ritualistic belief of the Internet’s social role. A specific 
mentality is internalized that, through an equal-opportunity, free-competition 
marketplace, people can rely on themselves to achieve their life goals. In addition, the 
popularity of these three Shanzhai cases further reinforced this ritualistic perception of 
the Internet, or the mentality to govern people’s lives, and invited further Shanzhai 
production and imitations. 
What’s more, the convergence of various media, from Shanzhai producers’ 
imitating popular TV shows to their putting Shanzhai videos online, to their being 
reported and further imitated, form a totality of everyday experience, though largely 
mediated. The convergent media environment is almost a total institution of everyday 
life as Goffman (1961) argued. Both disciplines, as specific media uses, and a neoliberal 
mentality govern the way people live their lives through media. 
However, the ritualistic view on Shanzhai production seems to be functionalist and 
pessimistic which I tried to counterbalance in Chapter IV. In Chapter IV, I specifically 
categorized the strategies that Shanzhai producers and other parties involved in Shanzhai 
practices used in order to understand the power dynamics of cultural production, 
circulation, and regulation in contemporary Chinese society. 
To analyze the advantages that Shanzhai producers can take of the partially 
commercialized media system and the government’s promotion of the Internet as a 
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commercial public entertainment medium, as well as the disadvantages inherent to 
Shanzhai producers, I used a Bourdieusian framework in Chapter 4. In this framework, 
the different parties in the Shanzhai cultural production, ranging from government 
agencies, commercial sponsors, media of different natures, grassroots netizens, are 
constantly involved in negotiation and exchange, or exclusion from exchange, for social, 
economic, as well as cultural, capitals. In this detailed analysis of what exactly happened 
in the three Shanzhai cases, I tried to correct the pessimistic sentiment under the media 
ritual perspective, and show the leverage and strength of Shanzhai producers’ tactics. 
Indeed, in the intertwining network of power relationships, the weak grassroots Shanzhai 
producers did manage to get their words out to the hundreds of millions of netizens and 
mass media audiences. 
From the Foucauldian perspective, the strategies are really focusing on the 
visibility of Shanzhai producers and their works. Shanzhai producers want to enter the 
media synopticons staged by commercial media. But in order to be picked up in a 
panoptic surveillance assemblage of media, the Shanzhai participants have to constantly 
assume that the media are watching, and take efforts to draw media’s gazes by 
performing in the way commercial media want, such as opting for the professional 
standards. Meanwhile, the state is also monitoring the media, both centralized and user-
generated, to decide which should be confined, or censored, according to their “norm.” 
The combination of panopticons and synopticons are trans-media and rhizomatic, which 
share the captured content in the assemblages but attribute different properties due to 
their different categorizing codes. What is more, evidence showed that Shanzhai’s 
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popularity gained from being staged in the synopticons can serve as leverage to negotiate 
with other monitoring agencies’, in this case government regulator’s, “norms.” 
The interactions of these strategies employed by different parties showed the 
complexity of media uses and power dynamics. On the one hand, strategies like adopting 
professional production standards reflect a neoliberal mentality of market-orientation 
and self-improvement in pursuit of personal life goals through media, a modality of 
governance from a distance. On the other hand, the media surveillance assemblages also 
grant marginalized social groups opportunities of resistance. The more flexible media 
system gives Shanzhai producers more freedom. The lines of flight in the surveillance 
assemblages reflect the “recalcitrance of the will and intransigence of freedom” 
(Foucault, 1982, p. 790) as resistance to the rigid discipline.  
After examining socio-cultural driving forces behind Shanzhai from a media ritual 
perspective, and what has been done in Shanzhai productions, by examining the 
strategies in the network of power, I turned to the discursive side to examine how 
Shanzhai is portrayed in popular media. This is important because it partly shaped the 
perception of Shanzhai for the general public as well as for all other parties. In terms of 
social governance, these discourses manifest the sorting standards in the rhizomatic 
surveillance system either to find model-citizens and put them in synopticons or to find 
deviants and isolate them by confinement. In the real media world, these standards 
decide whether a grassroots performer becomes a celebrity in the mass media or 
censored and blocked. 
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By examining the discursive construction of Shanzhai in metropolitan newspapers 
and Party mouthpiece papers, I found that Shanzhai was framed in two dimensions: 
authenticity and legitimacy. In most of the accounts in the commercial metropolitan 
newspapers, authenticity and legitimacy are constructed as in a rival relationship where 
they cannot be achieved simultaneously. While in the Party mouthpiece newspapers, the 
two dimensions are dominantly portrayed in a harmonious relationship which is 
consistent with the more general official discourse of harmonious society in China. 
Discourse analysis of these newspaper accounts revealed different meanings of 
authenticity. In the rivalry discourse, authenticity refers to a Western notion of 
autonomy, freedom and resistance to the corporate or state power. Thus, in the rivalry 
discourse authentic Shanzhai culture should not be “contaminated” by 
commercialization, professional standards, government guidance, or any external norm. 
In this sense, authenticity and financial, political, and professional legitimacy cannot co-
exist. However, in the harmony discourse, if Shanzhai follows the Party’s guidance and 
the government’s policy regarding cultural production, as well as intellectual property 
laws, Shanzhai culture is both legitimate and authentic socialist popular culture. The two 
discourses are the sorting standards in the media assemblages. They are both the 
disciplines that the commercial media and the state want Shanzhai producers to follow. 
The divergence of discursive constructions on Shanzhai, or the two conflicting 
standards, demonstrated the heterogeneous enunciative dimension in the surveillance 
assemblages. This divergence provides the opportunities for Shanzhai producers to take 
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advantage of as resistance to power. Thus, this complex power relationship provides 
chances of social change through media production, circulation and regulation. 
Implications of This Study 
Having made these arguments with the empirical evidence, I will discuss the 
implications of Shanzhai culture on the Chinese society and our understanding of the 
postmodern media surveillance. 
First, the findings in this research suggest dialectic power relationships in the 
media system in China. When we talk about the Chinese media, especially the popular 
uses of ICTs, we sometimes find ourselves caught between the pillars between optimism 
and pessimism, or between utopia and dystopia. The cases of Shanzhai productions show 
us that the new social, technological and economic conditions, while they crack the older 
system to grant people new autonomy, also subject people to these new conditions. For 
example, the commercialization of the Chinese media system, such as metropolitan 
newspapers and the Internet, provide great opportunities for ordinary people to enter the 
media world, to acquire the once-monopolized media power, they also prescribe the 
forms of media uses, culturally, and access to them, economically. The media rituals are 
people’s serious cultural beliefs manifested in and contributive to these media uses. 
While people are given chances to actually produce media content, they have to 
negotiate with new agencies such as commercial media and sponsors for access and 
publicity. In addition to the state’s cultural norms, they have to learn the new cultural 
capital of commercial media, and compete for attention under a neoliberal logic. 
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Second, as a socio-cultural phenomenon closely connected to the media system, 
the cases of Shanzhai also attest to the truism of the rhizomatic assemblages of 
surveillance. In the past, when the surveillance system was more centralized and 
monopolized, the sorting standard tended to be monolithic. For ordinary people, while 
there’s less chance to be picked up by the surveillance system and become famous, in 
the sense of either a celebrity or a deviant, there’s also less chance to be censored. 
However, the rhizomatic assemblages decentralized the surveillance system. In this 
process, as evidenced in the commercialization and professionalization of China’s 
media, there are increasingly conflicting sorting standards in the rhizome. Thus, there’s a 
better chance for traditionally non-mainstream subjects to be picked up and staged in 
media synopticons. In the meantime, because of the easy sharing of surveillance data, 
these “media persons” hailed under one norm are also likely to be seen as deviant by 
other norms.  
Third, other than the previous empirical contributions to the understanding of 
China’s media system, this research also makes conceptual contribution to the social 
surveillance as a disciplinary power in the postmodern conditions. The cases of Shanzhai 
showed the tension between different sorting standards existing in the media 
assemblages. Mathiesen’s theorization (1997) of the combination of synopticon and 
panopticon and Haggerty and Ericson’s theorization (2000) of a powerful and pervasive 
inter-connected surveillance system are rather pessimistic and concentrate on the totality 
of surveillance and oppression. In fact, there could be multiple norms in one surveillance 
assemblage. The disagreement between different sorting standards could potentially 
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benefit the traditionally marginalized groups to gain expression. Nonetheless, those 
groups also have to subject to the alternative standards as disciplines. 
However, I also want to raise the caveat that the different sorting standards are 
negotiating with each other and are not necessarily equally powerful. As in the case of 
censoring the Shanzhai gala, the commercial televisions finally had to drop their plan of 
co-production with Lao Meng, commercial video sharing websites had to delete 
“Shanzhai Chunwan” in video titles, and Lao Meng had to change the name to the 
“Folk” Spring Festival Gala to get the approval of commercial performances from the 
government. In this sense, the power of different norms, or the machines to announce 
“truth,” is different. 
Fourth, the explication of the strategies used in the Shanzhai practices adds to our 
understanding of popular resistance through media. We have been talking about the 
textual poaching (Jenkins, 1992) and tactics of making-do (De Certeau, 2002) in cultural 
studies as symbolic resistance to the power bloc. The power of “decoding” is an 
important part of popular resistance ranging from interpreting and parodying to posting 
and sharing. However, the study of Shanzhai actually shows the political economic 
struggles in which the weak gained some material favor. For example, Lao Meng used 
the presence of the Macau-based television station to leverage commercial sponsors and 
government regulators for his benefits. In these negotiations, the power of the weak not 
only gives them idealistic autonomy, but also the material resource and contributed to 
their strength in power relationships. 
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Lastly, this research assumes a holistic view on the Shanzhai participants and the 
media environment. This view helps us understand the nature of cultural phenomenon in 
the environment of media saturation like ours. On the one hand, just like the transition 
that the fandom studies identified from concentrating on devoted fans to the relatively 
loosely involved people, from an extraordinary activity to everyday life (Gray, 
Sandvoss, & Harrington, 2007), studies of media phenomena like Shanzhai should 
attend to the emotionally-uninvolved netizens or mass media audiences. A media 
phenomenon should be seen as a synergized, though not deliberated directed by 
anybody, social process under certain social conditions. On the other hand, it is the 
convergence of multiple media and the trans-platform circulation that usually gives rise 
to a society-wide sensation like Shanzhai. We can neither see Shanzhai as a new-media 
phenomenon or the work of a specific group of people, or social stratum. The 
combination of panopticons and synopticons, and the rhizomatic assemblages sharing 
social surveillance, should not be theorized separately.  
In addition to the previous implications, I would also provide a few critical points 
of this study as well as suggestions for exploration of Shanzhai or, more broadly, other 
forms of participatory cultural phenomena. First, this study is based on the data I 
collected between early 2008 and the summer of 2010. However, while I was working 
on these data, the Shanzhai cultural phenomenon has kept changing. On the one hand, 
Lao Meng had produced the third, a fully commercialized, Spring Festival gala. This 
time, not only it is not labeled Shanzhai, but actually titled with the sponsor’s brand. 
Meanwhile, Han Jiangxue and Chen Weishi haven’t provided any new Shanzhai work. I 
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would be reluctant to say it is the demise of Shanzhai, but I think further exploration 
should examine and explain the current trend of Shanzhai productions. 
Second, I understand Shanzhai as a microcosm of the governance and resistance of 
everyday life in contemporary Chinese society. However, I must raise the issue of the 
digital divide in China which is not theoretically explored in this study. The Shanzhai 
producers are marginalized in terms of their access to institutional expression channels. 
However, they, as well as the producers of some later Shanzhai works as far as I know, 
are still mostly urban, male, and quite well educated. Though somewhat marginalized in 
urban settings, they are still quite privileged in the general population of China. They not 
only have Internet access, mostly broadband, but have the computer skills to “digitize” 
their cultural expressions. In fact, it is the mass media that heavily highlighted their 
“grassroots” identity and made a case of people’s resistance to the powerful bloc in 
China. This is quite evident in the rivalry discourse of metropolitan newspapers in 
Shanzhai coverage. The economic, educational, and gender divide is not fully explored 
in this study. They could be topics of further explorations on Shanzhai, as well as other 
participatory media uses in China. 
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APPENDIX A 
REFLECTION ON RESEARCH METHOD AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
Case Selection and Interviewee Sampling: 
In this study, I concentrated on three Shanzhai cases: the Shanzhai Spring 
Festival Gala, the Shanzhai Red Mansions, and the Shanzhai Lecture Show. I discussed 
the reasons for choosing them for detailed case studies in the background chapter. To 
recap my rationale, first, in these three cases, both the producers and the videos they 
produced are the most famous in terms of the circulation of their videos and the media 
coverage they received. Second, because of the public recognition, they also invited 
media participation in the production, in addition to news coverage, commercial 
sponsorship, as well as government intervention. These full-fledged cases showed how 
the power dynamics among different parties were played out. Third, these cases, because 
of their popularity, also invited further imitations of them. Thus, these further imitations 
and the cases themselves as imitations of the original television shows repeated the 
cultural logic behind Shanzhai practices and provided further evidence for my 
arguments. 
I decided to employ in-depth interviews to examine these Shanzhai cases because 
“every word that people use in telling their stories is a microcosm of their 
consciousness” (Seidman, 2006, p. 7). According to Seidman, through well-designed 
interviews, researchers can access the context of people’s behavior which explains the 
symbolic significance of that behavior. This is my goal to recover my interviewees’ life 
experiences in order to understand what Shanzhai means to them. 
To prepare for my research design, I started with reviewing multiple types of 
documents on Shanzhai (Thøgersen, 2006), including the news reports on these Shanzhai 
cases and those on Shanzhai cell phones and the Shanzhai phenomenon, government 
regulations on online video production and circulations and on commercial cultural 
activities, popular Shanzhai videos and viewers’ comments, online forum discussions, 
etc. These written materials provided me an important understanding of Shanzhai as well 
as the broader context of cultural production in China. Many of my interview questions 
actually emerged from these materials. However, I was also always cautious about that 
my perspectives could be potentially framed by these materials, and I kept my mind 
open in my actual interviews and asked more open-ended questions that allowed for less-
structured conversations. 
I applied for the IRB review in April 2010. My interview questions, 
confidentiality protocols, informed consent procedures were approved in May. However, 
as I will elaborate later, the Western-based research procedures and protocols didn’t 
apply to the Chinese context and sometimes were even counter-productive. 
To target the important parties involved in Shanzhai cultural production, 
circulation, and regulation, I decided to start my interviews with the Shanzhai producers 
and media workers who directly dealt with any or multiple Shanzhai cases, government 
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officials whose departments intervened in Shanzhai cultural production in any way, and 
commercial sponsors of Shanzhai productions. Because of my personal connections with 
the news media in China, it was not hard for me to obtain access to journalists that 
covered these Shanzhai cases. Through the journalists, snowball sampling was used to 
get access to Shanzhai producers, video sharing websites, and producers of the television 
shows that Shanzhai videos imitated. Then through the Shanzhai producers, I also 
accessed more journalists, commercial sponsors, and other participants in these Shanzhai 
productions. 
The access to an official of the State Administration of Radio Film and 
Television (SARFT) (Informant No. 1) was noteworthy because of the role “guanxi,” or 
the connection, played in my negotiation for access. Western scholars have recognized 
the importance and discussed the cultural meanings of “guanxi” quite abundantly. Most 
of the time, good and close guanxi with the subject, or subjects’ employers, is seen as a 
necessary and sufficient condition to get research access, even though the concept of 
guanxi itself is constantly changing within Chinese society (M.-h. M. Yang, 2002). Kriz 
and colleagues (Kriz, McSwiney, Purchase, & Ward, n.d.) even equated good guanxi 
with “xinren,” or trust, in the research process. However, my experience of interviewing 
the SARFT official taught me that a good guanxi with the interviewee is far from valid 
information. 
Initially, my father, who has been working for the SARFT his entire career, 
arranged a visit to one of the top officials of the SARFT’s Propaganda Management 
Department (formerly the Chief Editing Office of SARFT) for me. This department is in 
charge of “drafting policies and plans of propaganda, and implement them on radio and 
television”, “monitoring propaganda and the broadcasting of radio and television, and 
dealing with major cases of violation of propaganda policies or propaganda 
orientations,” etc. (SARFT.gov.cn, 2008). I was sure that this official knew about the 
banning of Lao Meng’s Shanzhai gala because Lao Meng, newspaper journalists, and the 
producer of Guizhou Television Station all confirmed the issuance of this prohibition by 
this department. I expected him to talk a little about it, even not in detail for 
confidentiality concerns, because my father was an acquaintance of his for years. 
However, upon my visit introduced by my father, he immediately denied this banning 
decision and referred me to a subordinate of his whom he said was in charge of specific 
issues. The referee, though much younger than my father, also knows my father, and has 
the same official rank as my father. He accepted my interview and my father left right 
after introducing me. We talked for more than two hours during which he constantly 
digressed from my questions and apparently dodged sensitive issues. I couldn’t call this 
interview a successful one since I barely got the information I wanted. 
Other than the issues of my position as the interviewer vis-à-vis him as a high-
ranking government official and the possibly counter-productive role of my consent 
information which I will discuss later, I attribute this failure partly to my naïve 
understanding of guanxi. I realized that acquaintance between the departmental official 
and my father didn’t guarantee the trust (xinren) between them, let alone the trust 
between the official and me. The departmental official’s agreeing to see me is more a 
result of “face” than willingness to talk. My father’s guanxi with him simply made him 
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obliged to give “face” to my father, an acquaintance for years in the SARFT. The 
referred subordinate official probably also accepted my interview because of the 
facework for my father and his superior’s reference as a task. Cynically, I even suspect 
that the department official informed the referee on the boundary of the answers during 
the few minutes my father and I went to the referee’s office on another floor. As an 
official with a higher rank than my father, the department official probably didn’t trust 
either my father or me enough to open his heart. Thus, an optimistic understanding of 
guanxi as trust (Kriz, et al., n.d.) seems to be very naïve. Of course, there are also many 
other factors playing a role, such as the hierarchy between the interviewee and my father 
and I, or the tactics of obtaining informed consent. 
Since trustworthiness is linked to validity in interviews (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), 
I had been critical of the answers of this government interviewee and tried to triangulate 
this interview (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002) with information from different sources, 
especially that from the producer of the Guizhou TV Station and a former producer of 
CCTV’s Lecture Show who are closer to the government administration. 
Meanwhile, the subordinate officer answered my questions in a very official and 
diplomatic manner, in the ganbunese, or cadres’ language. Thøgersen (2006) contrasted 
the ganbunese as the official’s language and the  baixingese as the ordinary people’s 
language. They are two language systems in China (Q. Li, 2000). The ganbunese is 
dominantly used in official documents, newspapers, and official speeches. “It is closely 
tied to the construction of the party-state and by using ganbuaese one signals 
identification with the state, or at least demonstrates one’s knowledge and mastery of the 
state’s rules” (Thøgersen, 2006, p. 112). I triangulated the official stance to Shanzhai 
manifested in their language uses with the Party mouthpiece newspapers I examined in 
Chapter 5. It helped my research in this way more than as I expected in the research 
design. 
Subject Position and Positionality 
During my interviews, I deeply felt the fluidness of my interviewees’ perception 
of my identity as an insider or an outsider. It greatly influenced the subsequent outcome 
of our talks. This prompts me to reflect on my lack of recognition of the complexity of 
my position in my fieldwork from the beginning of my research design. 
Chacko (2004) refers “positionality” to “aspects of identity in terms of race, 
class, gender, caste, sexuality and other attributes that are markers of relational positions 
in society, rather than intrinsic qualities” (p. 52, original emphasis). There are power 
relations implicated in the positionality as a result of people’s identities which might 
vary as perceived in different social situations (C. Katz, 1994). These identities as an 
insider or an outsider are fluid; thus, scholars often find themselves positioned 
differently in different research contexts which is a result of what Entrikin (1991) calls 
“in-between,” This in-between position implies a middle-ground of epistemology 
between totality, or “the objective pole of scientific theorising” and contextuality, or “the 
subjective pole of empathy and understanding” (p. 113). Scholars have called for self-
reflexivity to cope with the subject positions of researchers, however, which itself may 
become a privilege of scholars’ power to construct knowledge (McDowell, 1992; G. 
Rose, 1997). 
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The subject positions that I experienced in doing fieldwork, mainly in-depth 
interviews, echo the situations other scholars have faced (Mohammad, 2001; Sӕther, 
2006). I grew up in China and am native to the culture that I study. I am from a middle 
class family in Beijing and am quite privileged among the whole population in China. I 
am male, well-educated, and I had worked in a quite well-known university in China. I 
communicate in our shared native language with my interviewees. Meanwhile, I am also 
studying in a foreign university in a developed country in my early thirties. All these 
factors intertwine together to give me both advantages and disadvantages 
simultaneously, both in terms of accessing my research resources and of theorizing the 
data I collected. However, I was not aware of the complexity and mostly took my 
position as a cultural insider for granted until I stepped into the research field. 
On some occasions, my “outsiderness” as a student bathing in foreign literatures 
and perspectives/ideologies, as perceived by my interviewees, resulted in both welcome 
and suspicion. For example, Lao Meng and Han Jiangxue, as well as other performers in 
the Shanzhai gala, were very happy when I first contacted them and introduced my 
background and intention. Some of them even explicitly expressed their feeling of being 
flattered for being recognized and approached by a scholar from a foreign country. 
However, the SARFT officials were not as friendly. As I discussed in the previous 
section, even though I gained access to them, their agreeing to see me is more of giving 
face to my reference than willingness to talk to me. Because of the lack of personal 
contact, or a good guanxi, with the Law Enforcement of Culture of Beijing, upon calling 
their staff’s office and introducing myself, I was immediately turned down because I was 
“working for a foreign institution.” 
Among these rejections and suspicions, one episode is especially interesting. 
When I visited a former producer of the CCTV lecture show (Informant No. 10), I 
introduced myself and my research, as well as all the information required by the IRB 
protocols. Especially I emphasized the fact that I went to and was a lecturer of the 
Communication University of China (CUC) where he and many employees in CCTV 
went for college. Learning from the lesson of a too formal informed-consent procedure, I 
intended to draw his attention to our common background of college and toned down my 
foreign background. I just told him that I was at that time pursuing my Ph.D. degree at 
Texas A&M University. However, for some reason, he thought my interview was for a 
research project of the CUC. During the early stage of my interview, he answered all my 
questions in a quite “ganbunese” manner and repeatedly referred to articles that he 
published in different official outlets during the years when he was working on the 
lecture show. As I tossed more questions to him, he almost lost patience and told me to 
read those articles. He said “it is all there, everything you want.” Then he started asking 
me why I was doing this research and asking these questions. I explained my research 
interest and my understanding of the significance of this study, and he suddenly said 
“well, now I got it. If you are doing this for the foreign university, then that makes sense. 
Foreigners like studying this.” On the one hand, I felt embarrassed for not making my 
background clear, and on the other hand, I felt happy for his finally understanding me, 
recognizing my research, and, more importantly, starting to open up to me. Soon after, 
we started to talk about the survival strategies to balance official propaganda discipline 
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and appeals to audiences. He said “I know what to do, but I never let others see that I 
know it.” To his colleagues and in the articles he wrote, he frames the success of the 
lecture show as a result of following the themes and approaches called for by the Party. 
However, as he admitted, he recognizes the power of urban elite viewers in China who 
he was trying to mobilize in another show he was working on at the time of my 
interview. He believes that is the real strength of the lecture show. At that moment, I felt 
that I had established a rapport with him and gained his trust, partly as a result of my 
outsider position perceived by him. Our talk lasted almost three hours, and I felt I gained 
insights more than I had ever imagined. 
My talk with that SARFT official is apparently also a result of my complex 
identity as a foreign scholar, a native Chinese, a young man without any institutional 
power, and the son of an acquaintance whose official rank is no higher than my 
interviewee. Again, I had to admit that my formal briefing of my research and the 
interview probably highlighted my identity as an outsider as perceived by that 
government official. His use of the “ganbunese,” his educational and patronizing tones, 
and constant digression were probably results of him seeing me as simultaneously a 
cultural insider who should be fine to take his patriarchal manner because of the high 
power-distance culture of China and an organizational outsider to whom he should only 
say safe things. 
However, even though some of the interviews didn’t yield my intended 
information, or didn’t even happen, they nonetheless strongly signal the official 
discourse, attitudes, and orientations, as well as how the power relationships are 
performed on the visible surface. As Kevin O’Brien (2006) reflected about his research 
experience in China, it is sometimes productive to allow talks with economic, social, and 
political elites be less structured. On the one hand, high-level interviewees usually find it 
confining and insulting to be led around by the nose, and on the other hand, their 
spontaneous talks can often lead to unintended insights and answer questions that 
researchers didn’t even think of asking. Of course, when interpreting these 
conversations, I made sure to take the subject positions into consideration. Meanwhile, 
to avoid ego-centric reflection on my positionality (G. Rose, 1997), I also tried to 
triangulate these interviews with other interviews and newspaper discourses. 
Informed Consent and Chinese Culture 
Acquiring informed consent is an important part of the protocols and procedures 
for studies of human subjects. The Belmont Report suggests that the research subject, “to 
the degree they are capable, be given the opportunity to choose what shall or shall not 
happen to them” (1979). An informed consent should be based on information, 
comprehension, and voluntariness. In my research design, I included the topic, 
significance of my research, uses and archiving of the interview data, confidentiality, 
voluntariness, and contact of the IRB of Texas A&M University. I prepared copies of 
consent forms for my participants to sign after I got through the information and 
answering their questions. 
However, this standard procedure actually invited unexpected reluctance and 
even resentment to my study. There have been scholarly discussions on defects of cross-
cultural operation of informed consent (Adams et al., 2007; Hyder & Wali, 2006), but 
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most of them are in clinical studies. The backfire that I experienced is a result of my 
failure to consider the Chinese cultural norm, and uncritical and dogmatic adherence to 
the research procedures originated in another culture. Before entering the field, I was 
actually quite satisfied with my consideration of my research subjects’ well-being, 
especially the potential risks of job security of some of them. I carefully planned the 
methods of data archiving and thought through ways to conceal their identities and the 
potential identifiers of them. I candidly disclosed these measures and potential risks in 
the consent form and rehearsed oral informing. This candidness was welcomed by all 
Shanzhai producers and performers, most of their commercial sponsors, and most 
journalists. Because I have to reveal the identities of the Shanzhai producers and some 
performers since they are already public figures and their works are famous, I informed 
them regarding this issue and the potential risks. Many of them appreciated my 
consideration and the measures to protect them. Journalists and commercial sponsors I 
interviewed agreed with my procedures, and some of them asked me not to mention 
some specific details. However, the official of the Propaganda Management Department 
of SARFT explicitly expressed his concern regarding signing the consent form. 
Although he referred me to his subordinate, he repeatedly suggested that it would be a 
“casual talk,” and “he [the subordinate] probably doesn’t know what you want.” In the 
interview with the subordinate, I decided not to ask him to sign the form, but fully 
inform him in detail, though in a very casual and conversational tone. I got his oral 
consent which I do not have any record of because I thought he wouldn’t talk if I had 
audio-recorded it. 
This incident teaches me that even if I had good intentions to protect and inform 
my research subjects, cultural norms have to be carefully taken into consideration. As 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) argued, in qualitative research, we should substitute 
trustworthiness for validity because it provides the basis of rapport which is the basis of 
valid information. However, the trust, in China, is more based on personal connections 
(M.-h. M. Yang, 2002) than a signed contract as in the West. Presenting a contract could 
ruin the personal rapport that is based on personal guanxi and face. Of course, as I 
described in the previous part, guanxi itself is not sufficient for trust; however, it is 
necessary. By following the IRB procedures adamantly, I was actually being Western-
centric holding and imposing an alien “ethic” protocol. The good will and care for 
research subjects is necessary; however, the implementation of IRB procedures has to be 
situated and negotiated. 
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APPENDIX B 
THE LIST OF INFORMANTS 
 
Only the names of the following informants, if they agreed to reveal their 
identity, appear according to the Chinese convention where the family name goes first. 
All other names in this dissertation follow the Western convention where the first name 
goes first, including the name of some Chinese scholars cited. 
Informant No.1: An official of the Propaganda Management Department at 
SARFT. The interview was conducted on June 5, 2010 in person. 
Informant No.2: A manager of a public relation company based in Shanghai. 
His company is contracted to handle the public relations for a prestigious domestic food 
company which provided sponsorship for Lao Meng’s second Shanzhai Spring Festival 
Gala. The interview was conducted on May 27, 2010 via telephone. 
Informant No.3: A marketing manager of a leading video sharing website based 
in Beijing. He is one of the decision makers to track Lao Meng’s Shanzhai Spring 
Festival Gala and to decide to host the videos of the second gala in 2010. The interview 
was conducted on June 1, 2010 in person. 
Informant No.4: A journalist of a leading metropolitan newspaper in Beijing. 
She had tracked Lao Meng’s Shanzhai gala for two consecutive years.  The interview 
was conducted on June 6, 2010 in person. 
Informant No.5: A content manager of a leading video sharing website. His 
website invited Han Jiangxue to shoot the lecture on Napoleon after Han got famous. 
This manager has an education background on television production. He involved in 
training Han on presentation skills, also in the actual shooting, editing of the video. The 
interview was conducted on June 1, 2010 in person. 
Informant No. 6: Wang Yanan. She agreed to use her real name in this study. 
She had studied performance and singing in various art schools in different parts of 
China. By the time I interviewed her, she was a freelancing performer in Beijing, what I 
called “beipiao” (the Beijing floating). She participated in the second Shanzhai gala and 
her song was well liked. The interview was conducted on May 26, 2010 in person. 
Informant No. 7: Shanpao. This is his nickname which he agreed to use in this 
study. He is a Beipiao too. By the time I interviewed him, he had been in Beijing for four 
years and mainly lived on figurant jobs in television drama and movies. He participated 
in Lao Meng’s second Shanzhai gala. The interview was conducted on May 31, 2010 in 
person. 
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Informant No. 8: Xie Pengju. This is his real name which he agreed to use in 
this study. His college degree is in music. He taught music in middle school for two 
years before he moved to Beijing to prepare for the graduate entrance exam. At the time 
I interviewed him, he worked part-time at a restaurant playing Chinese musical 
instruments and singing. He attended the second Shanzhai gala. The interview was 
conducted on May 31, 2010 in person. 
Informant No. 9: A journalist in another metropolitan newspaper in Beijing 
which is one competitor of the newspaper Informant No.4 worked for. She covered Lao 
Meng’s Shanzhai gala as well as other Shanzhai sensations for two years. The interview 
was conducted on May 30, 2010 via telephone. 
Informant No. 10: The CCTV producer who worked on the Lecture Show that 
Han Jiangxue imitated. By the time I interviewed him, he had moved to another show 
and assumed more administrative work in that channel. This interview was conducted on 
June 11 2010 in person. 
Informant No. 11: Chen Weishi’s sister. She didn’t give me her real name even 
though she’s widely famous in news coverage and the Shanzhai Red Mansions videos. 
She is in high school in Luzhou city, Sichuan province. The interview was conducted on 
June 15, 2010 via telephone. 
Informant No. 12: Lao Meng. Lao Meng is the casual way people call Shi 
Mengqi. He agreed to use both Shi Mengqi and Lao Meng in my study. He moved from 
Wanzhou city, Sichuan province in 2005 and worked as a wedding cameraman. He later 
started his own business doing wedding recording and wedding host/hostess training. He 
initiated and led the two Shanzhai Spring Festival Gala. I conducted two interviews in 
person with him on May 28 and June 20, 2010. 
Informant No. 13: Han Jiangxue, the producer of the Shanzhai Lecture Show. 
He agreed to use his real name in this study. I interviewed him twice in person on May 
31 and June 16, 2010. 
Informant No. 14: A producer from the satellite channel of Guizhou television 
station. He personally involved in the cooperation with the planning of coproduction of 
the first Shanzhai gala which was later banned by SARFT. The interview was conducted 
through June 7, 2010 via telephone. 
Informant No. 15: A television director of Phoenix TV. She produced one 
episode of a talk show in which Shanzhai was discussed. Lao Meng, Han Jiangxue, as 
well as some intellectuals were invited to discuss Shanzhai culture. The interview was 
conducted on June 12, 2010 in person. 
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APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL I (WITH SHANZHAI PRODUCERS) 
 
Preview: 
 
 (I will introduce myself here first) 
Thank you for agreeing to assist me in understanding the experiences and 
meanings of Shanzhai production of online video in the Internet in China. The purpose 
of this interview is to explore how you think about Shanzhai and what you have done in 
the process of Shanzhai video production and circulation. The information you share will 
be used in a study of the relationships among all the players in the Shanzhai 
phenomenon as revealed in the dialogues of meanings and interactions in the actions. 
You are selected because your Shanzhai videos have been widely circulated online, and 
you have received much attention from online viewers, news press, sponsors, 
government administrators, etc. 
 
Procedures:  
 
Please note that your identity will be revealed in this research. Readers will be able 
to identify you according to the description of your identity or that of your video 
products. Meanwhile, some of your statements in the interview will appear in the 
research as direct quotes or paraphrases, and some of them will be linked to you. You 
may refuse to answer any question at any time without explanation. Your experiences 
and insights are important, and I appreciate your willingness to share them. Our 
conversation will last one to one and a half hour. I would like to audio-record our 
conversation, so that I can recall what you've said with accuracy, and so I can 
concentrate on listening to you without needing to take notes. Later, this recording of our 
conversation will be transcribed into writing for my analysis. Is this okay with you? (If 
not, I will not record and instead jot notes in between the conversation, while paying 
close attention to the interviewee, then write in much detail when the interview is over). 
Do you have any questions before we begin? 
 
Questions: 
 
1.) Could you describe your personal background, including education, hobbies, 
family, career, etc. 
 
2.) Can you describe your opinions about popular culture and Internet uses? 
Possible probe questions: 
o How do you like online videos sharing? 
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o What kind of popular cultural products do you consume or are you a fan 
of? 
o What gives you the ability to make online videos (education, job training, 
self-taught)? 
  
3.)  Please describe the whole process of your video production, from the motivation 
of the idea, to the actually production, to gaining popularity, getting intervened, 
and sponsored, and so on. 
Possible probe questions: 
o I will ask for details about what exactly happened when necessary. 
o What are the struggles you felt and the tactics you took in face of 
government intervention, commercial sponsoring, news reports, etc. 
o What compromises did you made when you dealt with other parties in the 
whole process? 
o What and how did you purposefully violate other parties’ expectorations 
or requirements? Why? 
o What do you think you would do if you were not reported by news 
presses, or intervened by the governmental administrators, or provided 
sponsorship? 
 
4.）What does Shanzhai production mean to you, and have it changed in the process, 
and how? 
Possible probe questions: 
o How does the whole process influence how you understand yourself and 
Shanzhai? 
o How do you understand the other parties’ reactions to you?  
o How did other parties’ actions and attitudes changed to you and your 
video? 
o Are there moments when you feel your understanding of Shanzhai 
conflicts with others’, and how? 
o When do you feel weak and when do you feel empowered? 
o How do you think about other Shanzhai products, including Shanzhai cell 
phones, other forms of Shanzhai products, and other Shanzhai producers? 
o What do you think Shanzhai means to China, to the government, to the 
online viewers, and to commercial sponsors, etc.? 
o What is your future plan as a famous Shanzhai video producers, and 
ultimate goal? 
 
5.） Is there any additional information that you’d like to share that we did not 
already discuss in this interview? 
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Closing:  
 
Our interview is now over. I appreciate your willingness to participate in my 
research project and speak with me about your insights on this particular topic. Your 
personal perspective is important to me in reaching a better understanding about 
Shanzhai as a cultural phenomenon in China. I will send you the drafts of my research 
that contains references of or quotes from you, and we can discuss the uses of those data. 
If you have any questions regarding my research, please feel free to contact me. My 
contact information is listed on the consent form you have. Thanks again for your 
valuable insights! Have a nice day.   
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APPENDIX D 
 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL II (WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, WEBSITE 
ADMINISTRATORS, COMMERCIAL SPONSORS, TELEVISION STATIONS, 
METROPOLITAN NEWSPAPER JOURNALISTS, etc.) 
 
Preview:  
 
(I will introduce myself here first) 
Thank you for agreeing to assist me in understanding the experiences and 
meanings you have regarding Shanzhai production of online video in the Internet in 
China. The purpose of this interview is to explore how people understand and what 
people do in the process of Shanzhai video production and circulation. The information 
you share will be used in a study of the relationships among all the players in the 
Shanzhai phenomenon as revealed in the dialogues of meanings and interactions in the 
activities. You are selected because you involved in the actions taken by the organization 
you affiliated to in the process of Shanzhai production and circulation. 
 
Procedures:  
 
Please note that your identity will not be revealed in this research. However, readers will 
be able to identify the organization that you work for. Meanwhile, some of your 
statements in the interview will appear in the research as direct quotes or paraphrases, 
but none of them will be linked to you. You may also refuse to answer any question at 
any time without explanation. Your experiences and insights are important, and I 
appreciate your willingness to share them. Our conversation will last one to one and a 
half hour. I would like to audio-record our conversation, so that I can recall what you've 
said with accuracy, and so I can concentrate on listening to you without needing to take 
notes. Later, this recording of our conversation will be transcribed into writing for my 
analysis. Is this okay with you? (If not, I will not record and instead jot notes in between 
the conversation, while paying close attention to the interviewee, then write in much 
detail when the interview is over). Do you have any questions before we begin? 
 
Questions: 
 
1.) Could you describe the general decision-making process in your organization? 
Possible probe questions: 
• Who propose an idea and where does the ideal usually come from? 
• Is there usually debate involved in the decision-making process and how 
is it decided, and by whom? 
• Based on what consideration, are the decisions usually made? 
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2.) Please describe the whole story of the decisions made and actions taken by your 
organization in the case of Shanzhai video production. 
       Possible probe questions: 
• Who proposed this idea and how did Shanzhai draw your attention? 
• Is there any debate on different opinions or alternative plans in the 
decision-making process? 
• Based on what consideration, is this specific decision made? 
• What is the purpose of this decision? 
• Was the plan changed/compromised in the process of implementation in 
face of other forces (such as government intervention, news coverage, 
sponsorship, etc.) 
• What were the reactions from other parties toward your decision and 
actions, such as viewers, journalists, sponsors, government 
administrations, etc? 
• What is the biggest difficulty in the implementation of your plan? 
 
3.) What does Shanzhai production mean to you and your organization, and have it 
changed in the process, and how? 
Possible probe questions: 
• What stance does your organization take toward Shanzhai online video? 
• Is your organization aware of other parties’ opinions, and were they taken 
into account in the decision-making process?  
• Were there moments when your organization feels weak or empowered? 
• What do you think Shanzhai means to China, to the government, to the 
online viewers, and to commercial sponsors, etc.? 
• What is your organization’s plan to similar Shanzhai products in the 
future, and ultimate goal? 
 
4.)  Is there any additional information that you’d like to share that we did not already 
discuss in this interview? 
 
Closing:  
 
Our interview is now over. I appreciate your willingness to participate in my 
research project and speak with me about your insights on this particular topic. Your 
personal perspective is important to me in reaching a better understanding about 
Shanzhai as a cultural phenomenon in China. I will send you the drafts of my research 
that contains references of or quotes from you, and we can discuss the uses of those data. 
If you have any questions regarding my research, please feel free to contact me. My 
contact information is listed on the consent form you have. Thanks again for your 
valuable insights! Have a nice day.   
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